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investor-owned firm. Besides, higher the quality payment, more farmers are attracted by the investor-
owned firm, and it has an impact on the market structure. Last, this dissertation provides evidence from 
China for a better understanding of the different evaluations between CEOs and members, therefore helps 
CEOs to best serve the membership of the cooperatives. The survey shows that members have higher 
scores than CEOs regarding member profitability and overall performance, while CEOs have a higher 
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1 
Introduction
This chapter provides an overall introduction to the thesis, including the relevant 
background knowledge of cooperatives (1.1), the introduction to the topics and concepts 
in cooperatives (1.2), the declaration of contribution (1.3), and the outline of this thesis 
(1.4).
1.1 Background knowledge
Cooperatives have always been an important governance structure. Dating back to early 
civilizations in Egypt and China around 1,500-1,300 BC, agricultural products were 
already exchanged and sold in cooperatives in Babylonia (Groeneveld, 2015). Recently, 
the 2015 World Co-operative Monitor shows that the top 300 cooperatives covers 25 
countries, and generate total turnover of USD $2,360.05bn (“International Co-operative 
Alliance,” 2015). A cooperative is characterized as a member-owned, member-used and 
member-controlled enterprise (Nilsson, Pyykkönen, Ollila, Bäckman, & Kauriinoja, 
2012). Generally there are two main definitions about the cooperative. The first 
definition focuses on the enterprise: “an enterprise collectively owned by many 
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independent suppliers/buyers” (Hendrikse & Feng, 2013, p511). This firm view 
suggests that a cooperative is itself a business enterprise and an economic entity 
(Helmberger & Hoos, 1962, p290; Robotka, 1947, p103). The second definition focuses 
on the members: “an association of many independent parties (horizontal relationship) 
who jointly own an upstream/downstream party (vertical relationship)” (Hendrikse & 
Feng, 2013, p502). These two definitions have in common that two parts of a supply 
chain are present in a cooperative. It entails that “several stages in the production process 
are brought under one entrepreneurial control” (Phillips, 1953, p79). Therefore, a 
successful cooperative is seen as two worlds working together in one organization 
(Bijman, Hendrikse, & Van Oijen, 2013). 
From the organizational structure point of view, a cooperative consists of two 
organizational layers: a society of members and an enterprise which is jointly owned by 
the members (Helmberger & Hoos, 1962). Similarly, “the double nature” of 
cooperatives elaborated by Georg (1955, p16), who argued that every cooperative 
represents simultaneously: 1) an association of all cooperative members in the sense of 
sociology and social psychology, i.e., a social group, and 2) a joint enterprise, owned 
and operated by the same members of the group (Valentinov, 2005). As the agricultural 
cooperative is growing, the director board is authorized by all the members to represent 
all the member interests. Moreover, due to most agricultural cooperative members are 
farmers without specialized financial or marketing knowledge, outside experts are hired 
to bring additional management expertise for managing and operating the enterprise. As 
the result of these changes, the organizational structure is also changed: a board of 
directors is democratically chosen by the members to represent and serve member 
interests. It governs the activities and chooses investments; there is a professional 
management team hired to carry out the operational management of the joined 
cooperative enterprise. In large cooperatives, the agency1 relationship between board 
and manager team is changing. The professional management increasingly plays a more 
                                                        
1 Agency theory (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997) captures prominently the advantages of delegating decision-
making by having a principal assigning a task, or multiple tasks, to an agent. 
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important role, not only by making most strategic and operational decisions, pushing 
the board into a supervisory role (Bijman et al., 2013), but also interacting more 
regularly with the society of the members.  
Owners of a cooperative can be providers of capital, suppliers, demanders, workers, 
government, or others (Hansmann, 2009). In this dissertation, we study the suppliers as 
owners of the cooperative, i.e. a marketing cooperative. The cooperative’s main function 
is processing the products from the suppliers and selling them to customers. For example, 
a milk cooperative is collectively owned by many independent farmers. Marketing 
cooperatives have several advantages: bargaining power, knowledge of the market, 
effectiveness in innovation, competitive yardstick effect, horizontal and vertical 
coordination, adaptation advantages, etc. (e.g. Liang & Hendrikse, 2016, Deng, 2015, 
Feng, 2011). 
A comparative institutional approach is adopted in this dissertation. It compares the 
behavior of two prominent governance structures in agribusiness: Cooperative (Coop) 
and investor-owned firm (IOF). Behavior is expected to differ because members of a 
cooperative have a transaction relationship and ownership relationship with the 
(cooperative) enterprise, whereas shareholders of an IOF have only an ownership 
relationship with the (investor-owned) enterprise (Barton, 1989; Bijman et al., 2013; 
Hansmann, 2009). Therefore the transaction relationship within the organization is 
expected to differ between a Coop and an IOF. IOFs and Coops have their own 
(dis)advantages. Cook (1995) formulates five problems of cooperatives: free rider 
problem (members tend to use the resources of a Coop for their individual benefits); 
horizon problem (when a member's residual claim on the net income generated by an 
asset is shorter than the productive life of that asset); portfolio problem (members adjust 
their cooperative asset portfolios to match their personal risk preferences); control 
problem (the different interests between the membership and their board of directors 
(principal) and management (agent) in a Coop); influence costs problem (members 
attempt to influence the decision of the cooperative when organizational decisions affect 
the distribution of benefits among members).  
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However, a Coop has also several benefits compared to an IOF. One advantage of a 
Coop is the elimination of the (double monopoly) markup, i.e. ‘service at cost’ 
(Hendrikse & Feng, 2013). It entails a transfer price equal to marginal cost between the 
member farmer and the cooperative, while a transaction price consisting of the marginal 
cost and a markup arises when there is a market relationship, i.e. a farmer and an IOF. 
Hess, Lind, & Liang (2013) provide evidence that the transaction costs increase when 
pig farmers deal with IOFs rather than with Coops. Furthermore, coordination and 
pooling in Coops increase the stability of the payment to members (Dunn, Ingalsbe, & 
Armstrong, 1979; Liang & Hendrikse, 2016). Lastly, Spear (2004) summarized some 
social advantages of Coop. A Coop has fewer contract/agency problems compare to an 
IOF, because the members have strong incentives to monitor and control the 
management. Moreover, members may get additional social benefits just from trading 
within their own organization. Some of the social benefits of Coop are trust in the Coop, 
participation in the democratic process, and a strong territorial network. Hirschman 
(1970) also states that a Coop can offer benefits in terms of access to services and “voice” 
or influence in the production chain.  
1.2 Research topics in cooperatives 
This section presents an introduction to the topics of the dissertation: innovation, 
member sorting, and the evaluation of cooperatives. 
The first research topic is communication and innovation in cooperatives. Cooperatives 
differ in their intensity of horizontal and vertical communication, their innovation 
policies, and their centralization of decision-making power. We aim to establish 
relationships between these communication, innovation, and decision-making aspects 
of cooperatives, and to identify the circumstances when a particular configuration adds 
most value. Horizontal communication (HC) is characterized as exchange of 
information between farmers in the society of members. It is associated with process 
innovation. Vertical communication (VC) is the exchange of information between a 
member and the CEO of the cooperative enterprise. It is associated with product 
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innovation. Horizontal and vertical communication are analyzed in a decentralized and 
centralized cooperative. The CEO decides regarding the deliveries of the member and 
the level of vertical communication in the centralized cooperative, while these decisions 
are taken by the members in the decentralized cooperative. We establish that the 
decentralized cooperative is efficient at an intermediate level of the VC cost coefficient 
and when the HC cost coefficient is above a certain level, while the centralized 
cooperative is efficient in the other cases.   
The second research topic addresses how heterogeneous farmers in terms of location 
and quality sort themselves across processor enterprises. The processor enterprise can 
be either a cooperative (Coop) or an investor-owned firm (IOF). The Coop pays a 
uniform price to all farmers to maximize members’ revenue and retains no profits, 
whereas the IOF differentiates payments based on quality and maximizes profits. The 
governance structure of each enterprise in a duopoly market is determined by majority 
voting. A three-stage game is developed to address the sorting of farmers, the choice of 
governance structure at the processor enterprise, and the production choices of the 
farmers. In equilibrium a farmer tends to choose the enterprise most close to him/her, 
and a farmer with a high quality product tends to choose an IOF. We establish that the 
Coop (mixed, IOF) market is the equilibrium market structure when the payment for 
quality by the IOF is low (intermediate, high). 
The last research topic is the evaluation of cooperative performance. The management 
and the society of members in cooperatives may have different evaluations. 
Understanding these evaluations can help CEOs to formulate strategies that best serve 
the membership and keep the cooperatives successful. Therefore, we investigate 
whether there are differences between CEO’s and members’ evaluations regarding 
cooperative performance, and what are the differences. A survey of Chinese agricultural 
cooperatives in Zhejiang Province (240 CEOs and 543 members) was conducted. 
Cooperative performance is measured by three indicators: member profitability, social 
influence in the local community, and overall performance (Franken & Cook, 2015). 
The results show that both CEOs and members agree that their cooperatives are 
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successful. However, members have higher scores than CEOs regarding member 
profitability and overall performance, while CEOs have a higher evaluation regarding 
social influence. The results also show that the number of general meetings and CEOs’ 
age decrease the difference of evaluations. Male CEOs are more likely to evaluate more 
positive than female CEOs. Moreover female CEOs and members tend to have more 
similar evaluations. 
1.3 Declaration of contribution  
In this section, I declare my contribution to the different chapters of this thesis and also 
acknowledge the contribution of other parties. 
This thesis is written by the author independently. Some inputs and feedbacks of the 
promoter and coauthors are implemented in different chapters. Introduction (Chapter 1) 
and conclusion (Chapter 5) of the thesis are written by the author with the 
implementation of the promoter’s feedback. Three papers in this thesis (Chapter 2, 
Chapter 3 and Chapter 4) are written independently by the author and with the 
implementation of the feedbacks from coauthors. The data used in chapter 4 is collected 
through Zhejiang University China. 
1.4 Outline of the thesis 
The thesis is comprised of five chapters. The structure of the thesis is presented in Figure 
1.1. In Chapter 2 we highlight communication and innovation in cooperatives. A 
member sorting model is investigated in Chapter 3. In Chapter 4, we examine the 
CEO’s versus members’ evaluation of coops. Finally, we summarize the main findings 
from the research in Chapter 5. 
7Figure 1.1: Outline of the thesis
Chapter 1:
Introduction 
Chapter 5: 
Conclusion
Chapter 3:
Cooperatives versus IOFs in a 
Member Sorting Model
Chapter 4:
CEOs versus Members’ 
Evaluation of Cooperative 
Performance 
－ Evidence from China
Chapter 2: 
Communication and Innovation 
in Cooperatives
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Communication and Innovation in 
Cooperatives2
Abstract
Cooperatives differ in their intensity of horizontal and vertical communication, their 
innovation policies, and their centralization of decision-making power. We aim to 
establish relationships between these communication, innovation, and decision-making 
aspects of cooperatives, and to identify the circumstances when a particular 
configuration adds most value. Horizontal and vertical communication are analyzed in 
a decentralized and centralized cooperative. Horizontal communication (HC) is 
characterized as exchange of information between farmers in the society of members. It 
is associated with process innovation. Vertical communication (VC) is the exchange of 
information between a member and the CEO of the cooperative enterprise. It is 
associated with product innovation. The CEO decides regarding the deliveries of the 
member and the level of vertical communication in the centralized cooperative, while 
these decisions are taken by the members in the decentralized cooperative. We establish 
2 A version of this chapter was accepted by Journal of the Knowledge Economy.  
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that the decentralized cooperative is efficient at an intermediate level of the VC cost 
coefficient and when the HC cost coefficient is above a certain level, while the 
centralized cooperative is efficient in the other cases.  
Keywords: Agricultural cooperatives, communication, innovation, decentralization 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The organizational communication literature establishes that communication is one 
crucial element of organizational governance (Christensen & Cornelissen, 2011; Jablin 
& Putnam, 2001). White (1997) states that organizations can themselves be regarded as 
communication structures. Organizations cannot exist without communication, i.e., they 
come into existence in the interaction that takes place between organizational members 
and as a result of the communication between them. The wholeness of an organization 
shows a consistent and coherent image of what the organization is. Communication 
brings every part of the organization to the same level of understanding, and therefore 
allows the organization to achieve consistency and coherence (Schultz, Tannenbaum, & 
Lauterborn, 1994).  
This paper analyses communication in cooperatives. A cooperative is an enterprise 
collectively owned by a society of members having a transaction relationship with it 
(Helmberger & Hoos, 1962; Hendrikse & Feng, 2013; Robotka, 1947). The 
cooperative’s main function is to process the products from its members and then sell 
them to the customers. However, members are themselves business enterprises and 
economic units. An agricultural cooperative is therefore an enterprise collectively 
owned (vertical relationship) by an association of many independent upstream 
agricultural producer enterprises (horizontal relationship). Communication is essential 
to keep the cooperative working in the members’ interests. Members who lack 
understanding of its practices are likely to have a negative attitude towards their 
cooperative, and this may cause poor performance (Goodman, 1994). Not only the 
 
 
11 
 
communication among the members themselves, but also the communication between 
the members and the cooperative management is important (Cechin, Bijman, Pascucci, 
& Omta, 2013). 
Cremer, Garicano, & Prat (2007) and Garicano & Wu (2012) provide an organizational 
economics explanation of communication within an organization. They distinguish HC 
and VC. HC is defined as peer-to-peer communication among specialists with common 
codes, or overlapping knowledge, to share information in order to solve problems 
efficiently, which cannot be done by a single specialist with limited knowledge. VC is 
defined as communication between the peers and an external higher up “translators”. 
Only when the knowledge is beyond the field of the specialists and costly to codify, does 
VC become necessary to facilitate the matching between problems and solutions. 
Patrucco (2008) also mentioned that the technical communication between the internal 
investments in R&D and the technologies provided by an external party is a crucial 
strategy for increasing returns in the production of knowledge. 
These two types of communication have an impact on different types of innovation. HC 
is defined as the information exchange between farmers about their production methods. 
Farmers communicate with each other to share their production knowledge. This may 
decrease their own (marginal) production costs at the upstream stage of production. 
From the innovation perspective, this belongs to individual (small scale) innovation 
(Braguinsky & Rose, 2009; Pelz, Munson, & Jenstrom, 1978). We therefore associate 
HC with process innovation. VC is the communication between the member farmers 
(with superior production knowledge) and the CEO (with superior marketing experience 
in order to improve product quality). When the cooperative takes more responsibilities 
for the product than simply product sale, product innovation is gradually taken over by 
the CEO. Product innovation activities include quality control and development of new 
varieties in order to increase the price and demand in the market at the final stage of 
production. From the innovation perspective, this belongs to group (big scale) 
innovation (Pelz et al., 1978). We associate therefore VC with product innovation. 
Specifically, the farmers and the CEO exchange information about the development of 
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the product. On the one hand, the CEO organizes the research regarding the product 
from the customer perspective and sets up a research unit to develop the new production 
method. He is important in deciding what the farmers produce and then shares the 
technological knowledge with the farmers. On the other hand, the farmers provide 
feedback from the field, and collaborate with the CEO regarding product development. 
To summarize, the concept of HC and VC in this paper relates to two perspectives: 1) 
HC and VC reflect the horizontal relationship and vertical relationship in a cooperative 
organization; 2) HC and VC contribute to different types of innovation.  
Observing the history of agricultural cooperatives, many governance structures have 
been adopted in this organization.  Bijman, Hendrikse and Oijen (2013) discuss the 
governance structure in cooperatives regarding the allocation of decision right between 
the board of directors (representing the members) and the professional management. 
Chaddad and Iliopoulos (2013) also address the delegation of formal and real authority 
to non-patron, professional managers as a key to improving the efficiency of collective 
decision-making in cooperatives. In this paper, we study communication in two 
structures: decentralized and centralized cooperatives. We define (de)centralization in 
terms of the allocation of decision rights regarding innovation and production. Farmers 
decide regarding their own product innovation and production in a decentralized 
structure, while the farmers authorize the CEO to make product innovation and 
production decisions for the cooperative in a centralized structure.   
Alonso, Dessein and Matouschek (2008) compare centralized and decentralized 
coordination when managers communicate strategically. They distinguish HC as 
communication between the division managers and VC as communication between the 
division managers and the headquarter. Moreover, HC emerges when coordination is 
decentralized, while VC emerges when coordination is centralized. The result shows 
that a higher need for coordination can improve HC in a decentralized structure but goes 
at the expense of centralization benefits. Specifically, under decentralization, an increase 
in the need for coordination makes the managers more willing to listen to each other to 
avoid costly coordination failures. In contrast, under centralization, when coordination 
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becomes more important, the headquarter increasingly ignores the division managers’ 
information about their own divisions. This induces each manager to exaggerate his case 
more, which, in turn, leads to less information being exchanged. Unlike Alonso et al. 
(2008), we propose HC and VC exist in both structures, and we compared the level of 
HC and VC in the two structures. Moreover, we relate HC and VC to process and 
product innovation.
We examine how HC and VC contribute to process and product innovation, and how it 
differs between decentralized and centralized cooperatives. The role of VC is to increase
final product demand by product innovation, while HC leads to upstream process 
innovation by decreasing production cost. The conceptual model linking the variables 
is presented in Figure 2.1. It is in line with the framework presented by (Williamson, 
2000) in the sense that short run decisions are embedded in long run decisions. However, 
we provide more details by highlighting and positioning the role of communication.
Two questions are addressed. First, how do the communication and production 
decisions differ between the two governance structures? Second, what determines the 
efficient governance structure? In order to answer these questions, we develop a three-
stage non-cooperative model with two farmers and a CEO. In the first stage, the efficient 
governance structure is determined; in the second stage, the HC and VC levels are 
decided; in the last stage the production level is determined.
Figure 2.1: Conceptual model
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents two cases of cooperatives to 
illustrate the relevance of different communication structures. Section 3 presents the 
model regarding HC and VC. Section 4 derives the equilibrium production and 
communication levels, and determines the efficient governance structure.  Section 5 
relates the two cases to the model. Finally, conclusions are formulated in section 6. 
2.2 De Producent and Harvest House 
We present a description of two cooperatives to illustrate the relevance of different types 
of innovation, communication, and the relationship with decision-making.3 
De Producent  
De Producent is a cheese cooperative. The turnover of De Producent was around 11 
million euros in 2013. De Producent consists of 40 large members and 10 small, none-
active members. The membership is therefore homogeneous. They are individual 
farmers located in a radius of 100km around Gouda. The dairy farmers produce their 
own cheese, while the storage/processing of the cheese and the transportation of the 
cheeses to wholesalers and retailers are done by the cooperative.  
The decision structure of this cooperative can be characterized as centralized. The 
current general manager is not a farmer member. Instead, he is a professional manager 
with years of experience in the agricultural industry. Substantial decision power is 
delegated to the general manager, including the day-to-day operational decisions and 
the decision of whether to increase the cheese delivery of a member in the next year. He 
formulates a proposal regarding the retained earnings percentage, which is to be 
approved in the General Assembly meeting. The members are obligated to deliver 100% 
of their cheese to the cooperative. This bylaw has been in place since the birth of the 
cooperative. However, the general manager mentioned that “I am not a policeman”. If 
                                                        
3 We visited cooperative De Producent on April 28, 2014 and talked with Director Jacco Bot. We visited 
cooperative Harvest House on January 23, 2015 and talked with General Director Jelte van Kammen 
and Financial Director Fons van der Vleuten. 
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outside delivery is detected, the management will just talk to the member and no 
financial punishment is imposed.  
The cooperative pays substantial attention to product innovation. The cheese quality is 
independently checked by two fulltime employees based on three criteria: shape, taste, 
and consistency. The quality is also monitored. Each farm is checked approximately 2 
full days a year by the two employees, and quality improvement advice is provided by 
a quality enhancement program. Via these measures, the cooperative helps members to 
improve the production process at the farm. Next to the quality innovation, a research 
team is organized for developing new products with new flavors. Usually, the 
cooperative will select two members to trial the production of a new product. After that, 
it spreads the production technology to all members. 
There is a lot of communication between the general manager and the members, i.e., 
VC is intense. The cooperative sends a “weekly quality form” to every farmer. 
According to the general manager, “the cooperative is transparent about everything and 
farmers can check everything”. The general manager spends 50% of his time in 
communicating with the members, largely via phone calls and farm visits. The members 
do not like to use internet. The members trust the general manager/cooperative and share 
information with the cooperative. One important reason is that developing specialty 
cheeses has become financially very attractive, and therefore product innovation has 
gained in importance. The 40 active members know each other, but there is not much 
communication and information exchange between them. In fact, most of the farms 
grew to big enterprises in the past 10~15 years. Some of them have annual revenue of 
more than one million Euros. The growing size has limited communication between the 
farmers. Moreover, the CEO observes competition between members because everyone 
wants to deliver more cheese to the cooperative. It is known from the literature that the 
larger the number of participants in one project, the more direct the competition among 
them, and it leads to less information exchange concerning "precompetitive" data 
(Prosser, 1995). 
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Harvest House  
Harvest House specializes in vegetables. It has 826 hectares under cultivation, and a 
turnover of 530 million euros in 2013. The membership consists of four product groups, 
and in total 67 growers. First, there are 52 paprika growers, including 5 large growers. 
Second, there are 11 tomato growers, including 5 large growers. Finally, there are 2 
cucumber growers and 2 eggplant growers. The membership is therefore heterogeneous, 
within and between product groups. 
The decision structure of this cooperative can be characterized as decentralized. A lot of 
decision power is not granted to the CEO by the farmers. The different product groups 
organize their own logistics and packaging centers. There is competition between these 
centers because they are allowed to choose between these centers. For instance, if one 
of the packaging companies within the cooperative is able to offer a lower price, other 
growers are free to choose its services. In this way, the packaging seems to be efficient 
(Bulow & Klemperer, 1996). Growers decide the quantity to be delivered, and the 
cooperative is obliged to sell them. The management is responsible for the quality 
control in the cooperative, but it does not command farmers about how to resolve a 
given quality problem. For example, the management may communicate to the grower 
that his product lacks certain taste characteristics, or may suffer from early perishability, 
but will leave it up to the grower to find a solution. The growers may of course consult 
with each other regarding such problems or raise an issue in the product committee. The 
reason for such allocation of control is the growers’ better knowledge about the growing 
process and technology. Additionally, members are open to other growers’ advice and 
continuously learn from each other.  
Two product groups are set up for product related matters. When there is a problem 
regarding a product, the cooperative doesn’t take the responsibility to resolve it. The 
members discuss with each other in order to find a solution themselves. It generates high 
commitment and trust in the coop community. It contributes to improving the products. 
Therefore, members take the innovation decisions regarding production processes and 
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product development. For example, some growers are involved in the product project 
Agriport A7. Agriport A7 is the site of a development project for large-scale greenhouse 
and open-field crop cultivation. The large-scale production of fresh vegetables, 
processing, and logistics have been clustered at Agriport A7, and it is considered the 
most modern agro-park in the world. Additionally, Harvest House focuses largely on 
sustainability, which is market-driven.  
The coop provides many communication channels. Formally, the General Assembly 
meeting is organized two times a year. Once a month there is a product meeting, product 
groups attend the meeting and discuss price and quality and product competition issues. 
A newsletter is delivered to every member once a week, to report the weekly activities. 
Informally, the CEO visits every member once in a while. Besides, a digital platform is 
being built for better interaction within the coop. From the CEO’s observation, HC is 
intensive and very much valued. Members themselves communicate a lot due to that 
they actively join the organizational activities and make most of the decisions. VC is 
relatively low because less information exchange is needed between the cooperative and 
the members.  
Table 2.1 summarizes the differences between the two cooperatives.  
Table 2.1: De Producent versus Harvest House 
Attributes＼Case De Producent  Harvest House  
Product Cheese Vegetables 
Turnover 2013 €11 million €530 million 
#Members 50 67 
Member heterogeneity Low High 
Governance structure Centralized Decentralized 
Innovation support High Low 
HC level Low High 
VC level High Low 
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2.3 Model
Consider a cooperative in a monopolistic market. The cooperative consists of a CEO 
and two farmer members. Figure 2.2 shows the channels of communication in a 
cooperative. In the decentralized cooperative, farmer 1 chooses to communicate (ℎ1) 
with farmer 2 to improve his knowledge regarding his production process, i.e. process 
innovation. It results in reducing his production cost. The same decision has to be made 
by farmer 2 (ℎ2). The HC decisions ℎ1 and ℎ2 are made simultaneously. Meanwhile, 
farmers 1 and 2 have to choose the intensity of communication with the CEO (𝑣1 and 
𝑣2) to obtain knowledge regarding product innovation. Product innovation will increase 
the price of the products in the market. In the centralized cooperative, farmers 1 and 2 
choose the intensity of the communication between each other to enable process 
innovation, while the CEO determines the product development by deciding the VC 
levels (𝑣1, 𝑣2) for the cooperative. 
 
Figure 2.2: Communication in the cooperative
A three-stage game is developed to study HC and VC, innovation, and decision-making 
in a centralized and a decentralize cooperative. In the first stage, the governance 
structure decentralized (D) or centralized (C) cooperative is determined. In the second 
stage, the HC and VC decisions are determined simultaneously. Define ℎ𝑖 (𝑣𝑖) as the 
level of HC (VC) regarding farmer 𝑖, where 𝑖 = 1, 2. Define  ℎ (𝑣) as the average level 
of horizontal (vertical) communication. The HC decisions are taken by the farmers in 
both cooperatives, while farmers decide VC in the decentralized cooperative and the 
CEO is determining VC in the centralized cooperative. In the third stage, the farmers 
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choose their own level of production independently and simultaneously in the 
decentralized structure (𝑞1, 𝑞2), while the CEO decides the production level 𝑞1 and 𝑞2 
in the centralized structure. Figure 2.3 depicts the sequence of decisions.
Figure 2.3: The three-stage game
The market demand function is inspired by the seminal product differentiation model of 
Mussa & Rosen (1978), which is summarized by Mérel, Saitone, & Sexton (2009). It is 
defined as 𝑝 = (𝑣 + 𝑑) − 𝑄, where 𝑑 (> 0) is the basic demand parameter and 𝑄 (>
0)  is the quantity demanded. When 𝑣1 (𝑣2)  increases, more product innovation is 
created, and the consumers are willing to pay more for the new product. 
Define the cost of VC as 𝑉𝑖 =
1
2
𝑘𝑣𝑖
2, where 𝑖 = 1, 2 and 𝑘 is the VC cost coefficient 
(𝑘 > 0). The second derivative of the cost of VC is 𝑉𝑖
′′ = 𝑘, i.e. the marginal cost of VC 
is increasing. 𝑉𝑖
′′ can be interpreted as the discretion of the farmer regarding the choice 
and execution of activities between the farm and the cooperative enterprise, like 
upgrading deliveries, facilitating transportation, and dealing with intermediate product 
peculiarities. A high value of 𝑘 shows that additional VC is accompanied by a large 
increase in costs. An example is a bureaucratic organization (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992, 
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p122). In general, 𝑘 will be smaller as the size of the membership is smaller, or when 
member homogeneity is higher. 
The production cost of farmer 𝑖 is 𝐶𝑖 = 𝑐𝑖𝑞𝑖. The farmers talk to each other in order to 
improve their production process. It decreases their (marginal) production cost. HC is 
therefore to be interpreted as process innovation by decreasing the members’ marginal 
production cost to 𝑐𝑖 = 𝐴 − ℎ𝑖 (Falvey, Poyago-Theotoky, & Teerasuwannajak, 2013), 
where A is a base cost (i.e., the production cost when there is no process innovation). It 
is assumed that process innovation cannot decrease the marginal production cost to zero, 
i.e. 0 < ℎ𝑖 < 𝐴. Define the HC cost function for the farmer i as 𝐻𝑖 =
1
2
𝑟ℎ𝑖
2, where 𝑟 is 
the HC cost coefficient (𝑟 > 0 ). The payoff of farmer 𝑖 is therefore 𝜋𝑖 = (𝑣 + 𝑑 −
𝑄)𝑞𝑖 − 𝑐𝑖𝑞𝑖 −
1
2
𝑟ℎ𝑖
2 −
1
2
𝑘𝑣𝑖
2.  
2.4 Equilibrium  
The concept of subgame perfect equilibrium is used to solve the game. We start therefore 
with determining the equilibrium production levels and communication levels in the 
decentralized cooperative (2.4.1) and the centralized cooperative (2.4.2). The 
mathematical details are presented in the appendix. Comparative statics results are 
formulated in section 2.4.3.  
2.4.1 Decentralized cooperative  
Production levels  
In the final stage, each farmer determines his optimal production level by maximizing 
his own payoff. The first-order condition results in the best response functions 
𝑞1
∗(𝑞2) =
1
2
(𝑑 − 𝐴 + 𝑣 + ℎ1) −
1
2
𝑞2  
and 
𝑞2
∗(𝑞1) =
1
2
(𝑑 − 𝐴 + 𝑣 + ℎ2) −
1
2
𝑞1.  
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The quantity competition between the enterprises is reflected in the negative slope of 
the reaction functions. Notice that the reaction function of farmer 1 (2) shifts outward 
as a function of 𝑣1, 𝑣2, ℎ1 (ℎ2).
The intersection of the reaction functions determines the Nash equilibrium production 
levels: 
𝑞1
∗ =
1
3
(𝑑 − 𝐴 + 𝑣 + 2ℎ1 − ℎ2) 
and
𝑞2
∗ =
1
3
(𝑑 − 𝐴 + 𝑣 + 2ℎ2 − ℎ1). 
The best-response functions of farmer 1 and farmer 2 and the equilibrium production 
levels are presented in Figure 2.4. Notice that 𝑞1
∗ (𝑞2
∗) is positively related to 𝑣1, 𝑣2, ℎ1 
(ℎ2), and negatively related to ℎ2 (ℎ1).
Figure 2.4: Best-response functions
Communication levels
The communication levels are determined in the second stage of the game. 
Substituting 𝑞1
∗, 𝑞2
∗ into 𝜋1
∗ and 𝜋2
∗, and maximizing 𝜋1
∗ and 𝜋2
∗ with respect to the 
communication variables ℎ1, ℎ2, 𝑣1 and 𝑣2 results in four first-order conditions. The 
equilibrium levels of communication are 
ℎ1
∗(𝑘, 𝑟|𝐷) = ℎ2
∗(𝑘, 𝑟|𝐷) =
4(𝑑−𝐴)
𝑟(9−1/𝑘)−4
 
and 
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𝑣1
∗(𝑘, 𝑟|𝐷) =  𝑣2
∗(𝑘, 𝑟|𝐷) =
(𝑑−𝐴)
𝑘(9−4 𝑟⁄ )−1
. 
Substituting ℎ1
∗, ℎ2
∗, 𝑣1
∗, 𝑣2
∗ into 𝑞1
∗ and 𝑞2
∗, we obtain the Nash equilibrium production 
levels 
𝑞1
∗(𝑘, 𝑟|𝐷) = 𝑞2
∗(𝑘, 𝑟|𝐷) =
3(𝑑−𝐴)
9−4/𝑟−1/𝑘
.  
Substituting the above results into the payoffs, we obtain the total payoff of the 
decentralized cooperative 
 𝜋∗(𝑘, 𝑟|𝐷) = 𝜋1
∗ + 𝜋2
∗ = 
(𝑑−𝐴)2(18−16/𝑟−1/𝑘)
(9−4 𝑟⁄ −1 𝑘⁄ )2
. 
2.4.2 Centralized cooperative  
The VC level is determined by the CEO and the cost is shared equally by the farmers, 
while the HC level is determined by each farmer and the cost is paid by each farmer. 
The CEO chooses the production levels 𝑞1 and 𝑞2 in order to maximize the payoff of 
the cooperative. 
Production levels  
The payoff of the cooperative can be written as 
𝜋 = 𝜋1 + 𝜋2 = (𝑣 + 𝑑 − 𝑄)(𝑞1 + 𝑞2) − 𝑐1𝑞1 − 𝑐2𝑞2 −
1
2
𝑟ℎ1
2 −
1
2
𝑟ℎ2
2 −
1
2
𝑘(𝑣1 +
𝑣2)
2.  
The payoffs of the farmers are  
𝜋1 = (𝑣 + 𝑑 − 𝑄)𝑞1 − 𝑐1𝑞1 −
1
2
𝑟ℎ1
2 −
1
4
𝑘(𝑣1 + 𝑣2)
2, 
𝜋2 = (𝑣 + 𝑑 − 𝑄)𝑞2 − 𝑐2𝑞2 −
1
2
𝑟ℎ2
2 −
1
4
𝑘(𝑣1 + 𝑣2)
2. 
The first-order condition results in the best response functions 
𝑞1
∗(𝑞2) =
1
2
(𝑑 − 𝐴 + 𝑣 + ℎ1) − 𝑞2  
and 
𝑞2
∗(𝑞1) =
1
2
(𝑑 − 𝐴 + 𝑣 + ℎ2) − 𝑞1.  
Focusing on the symmetric equilibrium outcomes results in  
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𝑞1
∗ = 𝑞2
∗ =
1
4
(𝑑 − 𝐴 + 𝑣 + ℎ).  
Communication levels 
Substituting 𝑞1
∗ and  𝑞2
∗ into 𝜋,  𝜋1,  𝜋2, farmers maximize their own payoffs with 
respect to ℎ1, ℎ2, while the CEO maximizes the total payoff with respect to 𝑣 (𝑣 =
𝑣1 + 𝑣2). We get from the three first order conditions the equilibrium 
ℎ1
∗(𝑘, 𝑟|𝐶) = ℎ2
∗(𝑘, 𝑟|𝐶) =
2(𝑑−𝐴)
𝑟(8−1 𝑘⁄ )−2
  
and 
𝑣∗(𝑘, 𝑟|𝐶) =
2(𝑑−𝐴)
𝑘(8−2 𝑟⁄ )−1
. 
Substituting the results back into 𝑞1
∗  and 𝑞2
∗ , we obtain the equilibrium centralized 
production level 
𝑞1
∗(𝑘, 𝑟|𝐶) = 𝑞2
∗(𝑘, 𝑟|𝐶) =
2(𝑑−𝐴)
8−2/𝑟−1/𝑘
.  
Lastly, substitution of the above results in the total payoff of the centralized 
cooperative results in 
𝜋∗(𝑘, 𝑟|𝐶) =
2(𝑑−𝐴)2
8−2/𝑟−1/𝑘
. 
To summarize the equilibrium choices and payoffs, we list HC, VC, production and 
profit as functions of 𝑟 and 𝑘 in the (de)centralized structure in Table 2.2.  
Table 2.2: Equilibrium choices and payoffs in the decentralized/centralized cooperative 
Cooperative Decentralized structure Centralized structure 
Production 6(𝑑−𝐴)
9−4/𝑟−1/𝑘
  4(𝑑−𝐴)
8−2/𝑟−1/𝑘
  
HC 8(𝑑−𝐴)
𝑟(9−1 𝑘⁄ )−4
  4(𝑑−𝐴)
𝑟(8−1 𝑘⁄ )−2
  
VC 2(𝑑−𝐴)
𝑘(9−4 𝑟⁄ )−1
  2(𝑑−𝐴)
𝑘(8−2 𝑟⁄ )−1
  
Profit (𝑑−𝐴)
2(18−16/𝑟−1/𝑘)
(9−4 𝑟⁄ −1 𝑘⁄ )2
  2(𝑑−𝐴)
2
8−2/𝑟−1/𝑘
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In order to have meaningful result (by having positive values for all variables), assume 
that 𝑑 > 𝐴 > 0 and the parameters 𝑘, 𝑟 satisfy 
{
 
 
 
 
1
8
< 𝑘 ≤
1
7
, 𝑟 >
2𝑘
8𝑘−1
1
7
< 𝑘 ≤
1
6
, 𝑟 >
4𝑘
9𝑘−1
𝑘 >
1
6
, 𝑟 >
16𝑘
18𝑘−1
      
.4  
2.4.3 Comparative statics  
This section formulates results regarding the level of production, HC, VC, and profit in 
the decentralized and centralized cooperatives. We start with formulating a result 
regarding the level of production and profit in the decentralized and centralized 
cooperative, given the HC and VC levels. First, the production level in the decentralized 
cooperative is 
2
3
(𝑑 − 𝐴 + 𝑣 + ℎ), and it is higher than the production level 
1
2
(𝑑 − 𝐴 +
𝑣 + ℎ) in the centralized cooperative.5 This aligns with the overproduction problem of 
the decentralized cooperative (Albæk & Schultz, 1998). When farmers are making 
production decisions, they tend to produce more to achieve a higher payoff for 
themselves, ignoring the negative externalities for the entire membership. Proposition 1 
states this result. 
Proposition 1: The production level is higher in the decentralized cooperative than in 
the centralized cooperative, given the levels of communication. 
The difference between the joint profit of the centralized cooperative and the 
decentralized cooperative is 
1
36
(𝑑 − 𝐴 + 𝑣 + ℎ)
2
− 𝑘𝑣
2
, given the HC and VC levels. 
Therefore, given the communication levels, the centralized cooperative has a higher 
profit than the decentralized cooperative when 𝑘 is small. The benefit of the centralized 
                                                        
4 Given that 𝑑 − 𝐴 > 0, 𝑟 > 0, 𝑘 > 0, let both the denominators and the numerators be positive, we 
achieve  
{
 
 
 
 
1
8
< 𝑘 ≤
1
7
, 𝑟 >
2𝑘
8𝑘−1
1
7
< 𝑘 ≤
1
6
, 𝑟 >
4𝑘
9𝑘−1
𝑘 >
1
6
, 𝑟 >
16𝑘
18𝑘−1
      
. 
5 The proofs of the propositions are presented in the appendix. 
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cooperative is the internalization of the negative production externalities of individual 
profit maximization in the decentralized cooperative. However, when 𝑘  is above a 
certain level, the centralized cooperative will have a lower profit than the decentralized 
cooperative due to the increasing marginal cost of VC. The reason is that the CEO is 
doing all the VC in the centralized cooperative and carries all the cost, while each farmer 
carries his own VC cost in the decentralized cooperative. The result is formulated in 
proposition 2. 
Proposition 2: The profit level is higher in the centralized cooperative than in the 
decentralized cooperative when k is small, given the levels of communication. 
The understanding of the results is facilitated by first addressing the relationship 
between VC and production. This is done by taking the HC equal to 0 in both 
cooperatives. We present the equilibrium VC, production, and profit levels in the 
proposition 3 – 5. 
The difference between the level of VC in the centralized and decentralized cooperative 
is determined by the trade-off in the decentralized cooperative between the (unattractive) 
free riding due to the positive quality enhancement externality of the VC choices by the 
members and the (attractive) decentralized payments of the costs of VC by the members 
preventing to a certain extent the increasing marginal cost of VC. However, the first 
order conditions result in  𝑉𝐶𝐷 =
2(𝑑−𝐴)
9𝑘−1
  and 𝑉𝐶𝐶 =
2(𝑑−𝐴)
8𝑘−1
 , i.e. the level of VC is 
always higher in the centralized cooperative than in the centralized cooperative for all 
possible values of the VC cost coefficient k. This result is presented in proposition 3. 
The dominance of the free riding effect in determining the level of VC is due to the 
specification of the cost function of VC. 6 
                                                        
6 A straightforward way to illustrate this is to introduce a capacity constraint for individuals regarding 
the level of VC. For example, the level of VC in the centralized cooperative is lower than in the 
decentralized cooperative when the cost function is 𝑉𝑖 =
1
2
𝑘𝑣𝑖
2   when 𝑘 <
3(𝑑−𝐴)
2(9𝑘−1)
  and 𝑉𝑖 = ∞ 
otherwise.  
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Proposition 3 presents the result regarding the level of VC. 
Proposition 3: The VC level is higher in the centralized cooperative than in the 
decentralized cooperative, given the level of HC. 
Proposition 1 states that the decentralized cooperative produces more than the 
centralized cooperative, given the levels of communication. However, this result may 
be reversed when the choice of VC is endogenized. We have established that the 
production level is positively related to the average VC level (𝑄𝐷 =
2
3
(𝑑 − 𝐴 +
𝑣𝐷),𝑄𝐶 =
1
2
(𝑑 − 𝐴 + 𝑣𝐶)). An investment in VC creates therefore a positive quality 
enhancement externality. Lower level of VC due to the free riding in the decentralized 
cooperative leads to a lower price is paid by consumers for a unit of the product, and 
this reduces the incentive to overproduce. When the CEO in the centralized cooperative 
is not overburdened, i.e. k is sufficiently low, then the centralized cooperative produces 
more than the decentralized cooperative. This is reflected in the equilibrium output 
levels 𝑄𝐷 =
6(𝑑−𝐴)
9−1 𝑘⁄
 and 𝑄𝐶 =
4(𝑑−𝐴)
8−1/𝑘
. Specifically, the centralized cooperative produces 
more when 𝑘 <
1
6
. Proposition 4 summarizes this result. 
Proposition 4: The production level is higher (lower) in the decentralized cooperative 
than in the centralized cooperative when 𝑘 > (<)
1
6
, given the level of HC. 
The profit is higher in the decentralized cooperative than in the centralized cooperative, 
i.e. 
(𝑑−𝐴)2(18−1/𝑘)
(9−1 𝑘⁄ )2
>
2(𝑑−𝐴)2
8−1/𝑘
 , when 𝑘 ∈ (
5−√7
18
,
5+√7
18
) . The level of profit of the two 
governance structures is determined by a number of factors. The centralized cooperative 
has two advantages. First, it internalizes the negative production externalities of 
decentralized production decisions by the members (proposition 1). Second, the higher 
level of VC in the centralized cooperative than in the decentralized cooperative 
(proposition 3) results in higher price per unit sold. However, a higher level of VC is 
expensive for the centralized cooperative due to the increasing marginal cost of VC 
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(proposition 2). The high cost of VC dominates the two advantages when 
5−√7
18
< 𝑘 <
5+√7
18
, i.e. the decentralized cooperative has higher profits when k is at an intermediate 
level. Finally, the overproduction and the underinvestment in VC in the decentralized 
cooperative dominate the higher cost of VC in the centralized cooperative when 𝑘 >
5+√7
18
 . The reason is that the equilibrium level of VC is inversely related to k, and 
therefore the total costs of VC are decreasing when k is increasing. Therefore the 
centralized cooperative has the highest profits when k is sufficiently high. The result is 
formulated in proposition 5. 
Proposition 5: The profit level is higher (lower) in the decentralized cooperative than 
in the centralized cooperative when 𝑘 ∈ (
5−√7
18
,
5+√7
18
) (otherwise), given the level of HC. 
Next we address both HC and VC. The next two propositions formulate results regarding 
the equilibrium communication levels in the second stage of the game, anticipating the 
production level decisions in the final stage of the game.  
The centralized and decentralized cooperative are identical regarding HC in the sense 
that each member chooses its level of HC and pays for the costs. It involves an indirect 
negative externality because a higher level of HC reduces the cost of production, and 
therefore will result in a higher output level, but the costs of the resulting decrease in 
the price paid by the consumers is carried also by the other member. This results in too 
much production, and is the (indirect) negative externality in the choice of production 
due to the choice of horizontal communication. This effect is qualitatively the same for 
both cooperatives. However, the level of HC differs between the two cooperatives 
because the VC and production choices differ between the two cooperatives. Figure 2.5 
presents the comparison between the two cooperatives regarding their equilibrium 
communication choices (proof see appendix). 
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Figure 2.5: Comparison of HC and VC levels in the two governance structures
Next we compare the equilibrium production level in the two cooperatives. Similar to 
proposition 4, both VC and HC counter the overproduction effect. We have shown that 
the production level is positively related to both the HC and VC level (𝑄𝐷 =
2
3
(𝑑 − 𝐴 + 𝑣𝐷 + ℎ𝐷),𝑄𝐶 =
1
2
(𝑑 − 𝐴 + 𝑣𝐶 + ℎ𝐶) ). When k increases, more VC free 
riding problems occur in the decentralized cooperative, and it reduces the production. 
Moreover, when r increases, the indirect negative HC externality is weakened, less 
process innovation occurs in both cooperatives, and it reduces the overproduction. 
Therefore the production level decreases in both cooperatives. The centralized 
cooperative produces more than the decentralized cooperative when 
6(𝑑−𝐴)
9−4/𝑟−1/𝑘
<
4(𝑑−𝐴)
8−2/𝑟−1/𝑘
 , i.e. 𝑘 <
2𝑟
15𝑟−2
 . The result regarding the production level is formulated in 
proposition 6. 
Proposition 6: The equilibrium production level is higher (lower) in the decentralized 
than in the centralized cooperative when 𝑘 > (<)
2𝑟
15𝑟−2
 . 
Figure 2.6 presents proposition 6. 
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Figure 2.6: Comparison of production levels in the two cooperatives
The efficient governance structure is defined as the governance structure creating the 
highest value, while taking into account the communication and production level 
choices in the second and third stage of the game. When 𝑘 ≤
5𝑟+1−√7𝑟2−10𝑟+1)
20+18𝑟
, and 𝑟 
satisfies 𝑟 ∈ [(5 + 3√2)/7,∞), the profit is higher in the centralized cooperative due 
to its two advantages: it internalizes the negative production externalities, it generates a 
higher VC level and results in a higher price per unit sold. When 
5𝑟+1−√7𝑟2−10𝑟+1)
20+18𝑟
<
𝑘 <
5𝑟+1+√7𝑟2−10𝑟+1)
20+18𝑟
 , and 𝑟  satisfies 𝑟 ∈ [(5 + 3√2)/7,∞) , the decentralized 
cooperative has a higher profit level due to the high equilibrium VC level and  costs in 
the centralized cooperative. When 𝑘 >
5𝑟+1+√7𝑟2−10𝑟+1)
20+18𝑟
 , and 𝑟  satisfies 𝑟 ∈ [(5 +
3√2)/7,∞), the decentralized cooperative starts suffering from its overproduction and 
the underinvestment of the VC, and the loss of surplus is larger than the costly 
communication in the centralized cooperative. This makes the centralized cooperative 
efficient again. However, when 𝑟 < (5 + 3√2)/7 and regardless of k, the profit level is 
always lower in the decentralized cooperative than the centralized cooperative. This is 
due to that when r is small, the VC level is lower in the centralized cooperative, and 
therefore the costly VC in the centralized cooperative becomes insignificant. The 
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advantage of the internalization of the negative production externalities dominates. The 
result regarding the efficient governance structure for all possible values of the 
communication cost parameters is formulated in proposition 7. 
Proposition 7: The profit level is higher (lower) in the decentralized cooperative than 
the centralized cooperative when 𝑟 ∈ [(5 + 3√2)/7,∞) and
 𝑘 ∈ (
5𝑟+1−√7𝑟2−10𝑟+1)
20+18𝑟
,
5𝑟+1+√7𝑟2−10𝑟+1)
20+18𝑟
) (otherwise).
We present proposition 9 in Figure 2.7. 
Figure 2.7: Comparison of profit levels in the two cooperatives
2.5 De Producent versus Harvest House
This section presents the two cooperatives in terms of the parameters of the model. With 
the description of the two cooperatives, we formulate the following assumptions of the 
four parameters in our model. First, the communication cost coefficients 𝑟 and 𝑘 are 
higher in Harvest House than in De Producent. This due to the different compositions 
of the membership of the two cooperatives. There is only one product in De Producent, 
while there are four products in Harvest House. Additionally, product groups in Harvest 
House have large and small growers, while the farmers owning De Producent have 
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similar sizes. Therefore member heterogeneity is higher in Harvest House than in De 
Producent. This makes it relatively more difficult to communicate both horizontally and 
vertically in Harvest House than in De Producent. However, Harvest House has 
separated the tomato group and paprika group in its governance structure to facilitate 
the HC. This lowers the parameter r to the level of De Producent. Moreover, the demand 
and the fixed production cost have to be considered as well since they are different in 
different cooperatives. Due to product differentiation, the price of cheese (De Producent) 
is relatively higher than that of vegetables (Harvest House), and the fixed production 
cost of cheese (De Producent) is relatively higher than that of vegetables (Harvest 
House). Table 2.3 summarizes these observations regarding the parameters of these two 
cooperatives, where H represents Harvest House and P represents De Producent. 
Table 2.3: Comparison of parameters between De Producent and Harvest House 
Member heterogeneity determines: 𝑟 𝑟𝐻 > 𝑟𝑃 
𝑘 𝑘𝐻 > 𝑘𝑃 
Product feature determines: 𝑑 𝑑𝐻 < 𝑑𝑃 
𝐴 𝐴𝐻 < 𝐴𝑃 
Figure 2.8 presents the two cooperatives in terms of the (relative) values of the four 
parameters of the model, taking into account the assumption  𝑑 > 𝐴 > 0  and 
{
1
3
< 𝑘 ≤
3
7
,
𝑘
4𝑘−1
< 𝑟 < 1
3
7
< 𝑘 < 1,
4𝑘
9𝑘−1
< 𝑟 < 1
. 
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Figure 2.8: De Producent and Harvest House in terms of r, k, d, A
In order to compare De Producent and Harvest House, we combine Figure 2.7 and 
Figure 2.8 to illustrate proposition 7. Due to d-A is constant, Figure 2.9 is depicted with 
r on the vertical axis and k on the horizontal axis. From Figure 2.9 the parameters of the 
two cooperatives align with the finding of proposition 7. When r is lower and k is in 
small, the centralized cooperative is efficient, i.e. De Producent. When r is higher and k 
is in the middle range, the decentralized cooperative is efficient, i.e. Harvest House. 
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Figure 2.9: De Producent versus Harvest House 
The different communication levels and governance structures of these two cooperatives 
may also be due to the nature of the product and the innovation strategies. Specifically, 
the vegetable cooperative has various ways of processing/packaging. Therefore HC is 
more important for improving the process innovation, and a decentralized structure is 
adopted to facilitate this. The cheese cooperative has identical packaging, but various 
flavors are developed. Therefore VC and product innovation are more important for a 
cheese cooperative, and a centralized structure is adopted to apply this strategy.
In other cooperatives, the situation may differ. However we claim that the general 
conclusion is applicable: 1) if process innovation is important for the cooperative, a 
decentralized governance structure should be adopted to secure the HC in order to create
process innovation; 2) if the product innovation is the focus of a cooperative’s strategy,
a centralized governance structure should be adopted to implement intensive VC, in 
order to secure product innovation. In addition, the communication cost has to be 
considered. Member heterogeneity and distance of the members are examples that 
influence the communication cost. Our results show that when communication costs are
small or large (intermediate), the centralized (decentralized) cooperative is efficient. 
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2.6 Conclusion and future research 
In this paper, the relationship between communication, innovation, and 
(de)centralization in cooperatives is investigated. HC and VC associate with different 
types of innovation. HC is related to process innovation, while VC is related to product 
innovation. The intensity of the two types of communication depends on the costs of the 
two types of innovation. A decentralized cooperative is characterized by the members 
taking individually the vertical communication and production decisions, while these 
decisions are made by the CEO of the cooperative enterprise in a centralized cooperative. 
Horizontal communication decisions are made by members individually in both 
cooperatives. The decentralized cooperative has a tendency to overproduce due to the 
negative production externalities and to generate insufficient VC due to the positive 
externalities in the provision of product quality. An advantage of the decentralized 
cooperative is that the costs of VC are carried by the various members, as opposed to 
the centralized cooperative in which all VC are generated by the CEO. We find that 
when both communication cost coefficients are small and large, the centralized 
cooperative dominates, when both communication cost coefficients are in an 
intermediate range, the decentralized cooperative dominates.  
There are various possibilities for future research. First, the current model provides a 
start to model the choice of communication policy of supplier owned enterprises. In 
practice, a much richer menu of communication devices is used and developed to 
address a variety of issues. For example, an important theme in cooperatives is the 
development of membership policies to foster involvement, commitment, and trust 
between the farmers and the cooperative enterprise. These membership policies involve 
several means to stimulate HC as well as VC. Another example is social capital in 
cooperatives (Deng, 2015). Second, VC in our model is a beneficial activity. It is related 
to product innovation, and increases therefore the product market price. However, other 
types of VC are present in cooperatives. Farmers communicate extensively with the 
general manager about the transactions between the farm and the cooperative enterprise, 
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and the strategy of the cooperative, due to their large financial involvement in the 
cooperative. Cook (1995) identifies five general problem sets in cooperatives: free-rider 
problem, horizon problem, portfolio problem, control problem, and the influence costs 
problem. At least two of these five problem sets, i.e. the control problem and the 
influence costs problem, involve VC. However, the nature of VC in these problem sets 
seems to be quite different, and requires therefore different modelling. Third, research 
regarding the governance of cooperatives is usually highlighting the differential 
incentives of various board models (Bijman et al., 2013). Such research addresses the 
relationship between a board representing the members and the professional 
management of the cooperative enterprise. However, the relationship between the 
professional management and the many individual members in terms of management 
may be more important in the creation of value, and is challenging and complex (Cook, 
1994). Research regarding the governance of cooperatives will therefore benefit from 
putting more emphasis on the managerial importance of developing and implementing 
communication policies by distinguishing various types of communication and 
recognizing their differential impacts. Finally, we stated at the beginning of section 2 
that the information about the two cooperatives are descriptions. These descriptions are 
valuable because they signal important phenomena in cooperatives. However, it will be 
informative and important to have future research using a rigorous case study 
methodology in the collection of data.  
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Cooperatives and Investor-Owned 
Firms in a Member Sorting Model
Abstract
This article addresses how heterogeneous farmers in terms of location and quality sort 
themselves across processor enterprises and determine the governance structures of their 
enterprises by majority voting in a duopoly market. The processor enterprise can be 
either a cooperative (Coop) or an investor-owned firm (IOF). The Coop pays a uniform 
price to all farmers to maximize members’ revenue and retains no profits, whereas the 
IOF differentiates payments based on quality and maximizes profits. A three-stage game 
is developed to address the sorting of farmers, the choice of governance structure at the 
processor enterprise, and the production choices of the farmers. In equilibrium, a farmer 
tends to choose the enterprise most close to him/her, and a farmer with a high quality 
product tends to choose an IOF. We establish that the Coop (mixed, IOF) market is the 
equilibrium market structure when the payment for quality by the IOF is low 
(intermediate, high).
Keywords: Cooperatives, investor-owned firms, farmer heterogeneity, sorting, majority 
voting
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 ‘To our knowledge, there is no analysis in which both consumers and producers are 
differentiated. ’  
Fulton & Giannakas (2013, p64) 
‘If the membership expands, the composition of the future electorate changes. When 
today’s members vote for expansion, they have to take into account the impact on 
tomorrow’s vote. This is difficult territory. … We leave such tantalizing issues to future 
research.’ 
Hart & Moore (1996, p67) 
 
3.1 Introduction 
“For Farmers” is an animal feed enterprise. Its origins date back to 1896 when the 
cooperative Welbegrepen Eigenbelang was formed in the eastern part of the Netherlands. 
In a process of mergers (between cooperatives) and acquisitions, a large cooperative 
emerged with production facilities in the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany and the 
United Kingdom, 2,370 employees, and a turnover of 2.2 billion euros in 2015. In 2016, 
the 6300 members of For farmers voted almost unanimously to change the governance 
structure of For farmers from a Coop to an IOF (Kosterman, 2016). This article will 
address how many independent farmers sort themselves across enterprises and choose 
the governance structure of the enterprise by majority voting.  
Governance structures are distinguished by ownership rights, decision rights, and 
income rights (Baker, Gibbons, & Murphy, 2008). A Coop is defined as user-owned, 
user-controlled, and user-benefitted (Dunn, 1988), i.e. a Coop is an enterprise 
collectively owned by many independent upstream or downstream farmers. Collective 
ownership requires a collective decision-making procedure. Democratic decision-
making with a majority rule is the most well-known procedure and adopted by most 
Coops. The impact of this procedure is analyzed on the sorting of farmers across 
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processor enterprises, their anticipation of the choice of the majority voting outcome, 
and their production decisions. We follow Hart & Moore (1996) in adopting the one-
member-one-vote voting rule. If at least half of the farmers at a processor enterprise vote 
for the Coop (IOF), then a Coop (IOF) governance structure is adopted for this enterprise.  
Fulton & Giannakas (2013) argue that member heterogeneity becomes gradually more 
important for organizations generally, and for Coops in particular. Membership 
heterogeneity can be measured by variables such as geographic dispersion, the number 
of different commodities produced or inputs purchased by the members, the variance in 
members’ age, the variance in members’ educational levels, the differences between 
members in farm size, the percentage of non-farm income, or the differences between 
members in terms of business objectives (Iliopoulos & Cook, 1999). Member 
heterogeneity reflects therefore various benefits of members in different ways, and it 
affects the members’ decisions such as coop’s membership choice, R&D support, and 
the efforts to achieve product quality. We highlight that Coops and IOFs differ in their 
price policies regarding heterogeneous farmers. 
Two income rights of a Coop are pooling and the zero-profit constraint. Cook, Iliopoulos, 
& Chaddad (2004) observe that pooling of revenues, which is a form of uniform price, 
is a common and traditional price scheme in Coops. For example, Emanuelsson & 
Lindholm (2000) mentioned that uniform delivered pricing is prevalent in the Swedish 
cooperative banking sector. Sometimes the government enforces pooling schemes to 
enable price supports and open access to resources like fisheries (Weitzman, 1974), and 
average cost pricing is used to allocate surpluses or deficits (Sexton, 1986).7 The zero-
profit feature captures that the revenues of the Coop are returned to members and that 
the Coop has therefore zero-profits, or balances its budget (Fulton & Giannakas, 2013; 
Helmberger & Hoos, 1962). We use the uniform price as the price policy of a Coop. It 
                                                        
7 Non-uniform pricing schemes are developed when there is a heterogeneous membership to strengthen 
fairness and efficiency in agricultural cooperatives. However, it is likely to have distributional 
consequences (Fulton & Vercammen, 1995). Sexton (1986) observes that a non-uniform pricing 
mechanism is difficult to implement because it requires substantial information about members. 
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implies that the Coop does not differentiate payments to farmers based on quality. This 
is done by paying an average price to every farmer/member. The IOF is an enterprise 
which pays farmers based on their product quality and/or quantity. The IOF may decide 
to differentiate prices based on product quality. The Coop and IOF deal therefore in a 
different way with member heterogeneity. We analyze how this difference in the price 
policy has an impact on the choice of processor of the farmers, the choice of governance 
structure at each processor, and the production decisions of the farmers, i.e. the 
interaction between ownership rights (i.e. majority voting by members), and income 
rights (i.e. the price policy at the processor enterprise) are addressed. 
Horizontal and vertical product differentiation models are surveyed by Mérel, et al. 
(2009). Horizontal product differentiation captures that consumers differ in their 
preferences regarding products. The classic model is formulated by Hotelling (1929). In 
his model enterprises position their products by a choice of location. A consumer closer 
to the location of an enterprise likes the product of this enterprise more. For example, 
Fulton & Giannakas (2001) and Giannakas & Fulton (2005) analyze the impact of 
member heterogeneity on innovation, where the level of commitment towards a 
consumer Coops is modelled along the lines of a horizontal product differentiation 
model. Producer heterogeneity in terms of location is analyzed with the Hotelling model 
by Sexton (1990).  
Consumers agree unanimously about the ranking of producers in vertical product 
differentiation models, i.e. all consumers prefer high quality above low quality. Vertical 
product differentiation models are mostly adapted from Mussa & Rosen (1978). For 
example, Hoffmann (2005) investigates how ownership affects quality endogenously in 
a duopoly market with price competition under various cost structures. Pennerstorfer & 
Weiss (2012) investigate the incentive to produce high quality in a mixed duopoly. They 
claim that the Coop is characterized by decentralized decision-making which gives rise 
to overproduction and free riding. Therefore the Coop never produces high quality 
goods compared to the IOF. Liang & Hendrikse (2016) examine farmers’ outlet and 
production choices in a vertically differentiated mixed duopoly market. A similar 
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finding is that the farmers with low quality products deliver to the cooperative, whereas 
farmers with high quality products deliver to the IOF. Moreover they find that the 
cooperative has a competitive yardstick effect. 
Coops and IOFs coexist in most agricultural markets (Fulton & Giannakas, 2001; 
Hendrikse, 1998). Various explanations have been formulated for their coexistence, such 
as supply assurance (Carlton 1979a and 1979b), differences in the risk attitudes of both 
consumers and producers (Hendrikse and Peters, 1989), a pro-competitive yardstick 
effect of Coops on its rival IOF’s pricing behavior (Sexton, 1990), screening differences 
in the decision-making processes of Coops and IOFs (Hendrikse, 1998), and contractual 
externalities in contract formation (Hendrikse, 2007). 
Both consumer and producer differentiation are not yet investigated in one model 
(Fulton & Giannakas 2013, p64). This article develops a model where both types of 
heterogeneity are present. Producers differ in location and quality, while consumer 
heterogeneity is reflected as vertical product differentiation. The interactions between 
sorting of heterogeneous farmers, majority voting at enterprises, and production are 
analyzed in a three stage model. Each farmer chooses an enterprise in the first stage. In 
the second stage farmers choose collectively the governance structure of their enterprise 
by majority voting. In the last stage, the farmer decides to produce or not. Novel features 
of our model are therefore that both consumers and producers are differentiated (Fulton 
& Giannakas, 2013), and that producers anticipate that the prospect of the governance 
structure, and therefore the price policy of the enterprise, will be determined by majority 
voting and has an impact on the composition of the electorate and therefore the outcome 
(Hart & Moore, 1996, p67). In equilibrium a farmer tends to choose the enterprise most 
close to him/her, and a farmer with a high quality product tends to choose an IOF. The 
market consists of 2 (1, 0) Coops and 0 (1, 2) IOFs when the payment for quality by the 
IOF is low (intermediate, high). 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 formulates 
the Nash equilibrium choices of the farmers. Section 4 considers a specific choice of 
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price policy by the IOF. Finally, section 5 formulates the conclusions and future research 
directions.
3.2 Model
In this section we present the model of a three-stage non-cooperative game. Farmers are 
heterogeneous in two uncorrelated dimensions: distance 𝑑  and quality 𝑣  (Shelef & 
Nguyen-Chyung, 2015). A farmer is characterized by (𝑑, 𝑣) . Farmers are uniformly 
distributed over the unit square [0, 1] × [0, 1]. Define enterprise e as being located at (e, 
0), e  ∈ {0,1} . Farmer 𝑓 ≡ (𝑑, 𝑣)  represents therefore a farmer with quality level 𝑣 
located at a distance 𝑑 (1 − 𝑑) from enterprise 0 (1). Figure 3.1 shows the positioning 
of farmer 𝑓 and the two enterprises in the unit square. 
Figure 3.1: Positioning of a farmer 𝑓 and the enterprises in the market
Let 𝑒𝑓 ∈ {0,1} be the choice of enterprise e by farmer f. Define 𝐸0 ≡ {𝑓|𝑒𝑓 = 0}(𝐸1 ≡
{𝑓|𝑒𝑓 = 1}) as the set of the farmers who choose enterprise 0 (1), and the set of all 
farmers as 𝐸 ≡ 𝐸0 ∪ 𝐸1 . Denote 𝑔𝑓 ∈ {𝐼, 𝐶}  as the governance structure choice of 
farmer 𝑓, where I reflects governance structure IOF and C reflects governance structure 
Coop. Define 𝐸𝑒𝐶 = {𝑓|𝑒𝑓 = 𝑒, 𝑔𝑓 = 𝐶}  as the set of farmers choosing governance 
structure Coop at enterprise e. Similarly, define 𝐸𝑒𝐼 = {𝑓|𝑒𝑓 = 𝑒, 𝑔𝑓 = 𝐼} as the set of 
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farmers choosing governance structure IOF at enterprise e. The governance structure of 
enterprise e is defined as 𝑔𝑒 and determined by majority voting of the farmers, i.e. 𝑔𝑒 =
{
𝐶,𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 
|𝐸𝑒𝑐|
|𝐸𝑒𝐼|
> 1   
𝐼, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒            
.  
Let the market price be 𝑌(𝑣) = 𝛿𝑣 , where 𝛿 > 0  is the exogenous market taste 
parameter regarding the product (Mussa & Rosen, 1978). Assume that the processing 
cost of enterprise e is 0. Define 𝑝𝑒𝐼(𝑣) = 𝛽e𝑣, with 0< 𝛽e ≤ 𝛿, as the price paid by 
enterprise e with governance structure IOF to a farmer who delivers one unit of product 
with quality 𝑣 , i.e. the farmer’s payment is incrementally affected by his delivered 
product quality. Define 𝑝𝑒𝐶 as the uniform price paid to the members by enterprise e 
with governance structure Coop. Define the uniform price as the average price paid to 
the producing members, i.e. the total revenue divided by the total number of the 
members who produce. It is equal to 𝑝𝑒𝐶 = ∬𝛿𝑣𝑝(𝑓|𝐸𝑒) 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑣, where 𝑝(𝑓|𝐸𝑒) is the 
density function of the farmers in enterprise e.  
Assume that the travel cost per unit of distance is 1. Therefore, the distance cost of a 
farmer f who delivers to enterprise e is 𝑐𝑓𝑒 = |𝑑 − 𝑒|. Assume the production cost of a 
farmer is 0. Define 𝑞𝑓 as the amount of production by farmer f. Assume that a farmer 
produces either one unit of a product, or nothing, i.e. 𝑞𝑓 ∈ {0,1}. The payoff of farmer f 
is therefore defined as  
𝜋𝑒 = {
𝛽𝑒𝑣𝑞𝑓 − 𝑐𝑓𝑒 , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑔𝑒 = 𝐼  
𝑝𝑒𝐶𝑞𝑓 − 𝑐𝑓𝑒 ,   𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝑔𝑒 = 𝐶 
.  
In the first stage of the game, farmers choose independently and simultaneously to 
deliver their products either to enterprise 0 or to enterprise 1. In the second stage, the 
governance structure of each enterprise 𝑔𝑒, i.e. IOF or Coop, is determined by majority 
voting. The choice of governance structure determines the price policy, i.e. a uniform 
price in the Coop and a price proportional to quality in the IOF. In the third stage, farmers 
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choose 𝑞𝑓, i.e. to produce and deliver one unit or nothing. The sequence of decisions in 
the game is depicted in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: The sequence of decisions
3.3 Equilibrium
The game is solved by backward induction. It entails three steps. First, it is determined 
for each farmer whether it is attractive to produce one unit or nothing, given a choice of 
enterprise of each farmers in the first stage, i.e. a composition of the sets 𝐸0 and 𝐸1, and 
given a choice of governance structure of the enterprises 0 and 1 in the second stage, i.e. 
a choice of 𝑔𝑒 . Next the choice of governance structure at the two enterprises is 
determined in the second stage, given a choice of enterprise of each farmer in the first 
stage, and anticipating the payoff maximizing production choices of the farmers in the 
third stage of the game. Finally, the payoff maximizing choice of enterprise is 
determined for each farmer, anticipating the majority vote of governance structure at the 
two enterprises in the second stage of the game, and the payoff maximizing production 
choices of all farmers in the third stage of the game.
The solution method of backward induction entails that an infinite number of enterprise 
choice possibilities of the farmers have to be considered when the payoff maximizing 
choices in the second and third stage of the game are determined. We deal with this issue 
by on the one hand exploiting the fact that many choices are not equilibrium outcomes 
 
 
45 
 
and on the other hand considering only one of the two mixed markets.8 In section 3.3.1 
we determine the production decisions. In section 3.3.2 the governance structure choices 
are determined. In section 3.3.3, the enterprise choices of the farmers are determined. 
3.3.1 Production choices 
The production decisions have to be determined for all possible choices of enterprise of 
all farmers and all possible choices of governance structure at the two enterprises. Three 
settings 𝐺 = 𝐼,𝑀, 𝐶 are distinguished regarding the governance structure choices in the 
second stage. First, 𝐺 = 𝐼 , the IOF market: the two enterprises choose the IOF 
governance structure (𝑔𝑒 = 𝐼). Second, 𝐺 = 𝑀, the mixed market: enterprise 0 chooses 
the Coop (𝑔0 = 𝐶) and enterprise 1 chooses the IOF (𝑔1 = 𝐼). Lastly, 𝐺 = 𝐶, the Coop 
market: the two enterprises choose the Coop governance structure (𝑔𝑒 = 𝐶 ). The 
farmers being indifferent between the two enterprises are identified, and it implies the 
strict preference of all other farmers regarding the choice of enterprise. Evaluating these 
enterprise choices will characterize the equilibrium choices in the first and second stage 
of the game.  
IOF market 
Suppose that both enterprises have adopted the IOF. The quality level 𝑣𝑒𝑔
∗  at which 
farmers are indifferent between producing and not producing at location e with 
governance structure g is determined by 𝑝𝑒𝑔 − 𝑐𝑓𝑒 = 0 . A farmer at enterprise e 
produces one unit when 𝑝𝑒𝑔 − 𝑐𝑓𝑒 ≥ 0, while a farmer produces nothing when 𝑝𝑒𝑔 −
                                                        
8 Many choices do not have to be considered by realizing that a farmer will not join a specific enterprise 
when another farmer with the same quality level but closer to this enterprise does not join this 
enterprise. This feature will be used to determine the location 𝑑∗ at which farmer (𝑑, 𝑣) is indifferent 
regarding the choice of enterprise. Similarly, a farmer will not deliver to a specific enterprise when 
another farmer with the same distance to this enterprise but lower quality level, choses to produce 
nothing. This feature will be used to determine the quality level 𝑣∗ of a farmer (𝑑, 𝑣) at which this 
farmer is indifferent regarding production. Only the mixed market consisting of enterprise 0 with 
governance structure Coop and enterprise 1 with governance structure IOF is addressed. The other 
mixed market is not considered because the analysis is symmetric and it would introduce only certain 
coordination problems which are not core to the topic of this article. 
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𝑐𝑓𝑒 < 0. The indifferent quality level in an IOF market is determined by 𝛽0𝑣 − 𝑑 =
0 (𝛽1𝑣 − (1 − 𝑑) = 0). This results in 𝑣0𝐼
∗ =
𝑑
𝛽0
 (𝑣1𝐼
∗ =
1−𝑑
𝛽1
).
We also determine the location of the farmers being indifferent between the two 
enterprises. The indifferent farmer location is determined by 𝑝0𝑔 − 𝑐𝑓0 = 𝑝1𝑔 − 𝑐𝑓1 ⟺
𝑑𝐺
∗ =
𝑝0𝑔−𝑝1𝑔+1
2
 .The location of these farmers is therefore characterized by 𝑑𝐼
∗ =
(𝛽0−𝛽1)𝑣+1
2
 in an IOF market structure. Therefore, each farmer satisfying both 𝑝0𝐼(𝑣) −
𝑐𝑓0 ≥ 0 ⟺ 𝑑 ≤ 𝛽0𝑣 and 𝑑 ≤
(𝛽0−𝛽1)𝑣+1
2
  delivers one unit of product to the IOF at 
location 0. It is shown in the shaded area [𝑣0𝐼
∗ , 1] × [0, 𝑑𝐼
∗] in Figure 3.3.  Similarly, the 
farmers in the shaded area [𝑣1𝐼
∗ , 1] × [𝑑𝐼
∗, 1] deliver to IOF 1. 
                                   
Figure 3.3: Production choices of the farmers in an IOF market structure
Mixed duopoly market 
Suppose that enterprise 0 adopts the Coop and enterprise 1 adopts the IOF. The farmers 
being indifferent between producing and not producing at the Coop at location 0 are 
determined by 𝑝0𝐶 − 𝑐𝑓0 = 0⟺𝑝0𝐶
∗ = 𝑑, i.e. the farmers located to the left of 𝑑 = 𝑝0𝐶
∗  
produce and deliver the products, while the farmers located to the right of 𝑑 = 𝑝0𝐶
∗  do 
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not produce. The farmers being indifferent between producing and not producing at the 
IOF at location 1 is determined by 𝑝1𝐼 − 𝑐𝑓1 = 0 ⟺ 𝛽1𝑣 − (1 − 𝑑) = 0⟺ 𝑣1𝐼
∗ =
1−𝑑
𝛽1
. 
Moreover, the location of the farmers being indifferent between the two enterprises is 
𝑑𝑀
∗ =
𝑝0𝐶−𝛽1𝑣+1
2
 in a mixed duopoly market.9  
For the distance dimension, farmers located to the right of the downward sloping line 
𝑑𝑀
∗ =
𝑝0𝐶−𝛽1𝑣+1
2
 are not delivering to the Coop 0 because the (distance) costs are too 
high and the payment for quality is below what IOF 1 is offering. Similarly, farmers 
located to the left of the line 𝑑𝑀∗ =
𝑝0𝐶−𝛽1𝑣+1
2
 are not delivering to the IOF 1 because the 
(distance) costs are too high. For the quality dimension, the farmers located below the 
downward sloping line 𝑣1𝐼∗ =
1−𝑑 
𝛽1
 are not delivering to IOF 1 because the payment for 
the (low) quality is not sufficient to cover the distance cost.  
The price paid by Coop 0 is an average price satisfying the zero-profit constraint. It 
equals to the total revenue divided by the total number of the members who produce. 
Three ranges of the payment parameter 𝛽1 (small, medium, and large) are distinguished. 
Consider first case 𝛽1  is small. Take 𝛽1 = 0.5𝛿  and 𝛿 = 1 . 𝑝0𝐶
∗ =
∫ ∫ 𝛿𝑣 𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑣
𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑝0𝐶,𝑑𝑀
∗ ,1)
0
𝑚𝑖𝑛 (1,
𝑝0𝐶+1
𝛽1
)
0
∫ ∫  𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑣
𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑝0𝐶,𝑑𝑀,
∗ 1)
0
𝑚𝑖𝑛 (1,
𝑝0𝐶+1
𝛽1
)
0
=
𝛿
2
=
1
2
 . Consider next case 𝛽1 is intermediate. Take 
𝛽1 = 0.905𝛿 and 𝛿 = 1.  This results in 𝑝0𝐶
∗ = 0.468. Suppose 𝛽1 is large. Take 𝛽1 =
𝛿 = 1. This results in 𝑝0𝐶
∗ = 0.455. Figure 3.4 presents these three cases. 
                                                        
9 The indifferent farmer location is determined by 𝑝0𝐶 − 𝑐𝑓0 = 𝑝1𝐼 − 𝑐𝑓1 ⟺ 𝑝0𝐶 − 𝑑 = 𝛽1𝑣 −
(1 − 𝑑) ⟺ 𝑑𝑀
∗ =
𝑝0𝐶−𝛽1𝑣+1
2
.  
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Figure 3.4: Production choices of the farmers in a mixed market structure
Notice that the numerical example indicates that the price paid by the Coop decreases 
when the payment by the IOF increases. This is due to more high quality farmers 
switching from the Coop to the IOF when the payment by the IOF increases. Notice also 
that the composition of producing and non-producing farmers changes when the 
payment by the IOF changes. If the payment by the IOF increases, then some farmers 
with relatively low quality and located close to the IOF will switch from not-producing 
to producing.  There are also some farmers switching from producing to not-producing 
when the payment by the IOF increases. Some farmers delivering to the Coop will stop 
producing because the price paid by the Coop decreases due to some high quality 
farmers switching from the Coop to the IOF. Farmers located relatively far away from 
the Coop will not be able to cover the distance costs anymore, and prefer therefore to 
produce nothing.
Coop market
Suppose that both enterprises adopt the Coop. The farmers being indifferent between 
producing and not producing in the Coop market are determined by 𝑝𝑒𝑔(𝑣) − 𝑐𝑓𝑒 = 0. 
This results in 𝑝0𝐶
∗ = 𝑑 and 𝑝1𝐶
∗ = 1 − 𝑑.
Next, we determine the farmer’s location 𝑑𝐶
∗ =
𝑝0𝐶−𝑝1𝐶+1
2
   at which farmers are 
indifferent between the two enterprises in a Coop market structure. The indifferent 
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farmer location is determined by 𝑝0𝐶 − 𝑑 = 𝑝1𝐶 − (1 − 𝑑) ⟺ 𝑑𝐶
∗ =
𝑝0𝐶−𝑝1𝐶+1
2
. Notice 
that 𝑑𝐶
∗  is independent of 𝑣. This is due to the assumption that the production cost of 
quality is 0. It entails that a farmer at 𝑑 chooses Coop 0 or 1 independently of his product 
value 𝑣. We compute that 𝑝0𝐶
∗ =
∫ ∫ 𝛿𝑣 𝑑𝑣 𝑑𝑑
1
0
𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑝0𝐶,
𝑝0𝐶−𝑝1𝐶+1
2 )
0
∫ ∫ 1 𝑑𝑣 𝑑𝑑
1
0
𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑝0𝐶,
𝑝0𝐶−𝑝1𝐶+1
2 )
0
=
𝛿
2
 , which is driven by 
the market price 𝛿𝑣. Symmetrically, 𝑝1𝐶
∗ =
𝛿
2
. The farmers who choose Coop 0 (1) earn 
𝛿
2
− 𝑑 (
𝛿
2
− 1 + 𝑑).
 The two coops cover the market and split it equally when 𝑑𝐶
∗ =
1
2
. Figure 3.5 illustrates 
the sorting of farmer in a Coop market structure. Notice that when 0 < 𝛿 < 1, 𝑝0𝐶
∗ =
𝑝1𝐶
∗ <
1
2
. It implies that some farmers choose to produce nothing due to the high distance 
cost. Therefore the production choices in a Coop market are: when 0 < 𝛿 < 1, farmers 
produce one unit of the product when 𝑑 <
𝛿
2
 and 𝑑 >
𝛿
2
+
1
2
 , otherwise they produce 
nothing. When 𝛿 ≥ 1, all farmers produce. The results are formulated in Proposition 1. 
Proposition 1: In the Coop market, the two Coops split the market and pay the same. 
All farmers produce and deliver when 𝛿 ≥ 1, while only the farmers close to 𝑑 =
1
2
 do 
not produce when 𝛿 < 1.
Figure 3.5: Coop market structure
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3.3.2 Governance structure choices
The equilibrium governance structure choices are determined by majority voting of 𝐸0 
and 𝐸1. We assume that the price policy of the IOFs in the IOF market are identical and 
define 𝛽 ≡ 𝛽0 = 𝛽1 . Three ranges of the price policy parameters 𝛽 of the IOF are 
distinguished in order to determine the equilibrium governance structure choices. If 𝛽 
is small, then the Coop market is the equilibrium because the IOF is not able to attract 
enough farmers due to the low payment. Figure 3.6 presents the three market structures 
with 𝛽 = 0.5 and 𝛿 = 1. 
Figure 3.6: The three market structures when  𝛽 = 0.5 and 𝛿 = 1
First compare the IOF market with the mixed market. The farmers 𝐸0 earn 0.5𝑣 − 𝑑 in 
an IOF, while they earn 0.5 − 𝑑 in a Coop. The farmers 𝐸0 earn more in an IOF only if 
0.5𝑣 − 𝑑 > 0.5 − 𝑑 ⟺ 𝑣 > 1 . This implies that all the farmers 𝐸0  prefer a Coop 
governance structure due to the average payment being higher than the differentiated 
payment 𝛽 . Therefore the mixed market dominates the IOF market. It follows 
immediate with the same reasoning that the Coop market dominates the mixed market. 
The conclusion is therefore that the Coop market is the equilibrium. This result holds 
also when 𝛽 < 0.5.
Consider now intermediate values of 𝛽. Figure 3.7 presents the three market structures 
when 𝛽 = 0.905 and 𝛿 = 1. First we compare the IOF market with the mixed market. 
The farmers 𝐸0 earn 0.905𝑣 − 𝑑 in an IOF, while they earn 0.468 − 𝑑 in a Coop. The 
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farmers 𝐸0 are indifferent when 0.905𝑣 − 𝑑 = 0.468 − 𝑑 ⟺ 𝑣
∗ ≈ 0.517 . Therefore, 
the farmers 𝐸0 in the area 𝑣 < 𝑣
∗ = 0.517, 𝑝 < 𝑝0𝐶
∗ = 0.468 prefer a Coop governance 
structure, while the farmers 𝐸0 in the area 𝑣 > 𝑣
∗ = 0.517 , 𝑣 > 𝑣0
∗ =
𝑑
0.905
 prefer an 
IOF governance structure. The former (0.517 × 0.468 = 0.242) dominates the latter 
((1 − 0.517) × 0.5 − 𝜀 = 0.241 − 𝜀). Therefore the mixed market dominates the IOF 
market. We then compare the Coop market and the IOF market. The farmers 𝐸1 in an 
IOF earn 0.905𝑣 − (1 − 𝑑), while the farmers 𝐸1 in a Coop earn 0.5 − (1 − 𝑑). The 
farmers 𝐸1  are indifferent when 0.905𝑣 − (1 − 𝑑) = 0.5 − (1 − 𝑑) ⟺ 𝑣
∗ ≈ 0.552 . 
Therefore the farmers in the area 𝑑 > 𝑑𝑀
∗  and 𝑣 > 𝑣∗ = 0.552 choose an IOF (0.448 ×
0.5 + 0.032 × 0.413 +
1
2
× 0.187 × 0.413 + 𝜀 = 0.276 + 𝜀) and they outnumber the 
farmers in the area 𝑑 >
1
2
  and 𝑣 < 𝑣∗ = 0.552  who prefer a Coop (0.552 × 0.5 =
0.276 ). The mixed market dominates also the Coop market, and is therefore the 
equilibrium. 
Figure 3.7: The three market structures when  𝛽 = 0.905 and 𝛿 = 1
Figure 3.8 presents the three market structures when 𝛽 = 1  and 𝛿 = 1 . First we 
compare the Coop market with the mixed market. The farmers 𝐸0 earn 𝑣 − 𝑑 in an IOF, 
while they earn 0.455 − 𝑑 in a Coop. The farmers 𝐸0 are indifferent when 𝑣 − 𝑑 =
0.455 − 𝑑 ⟺ 𝑣∗ ≈ 0.455.  Therefore the farmers in the area 𝑣 < 𝑣∗ = 0.455  and 
𝑑 < 𝑝0𝐶
∗ = 0.455 prefer a Coop governance structure, but the farmers in the area 𝑣 >
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𝑣∗ and 𝑑 <
1
2
 prefer an IOF governance structure and outnumber them. Therefore the 
IOF market dominates the mixed market. Compare then the Coop market with the IOF 
market. The farmers 𝐸0 are indifferent when 𝑣 − 𝑑 = 0.5 − 𝑑 ⟺ 𝑣
∗ = 0.5. For both 
enterprises, the farmers at 𝑣 >
1
2
  prefer an IOF due to the high quality payment, and the 
farmers at 𝑣 <
1
2
  prefer a Coop. Therefore, the IOF market is the equilibrium market 
structure when 𝛽 = 1. When 𝛿 is 2, the Coop market is the equilibrium market structure 
when 0 < 𝛽 < 1.6.  The mixed market is the equilibrium market structure when 𝛽 is 
around 1.6. The IOF market is the equilibrium market structure when 1.7 < 𝛽 ≤ 2 . 
Furthermore, we test when 𝛿 is very small and very large. We find that Coop (IOF) 
market is the equilibrium when 𝛽 is small (large).
Figure 3.8: The three market structures when 𝛽 = 1 and 𝛿 = 1
We conclude that when 𝛽 is small, i.e. the IOF does not pay a high price, the IOF is not 
attractive. More farmers prefer the Coop, and 𝑝𝑒𝐶
∗  is therefore high. A Coop market is 
the equilibrium. When 𝛽 is large, i.e. the IOF pays a high price, more farmers choose 
the IOF. The IOF market is the equilibrium. When 𝛿  and 𝛽  are intermediate, both 
governance structures attract farmers. Specifically, the IOF attracts more high value 
farmers while the Coop attracts more low value farmers. The mixed market is the 
equilibrium. Additionally, when 𝛿 is small (i.e. 𝛿 < 1), some farmers do not produce 
and deliver because they are far away from both enterprises. There is no 
interaction/competition between the IOF and the Coop, and the mixed market therefore 
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does not emerge. When 𝛿 is very large (e.g. 𝛿 = 10), the IOF attracts most farmers. The 
mixed market does not emerge. The results are summarized in Proposition 2 and 
Proposition 3, and depicted in Figure 3.9. The numerical examples are shown in the 
appendix.
Proposition 2: The Coop (IOF) market is the equilibrium market structure when 𝛽 is 
small (large).
Proposition 3: If 𝛿 is at an intermediate level, then there exist intermediate values of 
𝛽 such that the mixed market is the equilibrium market structure.
Figure 3.9: Equilibrium governance structures in the market (𝛽, 𝛿)
3.3.3 Enterprise choices
The equilibrium enterprise choices of the farmers have to be determined in the first stage 
of the game. The definitions of 𝑑𝐺
∗   and 𝑣𝑒𝑔
∗   characterize the equilibrium enterprise 
choices. Take 𝛿 = 1. When 𝛽 is large, the IOF market is the equilibrium. The farmers 
at 𝑑𝐼
∗ < (>)
1
2
 choose enterprise 0 (1). When 𝛽 = 0.905 , the governance structure of 
enterprise 0 (1) is Coop (IOF). The farmers at the left (right) of 𝑑𝑀
∗ =
1.468−0.905𝑣
2
 
choose enterprise 0 (1). When 𝛽 is small, the Coop market is the equilibrium, and the 
farmers at 𝑑 < (>)
1
2
 choose enterprise 0 (1).
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3.4 Profit maximizing IOF  
The IOF is characterized as an enterprise which pays a farmer 𝛽 for each unit of quality 
delivered, and therefore the IOF earns 1 − 𝛽 for each unit delivered to it. The payment 
policy 𝛽 of the IOF is an exogenous parameter in the model. This raises the question 
how to endogenize 𝛽. A natural way to incorporate the choice of 𝛽 in the game is the 
second stage, i.e. a choice of governance structure entails a process of determining the 
choice of beta. This can be done in various ways. 
Our model highlights the importance of individual farmers in the supply chain. This is 
reflected in the first stage of the game by each farmer choosing the enterprise where the 
harvest will be delivered, in the second stage by the choice of governance structure of 
the enterprise by majority voting of the farmers, and the production decision by farmers 
in the third stage of the game. One way to endogenize 𝛽 is to assume that the payment 
policy 𝛽 in an IOF is chosen in a profit maximizing way by an outside entrepreneur. It 
entails that the entrepreneur pays 𝛽 for each unit of quality delivered. The remainder 
1 − 𝛽 is earned by the entrepreneur, and therefore farmers do not capture all value 
generated by their productive efforts. This matches with the observation that many 
markets are characterized by the coexistence of Coops and IOFs characterized by 
outside entrepreneurs (Fulton & Giannakas, 2001; Hendrikse, 1998, 2007; Liang & 
Hendrikse, 2016). 
We will present in this section the implications of characterizing the IOF as a profit-
maximizing entrepreneur regarding the choice of 𝛽 . The implicit assumption is that 
there are prohibitive costs of dealing with member heterogeneity in a Coop. The analysis 
is involved because endogenizing 𝛽 implies also endogenizing the sets 𝐸0 and 𝐸1, and 
therefore endogenizing the outcome of the majority voting by choosing the majority at 
each enterprise (Hart & Moore, 1996, p67). 
The game with the profit maximizing IOF is again solved by backward induction. The 
production decisions in the final stage of the game are identical to the ones specified in 
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section 3.3.1 because the profit maximizing price policy of the IOF is a specific value 
of the price policy of the IOF. In the second stage the farmers anticipate that the choice 
for the IOF implies that they will face a payment for quality which is determined by the 
IOF in order to maximize its profit. The payoff maximizing price policy of the IOF has 
therefore to be determined. This is done in section 3.4.1. Section 3.4.2 is dedicated to 
the governance structure choices, and section 3.4.3 to the enterprise choices of the 
farmers. 
3.4.1 Profit maximizing price policy of the IOF  
IOF market 
An IOF is assumed to maximize its profit, and therefore 𝛽0 and 𝛽1 have to be chosen in 
a payoff maximizing way. The payoff of the IOF at location 0 is 
𝜋0𝐼 = ∫ ∫ (𝑌(𝑣) − 𝑝0𝐼(𝑣)
min(𝛽0𝑣,
(𝛽0−𝛽1)𝑣+1
2
)
0
)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑣
1
0
  
= ∫ ∫ (𝛿 − 𝛽0
𝛽0𝑣
0
)𝑣𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑣 +
1
𝛽0+𝛽1
0
∫ ∫ (𝛿 − 𝛽0
(𝛽0−𝛽1)𝑣+1
2
0
)𝑣𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑣
1
1
𝛽0+𝛽1
.  
Symmetrically, the payoff of the IOF at location 1 is 
𝜋1𝐼 = ∫ ∫ (𝑌(𝑣) − 𝑝1𝐼(𝑣)
1
max(1−𝛽1𝑣,
(𝛽0−𝛽1)𝑣+1
2
)
)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑣
1
0
  
= ∫ ∫ (𝛿 − 𝛽1
1
1−𝛽1𝑣
)𝑣𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑣 +
1
𝛽0+𝛽1
0
∫ ∫ (𝛿 − 𝛽1
1
(𝛽0−𝛽1)𝑣+1
2
)𝑣𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑣
1
1
𝛽0+𝛽1
.  
The payoff maximizing price policy of enterprise e as a function of the price policy 
parameter of the other enterprise is called the reaction function of enterprise e. The 
reaction function of enterprise e is determined by maximizing 𝜋𝑒𝐼 with respect to 𝛽𝑒, 
given the price policy of the other enterprise. The first order condition is a fourth degree 
polynomial. The mathematical software package Maple shows that there are real as well 
as complex roots to the first order condition. We proceed by determining the equilibrium 
price policies and the slopes of the reaction functions for specific parameter values. The 
Nash Equilibrium price policies are determined by the intersection of the two reaction 
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functions: 𝛽0
∗ = 𝛽1
∗. When 𝛿 = 1, an equilibrium payment policy for each IOF is 𝛽0
∗ =
𝛽1
∗ =
1
2
.  This result is formulated in Proposition 4. 
Proposition 4: In the IOF market, the two IOFs split the market equally and pay the 
same. 
The nature of the payment policy competition between the two IOFs is reflected by the 
slope of the reaction functions. A competitive variable with a negative (positive) slope 
of the reaction function is called a strategic substitute (complement) (Fudenberg & 
Tirole, 1984). The slopes of the reaction functions are negative at (𝛽0∗, 𝛽1∗) = (
1
2
,
1
2
), and 
they are presented in Figure 3.10. The calculation 𝑑𝛽0
∗
𝑑𝛽1
=
𝑑𝛽1
∗
𝑑𝛽0
= −
3
11
< 0 is presented in 
the appendix. The explanation of this result is as follows. When IOF 0 increases the 
price parameter 𝛽0, a larger part of the farmer deliveries are taken by IOF 0. This implies 
that the residual supply left for IOF 1 decreases. Moreover, the average quality of the 
remaining farmers at IOF 1 decreases as well because only high quality farmers are 
leaving. They are leaving IOF 1 because they are producing/delivering and are 
indifferent between the two enterprises before the price increase. Therefore the 
remaining farmers delivering to IOF 1 will have a lower quality on average. The profit-
maximizing response of IOF 1 is to decrease 𝛽1. Proposition 5 formulates this result, 
while the proof is presented in the appendix. 
Proposition 5: In an IOF market, the IOF payment parameters 𝛽0 and 𝛽1 are 
strategic substitutes.  
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Figure 3.10: Reaction functions around (𝛽0
∗, 𝛽1
∗) = (
1
2
,
1
2
)
The production choices of the farmers in an IOF market structure are characterized by 
the separating line 𝑣0𝐼
∗ =
𝑑
𝛽𝑒
∗  (𝑣1𝐼
∗ =
1−𝑑
𝛽𝑒
∗ )  (e.g., when  𝛿 = 1 , 𝑣0𝐼
∗ = 2𝑑 (𝑣1𝐼
∗ = 2(1 −
𝑑)).10 When a farmer’s quality is larger than 𝑣0𝐼
∗  (𝑣1𝐼
∗ ), he/she produces one unit of the 
product. Otherwise he/she produces nothing. Figure 3.11 presents the choice of 
enterprise and the quantity decision of each farmer in an IOF market structure. 
Figure 3.11: IOF market structure
Notice that the payoff maximizing 𝛽𝑒 of IOF e increases with the final product market 
price (𝛿 ). For example, IOFs maximize their profit whith 𝛽0(1)
∗ ≈ 0.36 when 𝛿 =
1
2
 ,  
10 When 𝛿 increases, the slope of 𝑣𝑒𝐼
∗ (𝑑) declines. It entails that when IOFs pay more to farmers, more 
farmers produce. 
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𝛽0(1)
∗ =
1
2
  when 𝛿 = 1 , 𝛽0(1)
∗ ≈ 0.87  when 𝛿 = 2 , 𝛽0(1)
∗ ≈ 1.59  when 𝛿 = 3 , and 
𝛽0(1)
∗ ≈ 2.53 when 𝛿 = 4. It entails that when the market price is higher, IOFs will pay 
a higher price to farmers due to the competition between them. This result regarding the 
IOF market is formulated in Proposition 6.  
Proposition 6: 𝛽0(1)
∗  increases and more farmers deliver when the final product 
market price increases. 
Mixed duopoly market  
The price paid by Coop 0 is an average price satisfying the zero-profit constraint. It is 
equal to the total revenue divided by the total number of the members who produce. 
Two ranges of the market taste parameter δ are distinguished in order to specify the 
price. 
When 𝛿 ≤ 1, 𝑝0𝐶∗ = 𝛽1∗ =
𝛿
2
. 11  
When 𝛿 > 1,  
𝑝0𝐶
∗ =
∫ ∫ 𝛿𝑣 𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑣
𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑝0𝐶,𝑑𝑀
∗ ,1)
0
min (1,
𝑝0𝐶+1
𝛽1
)
0
∫ ∫  𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑣
𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑝0𝐶,𝑑𝑀,
∗ 1)
0
min (1,
𝑝0𝐶+1
𝛽1
)
0
 .  
The slope of 𝑑𝑀
∗  varies with different value of 𝛿, and therefore the boundaries of the 
integrals changes correspondly. The detailed computation is shown in the appendix. 
Meanwhile IOF 1 is maximizing its payoff by choosing 𝛽1:  
                                                        
11 Substitute 𝑑 = 𝑝0𝐶  back to 𝑑𝑀
∗ =
𝑝0𝐶−𝛽1𝑣+1
2
, we obtain 𝑣 = 1−𝑝0𝐶
𝛽1
. There is no interaction between 
Coop 0 and IOF 1 when 𝑣 = 1−𝑝0𝐶
𝛽1
≥ 1 . In this case, 𝑝0𝐶∗ =
∫ ∫ 𝛿𝑣 𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑣
p0C
0
1
0
∫ ∫  𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑣
p0C
0
1
0
=
𝛿
2
. 
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝛽1
 𝜋1𝐼 =
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝛽1
(∫ ∫ (𝛿 − 𝛽1)𝑣 𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑣
1
𝑑1𝐼
∗
1
0
) , which results in 𝛽1∗ =
𝛿
2
 . Therefore, 1−𝑝0𝐶
𝛽1
≥ 1⇔
1−
𝛿
2
𝛿
2
=
2−𝛿
𝛿
≥ 1
⇔ 𝛿 ≤ 1. 
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𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝛽1
 𝜋1𝐼 =
𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝛽1
(∫ ∫ (𝛿 − 𝛽1)𝑣 𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑣
1
𝑚𝑎𝑥(1,𝑑𝑀
∗ ,𝑑1𝐼
∗ )
1
max (0,
𝑝0𝐶−1
𝛽1
)
).
When δ = 1.5, solving the above two equations results in poC
∗ ≈ 0.71  and β1
∗ ≈ 0.6 . 
Similarly, we obtain poC
∗ ≈ 0.55 and β1
∗ ≈ 1.88 when δ = 3 and poC
∗ = 4.42 and β1
∗ =
7.63 when δ = 15. Figure 3.12 displays the equilibrium choices of farmers in a mixed 
duopoly market structure for various values of δ. dM
∗  separates the farmers who choose 
Coop 0 or IOF 1. 
Figure 3.12: Mixed duopoly market structure
Notice that when δ is high (low), dM
∗  is flatter (steeper). It entails that IOF 1 (Coop 0) 
attracts more high (low) quality farmers when δ is high. The results are formulated in 
Proposition 7 and Proposition 8.
Proposition 7: There are high (low) value farmers at 𝑑 < (>) 0.5 choosing IOF 1 
(Coop 0) in the mixed market when 𝛿 > 1. 
Proposition 8: If 𝛿 > 1, then IOF 1 (Coop 0) attracts more high (low) value farmers at 
𝑑 < (>) 0.5 when 𝛿 increases.
Another observation is that when δ is high, all farmers produce. Coop 0 as well as IOF 
1 are able to pay a sufficiently high price to the famers to cover the distance cost due to 
the market price is high. All high quality farmers, i.e. even the farmers located close to 
enterprise 0, go to IOF 1 because the policy of highly differentiated payments based on 
quality is sufficiently attractive to cover for the additional distance costs. Similarly, 
farmers with low quality and located close to enterprise 1 will choose to deliver to the 
 
 
60 
 
Coop at location 0. The average quality delivered at the Coop is sufficiently higher than 
the quality of such a farmer to cover for the additional distance cost of delivering to 
Coop 0. The result is formulated in Proposition 9. 
Proposition 9: All farmers produce when δ is sufficiently high. 
3.4.2 Governance structure choices 
The equilibrium governance structure choices are determined in two steps. First, 
compare the Coop market with the mixed market, and determine the circumstances 
when the Coop market dominates the mixed market. Second, we compare the Coop 
market with the IOF market, and determine when the Coop market is the equilibrium. 
First, compare the payoff of each farmer in the Coop market and the mixed duopoly 
market: 
𝜋𝑓|𝐶𝐶 = {
𝑝0 − 𝑑           , 0 ≤ 𝑑 ≤
1
2
           
𝑝1 − (1 − 𝑑),
1
2
< 𝑑 ≤ 1          
, 
𝜋𝑓|𝐶𝐼 = {
𝑝0𝐶 − 𝑑            , 0 < 𝑣 ≤ 𝑣
∗          
𝛽1𝑣 − (1 − 𝑑), 𝑣
∗ < 𝑣 < 1          
. 
The Coop market dominates the mixed market. The IOF does not pay a sufficiently high 
price to attract enough farmers due to its profit maximizing price policy, given the choice 
of enterprise of the farmers. The choice of enterprise 1 by a farmer in the first stage of 
the game entails a powerful position for the outside investor when the IOF governance 
structure is adopted in the second stage of the game. A majority vote of the farmers in 
the set 𝐸1 for the IOF (price policy) will put the outside investor in the attractive take-
it-or-leave-it position when the profit maximizing price is determined in the second 
stage of the game. The majority of the farmers earns more in a Coop than in an IOF 
governance structure. This result is illustrated with four cases (𝛿 is small (0 < 𝛿 ≤ 1), 
intermediate (𝛿 = 1.5) , large (𝛿 = 3), very large (𝛿 = 15)) , and the numerical 
examples are presented in the appendix. 
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Second, compare the payoff of each farmer in the IOF market and the Coop market: 
𝜋𝑓|𝐼𝐼 = {
𝛽0𝑣 − 𝑑          , 0 ≤ 𝑑 ≤
1
2
𝛽1𝑣 − (1 − 𝑑),
1
2
< 𝑑 ≤ 1
′ 
𝜋𝑓|𝐶𝐶 = {
𝑝0 − 𝑑           , 0 ≤ 𝑑 ≤
1
2
𝑝1 − (1 − 𝑑),
1
2
< 𝑑 ≤ 1
. 
When 0 ≤ 𝑑 ≤
1
2
, {
𝜋𝑓|𝐼𝐼 = 𝛽0𝑣 − 𝑑              
𝜋𝑓|𝐶𝐶 = 𝑝0 − 𝑑 =
𝛿
2
− 𝑑
 . When 0 < 𝑣 ≤
1
2
, 𝜋𝑓|𝐼𝐼(= 𝛽0𝑣 − 𝑑) <
𝜋𝑓|𝐶𝐶(=
𝛿
2
− 𝑑), i.e. farmers choose Coop when their quality is lower and equal to 1/2. 
When 
1
2
< 𝑣 ≤ 1, 𝜋𝑓|𝐼𝐼(= 𝛽0𝑣 − 𝑑) > 𝜋𝑓|𝐶𝐶 (=
𝛿
2
− 𝑑) , i.e. farmers choose IOF when 
their quality is higher than 1/2. Similarly, when 0 ≤ 𝑑 ≤
1
2
,   low (high) value farmers 
choose Coop (IOF). High value farmers like to be paid based on their delivered 
products’ quality, while the low value farmers like the average payment by the Coop.  
The number of farmers who like the IOF is always less than the number of the farmers 
who favor the Coop. This explains that the middle value farmers at 𝑣 =
1
2
 choose Coop 
(
𝛽0
2
− 𝑑 <
𝛿
2
− 𝑑). Finally, majority voting determines the governance structures. The 
Coop market is the equilibrium outcome. The result is formulated in Proposition 10.  
Proposition 10: If the IOF adopts a profit maximizing price policy, then the Coop 
market is the equilibrium governance structure of the market for all parameters values. 
This specification of the model results in a Coop market equilibrium. The Coop price 
policy is more attractive than the price policy of a payoff maximizing IOF. The first 
reason is that the profit maximizing feature leads to a low payment to the farmers. The 
second reason is that the sequence of decisions influences the price decision by the IOF. 
The sequence of decisions is that the farmers choose the enterprise before the 
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governance structure is determined, i.e. an IOF determines its price after the IOF 
governance structure is chosen.  
3.4.3 Enterprise choices 
From section 3.4.1 and 3.4.2, we find the Coop market tends to be the Nash equilibrium. 
Therefore, the location choices are: farmers at 𝑑 < (>)
1
2
 choose enterprise 0 (1) and 
farmers at 𝑑 < (>)
𝛿
2
 produce and deliver. 
3.5 Conclusion 
This paper contributes to the study of Coops and IOFs in several ways. First, we have 
formulated a model with consumer and producer heterogeneity. Consumer 
heterogeneity is reflected by vertical product differentiation, while producer 
heterogeneity is captured in terms of the farmers’ location and quality. The result shows 
that the farmers choose the enterprises and the governance structures based on two 
dimensions: distance and quality. The farmers tend to choose the enterprise most close 
to them, and the high value farmers tend to choose an IOF. Second, the choice of 
governance structures by majority voting is analyzed in a duopoly market with sorting 
by members. When the IOF price is low, the Coop market is the equilibrium. When the 
IOF price is in a middle range, the mixed market is the equilibrium. When the IOF price 
is high, the IOF market is the equilibrium. Additionally, when the IOF adopts a profit 
maximizing price policy, the Coop market is always the equilibrium. 
There are several possibilities for future research. First, the information regarding 
quality may differ between the governance structures. Members of a cooperative are 
more likely to make information about the level of quality of their products available 
due to their ownership of the downstream enterprise than farmers delivering to an IOF. 
This may have an impact on the price policy. Second, quality is exogenous in our model. 
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A topic for future research is to endogenize the quality decision by farmers, and to 
determine how these decisions are influenced by the governance structure and price 
policy (Shaked & Sutton, 1982). Third, one of the characteristics of the Coop in our 
model is the pooled price policy. Pooling is important in many cooperatives, but 
nowadays there are also many cooperatives paying for quality to a certain extent. This 
will make the cooperative more attractive for high quality farmers. One way to 
generalize the characterization of the Coop is to assume that 𝛽 is chosen by majority 
voting in a farmer payoff maximizing way and obeying the zero-profit constraint at the 
level of the enterprise. The characterization of the Coop in section 3.3 is then a specific 
case, i.e. the Coop is an enterprise with 𝛽 equal to zero and a balanced budget. However, 
members choosing the payment policy 𝛽  is not without difficulties. There is a 
substantial literature regarding Coops arguing that they may experience difficulties 
dealing with member/farmer heterogeneity (Hansmann, 2009). More generally, it raises 
questions about the nature of the enterprise (Coase, 1937; Grossman & Hart, 1986; 
Williamson, 2000). The impact of a quality differentiated price policy of the cooperative 
on the equilibrium composition of the market is a topic for future research. Fourth, the 
model shows that the mixed or IOF market will not be an equilibrium outcome when 
the price policy of the IOF is chosen in a payoff maximizing way. However, these 
markets are equilibrium phenomena for certain parameter values when a different price 
policy is adopted by the IOF. Such a price policy may emerge when a different sequence 
of stages of the game is adopted. Alternatively, the mechanisms to commit to a different 
price policy is also a topic for future research (Vickers, 1985). 
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CEOs versus Members’ Evaluation of 
Cooperative Performance 
－ Evidence from China
Abstract
The management and the society of members in cooperatives may have different 
evaluations of their cooperatives. Understanding these evaluations can help CEOs to
formulate strategies that best serve the membership and keep the cooperatives successful. 
We analyze the differences between CEOs and members’ evaluations regarding 
cooperative performance. A survey of Chinese agricultural cooperatives (240 CEOs and 
543 members) was conducted. Cooperative performance is measured by three indicators: 
member profitability, social influence in the local community, and overall performance 
(Franken & Cook, 2015). The results show that both CEOs and members agree that their 
cooperatives are successful. However, members have higher scores than CEOs 
regarding member profitability and overall performance, while CEOs have a higher 
evaluation regarding social influence. The results also show that the number of general 
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meetings and CEOs’ age decrease the difference of social influence evaluation. Male 
CEOs are more likely to evaluate more positive than female CEOs. Moreover, female 
CEOs and members tend to have more similar evaluations.  
Keywords: Cooperatives, performance, evaluation, CEOs, members. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Developments in markets, digitalization, genetics, and robotics bring challenges for 
cooperatives. The cooperative may respond with expanding the size of operations and 
adopt various hybrid organizational forms (Chaddad & Cook, 2004; Hind, 1999). An 
important aspect in the response of modern cooperatives to these developments is the 
separation between management and the society of members (Bijman et al., 2013). In 
this separation, decision rights have been shifted to the professional management in 
order to be more responsive to market competition and/or to reduce the costs of 
collective decision-making. This may create increasingly autonomous management and 
reduce the influence of members in the decision-making process and outcome (Bager, 
1996; Bhuyan, 2007; Bijman et al., 2013; Harte, 1997).  
Cooperatives are special because the members not only own the cooperative, but also 
patronize it. Members have therefore an ownership as well as a transaction relationship 
with the cooperative. This feature is expected to have an impact on how the cooperative 
is evaluated by the members as well as the manager(s) ( Feng & Hendrikse, 2012; Liang 
& Hendrikse, 2013). Members will evaluate the performance of a cooperative not only 
in terms of the financial results of the cooperative enterprise, but also in terms of the 
membership services delivered to them. Members expect better prices, an assured 
market, and also reliable services from the cooperative. Membership services have to 
be valuable for the farm enterprise and for the overall well-being of the member (Nilsson 
& Hendrikse, 2011). This dual role of a cooperative member makes management of a 
cooperative difficult. 
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A sustainable and successful cooperative requires a stable membership and high 
member commitment (Fulton & Adamowicz, 1993; Österberg & Nilsson, 2009). This 
includes members’ willingness to patronize the cooperative processor, invest in risky 
equity, and participate in the governance of the cooperative (Österberg & Nilsson, 2009). 
Arcas-Lario, Martín-Ugedo, & Mínguez-Vera (2014) find that high member satisfaction 
increases the members’ intention to continue their membership. However, the separation 
between the management and the members may result in dissatisfied members. The 
theoretical literature has associated a number of behaviors with unsatisfied members. 
First, unsatisfied members are not willing to participate in the governance of the 
cooperative (Birchall & Simmons, 2004). Second, unsatisfied members do not trust the 
long-run perspective of the cooperative and thus will be reluctant to invest (Nilsson et 
al., 2012). Finally, unsatisfied members may even exit and cause the dissolution of the 
cooperative (Bijman & Hendrikse, 2003; Cotterill, 2001; Hakelius, Karantininis, & 
Feng, 2013; Hendrikse, 2011; Sykuta & Cook, 2001).  
Members’ evaluation of their cooperative is an important indicator regarding their 
commitment. A positive evaluation of the cooperative makes it more likely that 
members stay with their cooperative than when the evaluation is low (Hernandez-
Espallardo, Arcas-Lario, & Marcos-Matas, 2013), whereas a low evaluation of the 
cooperative, dissatisfaction and negative attitudes can decrease members’ commitment. 
There are several empirical studies addressing members’ evaluation of their 
cooperatives. Cobia & Navarro (1972) show that the members they surveyed generally 
had a favorable attitude towards farmer cooperatives in general. More specifically, the 
favorable attitude of the members towards their own cooperatives is positively related 
to the cooperative’s financial performance as well as the length of time and level of their 
patronages. Other research reaches similar conclusions. The survey of Misra, Carley, & 
Fletcher (1993) on the dairy farmers located in 12 southern states of the US reveals that 
the degree of satisfaction of cooperative members towards their cooperatives is 1.167 
on a scale from 0 to 2, slightly higher than neutral. They also confirm that a better price, 
lower costs, good field service, and the assurance of a market for milk is positively 
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related with members’ satisfaction. Gray & Kraenzle (1998) find a positive attitude 
between the members of a North Central milk marketing cooperative. About 87 percent 
of the members are satisfied or very satisfied with their cooperative overall, and 73 
percent of the members are satisfied or very satisfied with their management. Nearly 74 
percent of the members are satisfied with “dairy farming as a way of life”. However, 
only 36 percent of members are satisfied with the income from their cooperative 
business. Morfi et al. (2015) investigate the motivations of farmers’ loyalty towards their 
cooperatives. Four factors turn out to be positively related to farmers’ loyalty: 
cooperative ideology, assured market, business orientation, and trust.  
These empirical studies examine only members’ evaluation of the cooperatives. This 
makes it hard to determine whether the perception of the CEOs aligns with that of the 
members. Understanding how CEOs differ from members regarding their evaluations, 
in which way, and what causes the differences, brings insights that are valuable about 
how CEOs can best serve the members. This paper provides evidence that the evaluation 
of the cooperative performance differs between the CEOs and members in Chinese 
cooperatives. In Chinese cooperatives, there is also a separation between the 
management and the members. They differ from cooperatives in the Western world by 
a heterogeneous membership in terms of core and common members (Liang & 
Hendrikse, 2013). Core members refer to entrepreneurial farmers who initiated a 
cooperative or are in charge of the management and product marketing. Among them, 
the CEOs are elected and they are the most important core members. Common members 
are farmers who buy a small amount of capital shares or pay an entry fee to join a 
cooperative. Therefore there is a difference in terms of the tasks performed. Liang & 
Hendrikse (2013, p27) characterize the difference as “a member CEO has multiple roles: 
a member or supplier of the cooperative, a member of the management, a member of 
the board of directors, and/or a member of the board of supervisors of the cooperative, 
while other members are mainly producers, inputs suppliers, and residual claimants of 
the cooperative”. The multiple roles of a CEO are likely to result in a different evaluation 
regarding the performance of the cooperative compared to the members. 
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Cooperative performance is measured by three indicators: member profitability, social 
influence in the local community, and overall performance (Franken & Cook, 2015). 
The results show that both CEOs and members agree that their cooperatives are 
successful. However, members have higher scores than CEOs regarding member 
profitability and overall performance, while CEOs have a higher evaluation regarding 
social influence. The heterogeneity of CEOs and members causes the different 
evaluations. This includes the divergence of interest, different knowledge, and self-
perception bias. Moreover, the associated factors which may have an impact on the 
evaluations are explored. The results show that the number of general meetings and 
CEOs’ age decrease the difference between the social influence evaluations of the CEOs 
and the members. Male CEOs are more likely to evaluate more positive than female 
CEOs. Moreover, female CEOs and members tend to have more similar evaluations. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 formulates the motivation for the 
hypotheses. Section 4.3 introduces the methodology of this study. Section 4.4 presents 
the analyses and results. Section 4.5 provides the exploratory tests regarding the 
associated factors. Finally, section 4.6 presents the conclusions. 
4.2 Hypotheses 
This section formulates the motivation for the hypotheses regarding overall 
performance (4.2.1) and financial and social performance (4.2.2). 
4.2.1 CEO versus Member Evaluation of Cooperatives 
The evaluation by members and the CEO of a cooperative are influenced by the different 
incentives faced by them and their different cognitive representations of the cooperative. 
Many authors argue that there is a divergence of interests between the membership and 
the management, and this leads to the control problem of cooperatives (Cook, 1995; 
Hendrikse & Feng, 2013; Vitaliano, 1983). The control problem is due to the separation 
of formal and real authority. It gives cooperative managers discretion to operate, and 
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therefore the possibility to pursue their own interest. Moreover, it is unlikely that the 
incentives of the CEO can be perfectly aligned with the interests of the members by 
incentive contracts due to the measurement limitations and difficulties in cooperatives 
(Hueth, Ligon, Wolf, & Wu, 1999; Feng & Hendrikse, 2012). As such, the different 
interests between the membership and the management cause different opinions of 
cooperatives’ performance.  
Differences in the evaluation of cooperative performance may also be due to different 
cognitive representations. Individuals employ simplified mental representations of their 
information environment. These representations have been referred to as implicit 
theories, cognitive maps, assumptions, schemata, and belief structures  (Walsh, 1988). 
Dearborn and Simon (1958) claim that there is a bias of management in problem 
identification due to systematic information-processing failures. Walsh and Fahey (1986) 
extended the study by examining managers' belief structures.12  A manager’s belief 
structure not only reduces the information-processing demand but also restricts the 
capabilities of the manager to process the information (Bower, Black, & Turner., 1979). 
This has an impact on a manager’s belief structure (Snyder & Uranowitz, 1978). Biek, 
Wood, & Chaiken (1996) state that the working knowledge and experience of managers 
have two effects on evaluations. One is a defensive bias of evaluation. In this case, the 
knowledgeable person uses his strength and others’ weaknesses to evaluate a favourable 
outcome towards himself. The other one is objectiveness of evaluation. In this case the 
knowledgeable person is critical regarding all the relevant information and tends to give 
an objective evaluation. John & Robins (1994) investigate accuracy and bias in self-
perceptions of performance in a managerial group-discussion task. They find that people 
are less accurate when judging themselves than when judging their peers. 
In Chinese cooperative, CEOs who are core members operate the cooperatives and make 
                                                        
12 “The simplified mental representations individuals employ to give their information environments 
form and meaning have been variously called implicit theories, cognitive maps, assumptions, schemata, 
and belief structures.” (Walsh, 1988, p873) The terminology "belief structure" is used in Walsh’s 
research. 
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a lot of decisions, while common members hardly participate in decision-making. This 
leads to different behavior between core and common members (Liang & Hendrikse, 
2013). Core members may hide the true profits of cooperatives from common members 
and reap the profits (Ma & Meng, 2008). This observation aligns with the incentive 
difference between management and members in the literature. Moreover, the CEOs are 
elected because of their superior knowledge and experience. Their different cognitive 
representation causes different perceptions compared to the members. Hypothesis 1 
summarizes these observations by stating that there is a difference between the CEOs 
and members’ evaluation regarding the overall performance of Chinese cooperatives. 
Hypothesis 1: The CEOs’ evaluation of the overall cooperative performance differs 
from the members’ evaluation. 
The overall performance of an organization is described in different ways in the 
literature. Meyer, Paunonen, Gellatly, Goffin, & Jackson (1989) use overall performance 
of the unit managers as one construct to test the relationship between organizational 
commitment and job performance. They ask district managers to rate their unit managers 
on overall performance with a five-point rating scale. The results show that commitment 
correlates strongly with job performance. Wang, Chou, & Jiang (2005) use team 
effectiveness and team efficiency with a five-point Likert scale to measure overall team 
performance. They find that there is a positive relationship between team cohesiveness 
and overall team performance. Watson, Kumar, & Michaelsen (1993) take the overall 
performance of group tasks to analyze cultural diversity's impact on the interaction 
between process and performance. Evaluators were asked to express their performance 
evaluations with a five-point scale. The results show that at the early stage of the 
experiment, the homogeneous groups scored significantly higher than the diverse 
groups on overall performance. By week 17, cultural diversity leads to no significant 
difference in overall performance. In this paper, we first take the evaluation of overall 
performance as an indicator for the general opinion, by both CEOs and members, of the 
cooperative performance. 
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4.2.2 Financial and Social Performance of Cooperatives 
Soboh, Lansink, Giesen, & van Dijk (2009) review the literature regarding the 
performance of agricultural marketing cooperatives. They argue that theory 
distinguishes member benefits and firm profitability, and assume multiple objectives. 
However the empirical research failed to address the cooperatives’ objectives as 
represented by the theoretical literature, i.e. in practice only firm profitability is used to 
address the performance of cooperatives. The authors suggest that “a meaningful 
empirical evaluation of the cooperative’s performance should address the dual objective 
nature of the organization”. Franken & Cook (2015) advance the description of 
cooperative performance from a solely financial perspective to multiple dimensions. 
They delineate the overall performance of a cooperative into financial performance and 
social performance. Factor analysis supports the claim that the overall performance is 
reflected not only by financial performance but also by patron services. In this paper, 
we examine the evaluations of the cooperative performance with the perspective 
developed by Franken & Cook (2015). 
We distinguish two components in the evaluation of the performance of a cooperative: 
financial and social performance. First, cooperatives are formed to advance members’ 
financial interests. Karantininis & Zago (2001, p.1266) claim that the members of 
cooperatives focus mainly on the price that the processing firms pay for their products. 
Maximizing patronage returns is the members’ main goal rather than maximizing the 
profits of the cooperative enterprise (Chaddad, 2001; Franken & Cook, 2015; Liebrand, 
2007). The capacity of the cooperative to enhance members’ financial well-being 
depends on the cooperative’s financial performance. Therefore, whether members are 
satisfied with their cooperative is directly linked to the cooperative’s ability to increase 
members’ incomes. However, the different understanding between the CEOs and the 
members generates different evaluations regarding the cooperative’s financial 
performance. Specifically, due to the CEOs’ superior marketing and management 
background, they are able to include more and different information in the evaluation of 
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the financial performance than the members (Biek et al., 1996). The members are less 
informed due to a lack of knowledge. Moreover, CEOs in Chinese cooperatives are high 
performers, i.e. they are elected to be the CEOs because they are leaders of the 
community. The CEOs therefore expect a higher return from the cooperatives compare 
to small members. However, the pooling payment feature of the cooperatives does not 
favor CEOs’ expectations regarding the financial return. Small members benefit more 
than the CEOs from the pooling payment scheme. Consequently, compared to the 
members, the CEOS have a lower evaluation of the financial performance. These 
observations are summarized in Hypothesis 2.  
Hypothesis 2: CEOs’ evaluation of the cooperative’s financial performance is lower 
than the members’ evaluation. 
Soboh et al. (2009) review the financial performance measurement of cooperatives.  
Member profitability is one measure used frequently by the literature (Barton, 2004; 
Hardesty & Salgia, 2004; Harris & Fulton, 1996; Mckee, 2007; Notta & Vlachvei, 2007). 
In this paper we use also member profitability to measure the financial performance of 
cooperatives.  
Second, cooperatives often have social objectives to promote cooperation, rural 
development, and community services. Fulton & Adamowicz (1993) argue that the 
cooperative patronage at the Alberta Wheat Pool is influenced not only by the dividend 
payments but also by the availability of agro-services. Ideological, cultural and political 
preferences are also relevant to explain differences in farmers’ participation in 
cooperatives (Fulton, 1999; Karantininis, 2007). Although nowadays some social 
elements of cooperatives are becoming less important than the financial functions of 
cooperatives (Fulton, 1995; Karantininis & Zago, 2001), members’ evaluation of their 
cooperative’s social activities and the contribution to public goods may still play a role 
in some farmers’ decisions (Fulton, 1999). Gray and Kraenzle (1998) indicate that the 
beliefs in collective actions and member identification with the cooperative continue to 
be relevant and important for members’ decisions in participating in the governance of 
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cooperatives in the US. If a cooperative could no longer satisfy the members’ social 
needs, it may lead to a lower evaluation of the cooperative by the members. This in turn 
makes the members identify less with the cooperative and thus negatively influence their 
participation in collective actions. The CEOs in Chinese cooperatives have not only 
large individual firms, but also a substantial network and a high social status (Liang & 
Hendrikse, 2013). Their contribution regarding the social aspect of cooperatives is 
recognized better by themselves because their belief structures leads to a defensive 
attitude bias regarding social performance, i.e. the CEOs use their knowledge and 
experience to evaluate an outcome according to their beliefs (Biek et al., 1996). 
Moreover, a high self-perception bias leads to a less accurate evaluation when the CEOs 
judge themselves rather than that they are judged by others (John & Robins, 1994).  
Finally, the social aspect is more difficult to be evaluated by the CEO than the members. 
Members enjoy the cooperatives’ social services most, and therefore they are more 
sensitive to the social aspects than the CEOs. When the CEOs evaluate the cooperative’s 
social performance as satisfactory, members may disagree. (Nilsson & Hendrikse, 2011) 
present a case of a Swedish agricultural cooperative. Although a cost cutting program 
improves the payment to the members, it cuts some of the connections between the 
members and the cooperative which are highly valued by the members. The members 
are therefore not satisfied. Therefore we hypothesize that the members have lower 
evaluations regarding their cooperative’s social performance compared to the CEO.  
Hypothesis 3: CEOs’ evaluation of the cooperative’s social performance is higher than 
the members’ evaluation. 
Soboh et al. (2009) mention that there are non-financial benefits of cooperatives: 
“participating in a democratic organization, contributing on the local community’s 
development, strengthening the social bonds among members”. In this paper, we use 
social influence in the local community to measure the social performance of 
cooperatives. 
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4.3 Methodology 
This section presents the methodological aspect of the study in terms of the sample, the 
data extraction method, the data aggregation, and the variables and measurements. 
Sample 
Development of cooperatives in China varies between regions. Cooperatives in the 
eastern part of China are more developed than those in western China (Han & Zhang, 
2012). In this paper, we collect the data from three provinces, i.e. Zhejiang, Sichuan, 
and Heilongjiang. They are located in the southeastern, southwestern, and northeastern 
part of China respectively. These provinces vary in terms of natural resources, economic 
development, and agricultural production. Zhejiang specializes in high value-added 
products such as vegetables and fruits. Sichuan is one of the largest provinces in 
livestock husbandry. Heilongjiang is famous for grain production. All three provinces 
have relatively high levels of cooperative development among all the provinces in China. 
Zhejiang is leading the development of cooperatives in China. Sichuan is one of the 
places where farmer cooperatives emerged initially. Heilongjiang has the best developed 
grain cooperatives.  
Two to five cooperatives from each county of the three provinces were selected 
randomly from the list of cooperatives provided by the agricultural departments of the 
three provinces. Moreover, more than three members of a cooperative were interviewed 
in order to enhance the representativeness of the performance evaluation by the 
members. In each cooperative, we chose more than three members randomly to evaluate 
their cooperative. 266 cooperatives were examined: 114 from Sichuan, 78 from 
Heilongjiang, and 74 from Zhejiang. In these cooperatives, 562 members and 266 CEOs 
were interviewed. Finally, 543 members and 240 CEOs responded the survey. 13  
                                                        
13 Data is accessible upon request to the authors.   
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Data extraction method 
Data is collected regarding personal demographic information and performance 
evaluations of members and CEOs of cooperatives in China. Field work was carried out 
in the summer of 2011 by selected students from Zhejiang University. The students 
collected the data when they were back home during the summer holiday. Before their 
interview work they had training to be objective regarding the data collection. The 
interviewers are outsiders, i.e. not part of either the cooperatives or the research group. 
An important reason is to avoid the social desirability bias. In addition, professors of 
Zhejiang University collected some of the CEO data via the cooperative training 
meetings. All the questionnaires were filled in by the interviewers in order to raise the 
quality of the data. Moreover, at the end of the questionnaire, the respondents have to 
sign an agreement: “The respondent guarantees that: I follow all the required procedure 
to fill in all the questions in this questionnaire, the information is all fact. If it is found 
false, all questionnaires filled by me will be treated invalid, and I will pay the 
corresponding loss.” Multiple pre-tests were conducted in Lishui and some other cities 
of Zhejiang province, in April and June, 2011, in order to revise questionnaires to be 
clear and easy to the respondents. 
Data aggregation 
From the responses of the 543 members and 240 CEOs, we cleaned the data in the 
following way. We first removed the observations with no response on all the evaluation 
questions. Data remains regarding 496 members and 212 CEOs. Then we sorted the data 
with the same cooperative name. As it is mentioned earlier, more than three members of 
a cooperative were interviewed to enhance the representativeness of the performance 
evaluation by the members. We therefore removed the data of cooperatives with less 
than three observations regarding members from the analysis. 118 cooperatives 
remained. Lastly, we averaged the members’ data to obtain one average value of a 
cooperative. Finally, an aggregated dataset with 111 cooperatives remained. In this 
dataset, each cooperative has a response of the CEO and an average value of the 
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response of three or more members. 
Measurement 
The variables member profitability, social influence in the local community, and overall 
performance are used in the survey. They are measured by the Likert scale, ranging from 
1 (very bad) to 7 (very good) (See Table 4.1).  
Table 4.1: Measure of the dependent variables 
 Variables  Measurements  
Cooperative 
Performance 
 
Member profitability Likert scale: 1 (very bad) to 7 (very good) 
Social influence Likert scale: 1 (very bad) to 7 (very good) 
Overall performance Likert scale: 1 (very bad) to 7 (very good) 
To avoid social desirability effects, we test for the correlation between reported 
performance and the archival performance. We use surplus data of cooperatives as the 
archival performance, and this indicates the financial performance. Table 4.2 shows that 
the member profitability is positively correlated with the surplus year 2010, and the 
overall performance is positively correlated with the surplus year 2010. This implies 
that the survey data regarding financial performance and overall performance 
correspond with the objective data regarding cooperative surplus. Social performance is 
itself a subjective measure, and we do not have objective data as archival performance 
to compare. 
Table 4.2: Correlation between reported performance and the archival performance 
 1 2  3 
1 Member profitability 
 
   
2 Overall performance 0.54* 
(0) 
  
3 Surplus 2010 0.19* 
(0.07) 
0.16 
(0.1) 
 
Note: p value in parentheses; * p<0.1. 
4.4 Analysis 
This section starts with the descriptive statistics regarding the cooperative performance 
evaluations by CEOs and members. Next the hypotheses are tested.  
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The evaluations of the CEOs and members are presented in Table 4.3. The results show 
that the mean evaluation of both CEOs and members regarding their cooperatives are 
quite high (mean > 4). The CEOs and the members are similar in their evaluations that 
cooperatives are successful in member profitability, social influence and overall 
performance, i.e. the mean value is higher 4 on the Linkert scale. However, there are 
differences between CEOs and members. Social influence receives the highest score, 
followed by overall performance. Member profitability displays the lowest score. 
Members evaluate their profitability and overall performance of cooperatives better than 
CEOs do, whereas CEOs have a higher evaluation of cooperatives’ social influence.  
Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics of performance Evaluation by CEOs and Members 
Variables  Identity Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Member profitability CEOs 4.88 1.36 1 7 
 Members 5.26 1.05 1.50 7 
Social influence CEOs 6.19 0.96 3 7 
 Members 5.94 0.80 3.50 7 
Overall performance CEOs 5.63 0.90 3 7 
 Members 5.83 0.71 4 7 
We examine whether the evaluation of the cooperative performance evaluation is 
significantly different between CEOs and members by a paired t-test. The results 
regarding the variances of the three aspects of the evaluation of CEOs and members on 
a sample of 111 observations are presented in tables 4-6. The test results show that the 
difference in the evaluations of the CEOs and members regarding all three performance 
aspects is statistically significant.  
Results of the paired t-test regarding the overall evaluation of performance between 
CEOs and members are illustrated in Table 4.4. CEOs score the overall performance of 
their cooperatives with 5.63 ± 0.90, while the members score it with 5.83 ± 0.71. The 
group means are significantly different as the p-value in the Pr(|T| > |t|) row (under Ha: 
diff != 0, i.e. difference is not equal to 0) is less than 0.05 (i.e., p = 0.02). A statistically 
significant decrease of .20 (95% CI, -.37 to -.03, t(110) = -2.34, p < 0.05) is found. 
Hence, CEOs’ evaluation of the cooperative’s overall performance is significantly lower 
than that of members. Hypothesis 1 is therefore supported. 
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Table 4.4: Paired t-test regarding CEOs versus members evaluation of overall performance 
Variable Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Overallperformance_CEO 5.63 .09 .90 5.46 5.80 
Overallperformance_member 5.83 .07 .71 5.70 5.96 
Overallperformance_difference -.20 .09 .90 -.37 -.03 
mean(diff) = mean(Overallperformance_CEO –Overallperformance_member)            t = -2.34 
Ho: mean(diff) = 0         degrees of freedom = 110 
Ha: mean(diff) < 0         Ha: mean(diff) != 0           Ha: mean(diff) > 0 
Pr(T < t) =0.01         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.02          Pr(T > t) = 0.99 
Results of the paired t-test regarding the difference in member profitability evaluation 
between CEOs and members are illustrated in  
Table 4.5. CEOs score the member profitability of their cooperatives with 4.88 ± 1.36, 
while the members score it with 5.26 ± 1.04. The difference between these two scores 
is significant, i.e. Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.001. Specifically, a statistically significant decrease 
of .38 (95% CI, -.60 to -.16, t(110) = -3.40, p < .05) is found. Hence, the CEOs’ 
evaluation of the cooperative’s member profitability is significantly lower than that of 
members. Hypothesis 2 therefore is supported. 
Table 4.5: Paired t-test regarding CEOs versus members evaluation of member profitability 
Variable Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Memberprofitability_CEO 4.88 .13 1.36 4.63 5.14 
Memberprofitability_member 5.26 .10 1.05 5.07 5.46 
Memberprofitability_difference -.38 .11 1.18 -.60 -.16 
mean(diff) = mean(Memberprofitability_CEO–Memberprofitability_member)           t =  -3.40 
Ho: mean(diff) = 0         degrees of freedom = 110 
Ha: mean(diff) < 0         Ha: mean(diff) != 0           Ha: mean(diff) > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.0005         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0010          Pr(T > t) = 0.9995 
Results of the paired t-test regarding the difference in social influence evaluation 
between the CEOs and the members are displayed in Table 4.6. CEOs score the social 
influence of their cooperatives with 6.19 ± 0.96, while the members score it with 5.94 
± 0.80. The difference between these two scores is significant, i.e. Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.01. 
Moreover, a statistically significant increase of .25 (95% CI, .06 to .44, t(110) = 2.57, p 
< .05) is found. Hence, CEOs’ evaluation of the cooperative’s social influence is 
significantly higher than that of members. Hypothesis 3 is therefore supported. 
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Table 4.6: Paired t-test regarding CEOs versus members evaluation of social influence 
Variable Mean Std. Err. Std. Dev. [95% Conf. Interval] 
Socialinfluence_CEO 6.19 .09 .96 6.01 6.37 
Socialinfluence_member 5.94 .084 .80 5.791 6.09 
Socialinfluence_difference .25 .10 1.03 .057 .44 
mean(diff) = mean(Socialinfluence_CEO –Socialinfluence_member)            t = 2.57 
Ho: mean(diff) = 0         degrees of freedom = 110 
Ha: mean(diff) < 0         Ha: mean(diff) != 0           Ha: mean(diff) > 0 
Pr(T < t) = 0.9942         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0116          Pr(T > t) = 0.0058 
4.5 Exploration of associated factors 
Besides the analysis of the difference between the CEOs and the members’ evaluation 
regarding cooperative performance, we also explore the associated factors that may 
influence the CEOs’ evaluation, the members’ evaluation and the difference between 
CEOs’ and members’ evaluation. Arcas-Lario et al., (2014) find that more information, 
more control, and more trust lead to higher satisfaction of cooperatives. Karami & 
Rezaei-Moghaddam, (2005) model the determinants of the cooperative performance in 
Iran. The results show that the “government support factor”, which indicates the amount 
of loan, aid, and the value of machinery provided by the government, has a positive 
impact on the cooperative performance. In this section, we explore the first step of the 
associated factors that may influence the evaluations with the collected data.   
Variables and Measurement 
We test the impacts of two categories of factors associated with the performance 
evaluation of CEOs and members. The first category refers to the governance of 
cooperatives. Specifically, we test regarding the number of general meetings and the 
ways of profit distribution. The second category of factors is personal information 
regarding the CEOs and members. It consists of gender, age, education, and working 
experience. We compare the average members’ personal information with the CEOs’ 
data, and then test their impact. Lastly, we consider several cooperative characteristics 
as control variables, including membership size, product type, and the cooperative’s 
economic status. Measurements of each variable are displayed in Table 4.7.  
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Table 4.7: Explanations and measures of independent variables 
 Variables  Measurements  
Cooperative 
governance 
(independent 
variables) 
The number of general meetings Average times of general meeting 
per year 
Profit distribution Based on capital shares=1;  
Based on both patronage and capital 
shares=2; 
Based on patronage=3;  
Equal distribution=4;  
Others=5 
Personal  
information  
CEOs  
(independent 
variables) 
Gender Male=1; 
Female=2 
Age  
Education No education=1;  
Primary school=2;  
Junior high school=3;  
Senior high school=4;  
College or university=5 
Working experience Having working experience other 
than farming=1; 
Otherwise=2 
Personal  
information  
Average Members 
(independent 
variables) 
Gender Male=1; 
Female=2 
Age  
Education No education=1;  
Primary school=2;  
Junior high school=3;  
Senior high school=4;  
College or university=5 
Working experience Having working experience other 
than farming=1; 
Otherwise=2 
Control variables Product type Grain and oil=1;  
Vegetables=2;  
Fruit=3;  
Chicken=4;  
Pork=5 
Economic status Best=1; 
Above average=2; 
Average=3; 
Blow average=4; 
Worst=5 
Membership size Number of members 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.8 shows the descriptive statistics of the investigated variables. The average size 
of the examined cooperatives is large (mean=483.41, min=6, max=21000). Besides that, 
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the data of the CEOs and the members show that the average age of the CEOs and 
members are similar. The gender of the CEOs is more towards male than the members. 
The average gender of members also shows that there are more male than female 
members. The education of the CEOs is higher than the education of the members. 
Finally, the working experience of the CEOs is more towards the option “Having 
working experience other than farming” than that of the members. The dependent 
variables regarding the evaluations are in the descriptive statistics. Additionally, we 
generate dependent variables regarding the difference of evaluations between the CEOs 
and the members by using CEOs’ evaluation scores minus members’ evaluation scores. 
Note that the difference of the evaluations have negative results in member profitability 
and overall performance. This corresponds with our findings in the previous section, i.e. 
members have a higher evaluation of member profitability and overall performance of 
cooperatives than CEOs, while the difference of the evaluations is positive regarding 
social influence. This implies that CEOs have a higher evaluation of cooperatives’ social 
influence than the members. The descriptive statistics in Table 4.8 provide an overview 
of all the variables which will be investigated.  
Table 4.8: Descriptive statistics 
 Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
1 The number of general meetings 2.18 1.38 1 7 
2 Profit distribution 3.13 1.49 1 6 
3 Gender of CEOs 1.05 0.21 1 2 
4 Age of CEOs 48.15 8.31 28 69 
5 Education of CEOs 3.86 0.83 1 5 
6 Working experience of CEOs 1.18 0.59 1 6 
7 Average Gender of members 1.15 0.21 1 2 
8 Average Age of members 47.06 6.58 29.33 62.25 
9 Average Education of members 3.19 0.52 2.2 4.67 
10 Average Experience of members 1.40 0.33 1 3 
11 Product type 2.76 1.40 1 6 
12 Economic status 2.14 0.85 1 4 
13 Membership size 438.41 1997.12 6 21000 
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14 Evaluation member profitability 
of CEOs 
4.88 1.36 1 7 
15 Evaluation social influence of 
CEOs 
6.19 0.96 3 7 
16 Evaluation overall performance of 
CEOs 
5.63 0.90 3 7 
17 Average Evaluation member 
profitability of members 
5.26 1.05 1.5 7 
18 Average Evaluation social 
influence of members 
5.94 0.80 3.5 7 
19 Average Evaluation overall 
performance of members 
5.83 0.71 4 7 
20  Difference evaluation member 
profitability 
-0.38 1.18 -3.25 2.8 
21 Difference evaluation social 
influence 
0.25 1.03 -3 2.67 
22 Difference evaluation overall 
performance 
-0.2 0.9 -3 1.75 
N=111. Variables 14 to 19 are the evaluations by the CEOs and the members. Variables 20 to 22 are 
the difference of evaluations between the CEOs and the members. 
Table 4.9 shows the correlation of all the investigated variables. Note that there are some 
correlations between the dependent variables. This indicates that the total evaluation is 
related to the other evaluations. The difference in evaluations is also related to other 
evaluations. Jarque-Bera test is performed for the normality, and the results shows a 
normal distribution. We therefore conduct multiple regressions to test the relationship 
between the associated factors and the evaluations.
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Table 4.9: Correlation matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19   
1 Number of general 
meetings                      
2 Profit distribution -0.18                     
3 Gender of CEOs 0.17 -0.02                    
4 Age of CEOs 0.11 -0.07 -0.08                   
5 Education of CEOs -0.01 0.15 -0.09 -0.32                  
6 Working experience of 
CEOs -0.05 -0.18 0.01 0.04 -0.01                 
7 Average Gender of 
members -0.03 -0.1 0.1 -0.01 -0.15 0.27                
8 Average Age of 
members 0.04 -0.1 -0.2 0.3 -0.1 0.04 -0.17               
9 Average Edu~ of 
members 0.03 0.05 0.19 0.07 0.15 0.1 0.06 -0.43              
10 Average Exp~ of 
members 0.04 0.03 -0.17 -0.01 0.03 0.09 -0.02 0.07 -0.27             
11 Product type -0.04 0.06 0.07 0.04 -0.14 0.05 0.17 -0.13 0.07 -0.02            
12 Economic status -0.18 0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.02 -0.13 -0.06 -0.24 0.05 0.11 0.2           
13 Membership size -0.1 0.09 -0.02 0.11 0.14 0.12 0.04 0.1 0.01 0.15 -0.1 -0.17          
14 Eva~ mem~ pro~ of 
CEOs 0.1 -0.01 -0.01 0.04 -0.1 -0.03 -0.03 0.12 -0.18 0.06 -0.02 0.04 0.14         
15 Eva~ soc~ inf~ of 
CEOs -0.2 0.23 -0.22 0.03 0.13 0.08 0 0.22 -0.02 0.03 0.05 -0.18 0.1 0.37        
16 Eva~ ove~ per~ of 
CEOs 0.01 0.14 -0.2 0.12 0.08 0.02 -0.04 0.18 -0.01 0.08 -0.15 -0.18 0.15 0.54 0.69       
17 Ave~ Eva~ mem~ 
pro~ of members 0.09 -0.07 0.08 0.14 -0.2 0.04 0.13 -0.16 -0.02 0.04 -0.01 0.19 0.12 0.54 0.1 0.32      
18 Ave~ Eva~ soc~ inf~ 
of members 0.13 0.02 0.01 0.19 -0.09 0.04 -0.1 -0.1 0.08 0 -0.05 0.04 0.1 0.31 0.33 0.45 0.56     
19 Ave~ Eva~ ove~ per~ 
of members 0.13 0.14 0.1 0.16 -0.19 0.01 0 -0.06 0.07 -0.03 0.12 0.02 0.12 0.4 0.24 0.4 0.63 0.78     
20 Diff~ Eva~ mem~ pro  0.04 0.04 -0.09 -0.08 0.06 -0.07 -0.15 0.28 -0.18 0.04 -0.02 -0.12 0.05 0.67 0.34 0.34 -0.26 -0.13 -0.1   
21 Diff~ Eva~ soc~ inf -0.29 0.2 -0.21 -0.12 0.19 0.05 0.76 0.28 -0.09 0.02 0.09 -0.17 0.01 0.1 0.68 0.29 -0.34 -0.47 -0.38 0.42  
22 Diff~ Eva~ ove~ per -0.1 0.03 -0.28 0 0.23 0.02 -0.04 0.23 -0.06 0.1 -0.25 -0.2 0.06 0.23 0.5 0.69 -0.18 -0.16 -0.39 0.42 0.6 
* p < .05
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Analysis and result 
We test the relationship between various cooperative governance variables, CEOs’ and 
members’ personal information variables, and the CEOs’ and members’ evaluations. 
Additionally, we use the difference of the evaluations between the CEOs and the 
members as the dependent variable, the difference of personal information between the 
CEOs and the members as the independent variable. For example, the difference of 
education is defined as the CEOs’ education minus the average members’ education. In 
this way, we test the relationship between the difference of personal information and the 
difference of the evaluations.  
The tests show that the number of general meetings is negatively related to the difference 
of evaluations regarding social influence. This implies that the difference of evaluations 
regarding social influence decreases when there are more general meetings. We find that 
the difference in age has a negative impact on the difference of evaluations regarding 
social influence. This implies that if CEOs are older than the members, the difference 
of the evaluations regarding social influence is smaller. It can be explained by young 
CEOs tending to be more over-confidence compared to old CEOs (Richeson & Shelton, 
2006). The old CEOs therefore have a lower self-perception bias compared to the young 
CEOs, and evaluate social influence more similar to the members’. Gender is negatively 
related to the social evaluation of CEOs. Moreover, the difference in gender is 
negatively related to the difference of evaluations. This implies that male CEOs’ 
evaluations are higher than female CEOs’, and female CEOs’ evaluations are more 
similar to the members’ evaluations. An explanation is that there is a confidence level 
difference between men and women. Men tend to be more confident and evaluate too 
positively regarding their performance (Beyer, 1990; Sarsons & Xu, 2015). The female 
CEOs are therefore less likely to have a self-perception bias compared to the male CEOs, 
and they evaluate more similar to the members. We do not find significant results to 
show that there are factors in the dataset that influence the members’ evaluations. This 
implies that in this current model, cooperative governance variables and members’ 
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personal information variables do not significantly influence members’ evaluations.  
The relationship between the associated factors and the evaluations is presented Table 
4.10. The robustness check of the regression models is in the appendix. 
Table 4.10: Factors which influence the evaluations 
  
Evaluation 
social influence 
of CEOs 
Difference 
evaluation social 
influence 
Difference 
evaluation overall 
performance 
Number of general meetings -0.1 -0.17* -0.03 
 (-1.19) (-2.14) (-0.36) 
Profit distribution 0.13 0.09 0 
 (1.80) (1.21) (0.07) 
Gender of CEOs -1.39*   
 (-2.36)   
Age of CEOs 0   
 (0.33)   
Education of CEOs 0.2   
 (1.20)   
Working Experience of CEOs 0.09   
 (0.53)   
Difference in gender  -0.94* -0.93** 
  (-2.42) (-2.66) 
Difference in age  -0.03* -0 
  (-2.23) (-0.24) 
Difference in education  0.16 0.16 
  (1.32) (1.46) 
Difference in experience  -0.12 -0.15 
  (-0.77) (-1.01) 
Product type 0.1 0.16* -0.12 
 (1.28) (2.20) (-1.72) 
Economic status -0.22 -0.18 -0.1 
 (-1.73) (-1.37) (-0.88) 
Membership size 0 0 0 
 (0.42) (1.64) (1.37) 
Constant 6.69*** -0.02 -0.02 
 (5.52) (-0.03) (-0.04) 
Note: t statistics in parentheses; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.  
Several tests are performed to check the validity of the regression models. The variance 
inflation factor test for multicollinearity shows that the VIF scores for all regression 
models are smaller than 5. There is no multicollinearity. Moreover, the Breusch Pagan 
test is performed to test for heteroscedasticity. The test does not reject the null 
hypothesis. Therefore, there is no heteroscedasticity problem in the regression models. 
The results of these two tests are presented in the appendix. 
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4.6 Conclusions  
This study provides evidence of Chinese cooperatives regarding the different 
evaluations between CEOs and members. Hypotheses regarding the differences between 
CEOs’ and members’ evaluation of their cooperative performance are established and 
tested. Furthermore, various relevant factors are analyzed which may influence the 
evaluations. The results show that although both CEOs and members provide a high 
evaluation of their cooperatives’ performance, their degree of satisfaction differs 
significantly. First, CEOs’ evaluation is significantly different from the members’ 
evaluation of overall performance, and the difference is negative. Second, CEOs’ 
evaluation is lower than the members’ evaluation regarding financial performance of 
their cooperatives. Lastly, CEO’s evaluation is higher than the members’ evaluation 
regarding social performance. A number of factors that are associated with the CEOs’ 
evaluations, the members’ evaluations, and the difference between them have been 
explored. Specifically, more general meetings decrease the difference of evaluations 
regarding the social performance of cooperatives. Male CEOs are more likely to 
evaluate more positive than female CEOs. Moreover, female CEOs and members tend 
to have more similar evaluations. Lastly, the evaluations between CEOs and members 
differ less when CEOs are older. The findings are in line with the literature.  
A CEO has to have an accurate understanding of members’ interests in order to operate 
the cooperative enterprise well. Therefore, knowledge of members’ evaluation of 
cooperatives, as well as how members’ evaluation differs from that of their own, can 
help cooperative CEOs to formulate strategies that best serve the membership and keep 
the cooperative successful. For example, if the cooperative recognizes that the CEO has 
higher expectations regarding financial performance rather than the social performance, 
social performance of the cooperative can be added and higher weighed as one task of 
the CEO’s responsibilities, and as one measurement of CEO’s performance. Moreover, 
the associated factors add to the knowledge on how the cooperative can reduce the 
different perceptions between CEOs and members. 
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This study has various limitations. First, the data is collected in Chinese cooperatives. 
A future study could have a sample from the Western world, to test if different 
cooperative structures lead to different results. Second, this study applies the 
measurements of the literature. However, confirmatory factor analysis is lacking. In a 
future study, a confirmatory factor analysis should be considered to avoid validity and 
reliability problems of the measurements. Third, omitted variables and common method 
bias are not tested in this study. A future study can test other variables and to examine if 
there is a bias in the current model. For example, social activities, social services can be 
examined and added to the social performance of cooperatives, to develop the measure 
of cooperatives’ social performance.  Lastly, the exploration of associated factors is only 
a start for finding the relevant influential factors that may have an impact on the 
evaluations. Future studies need to be designed to further investigate this issue 
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Summary and Conclusion
This thesis has addressed communication and innovation, member sorting, and 
evaluations of cooperatives. The general introduction to cooperatives and the topics of 
this thesis are presented in chapter 1. In chapter 2, two types of innovation which are 
associated with two types of communication are investigated in different governance 
structures, and efficient governance structures are determined. A member sorting model 
is developed in chapter 3. The model investigates how farmers choose the processor 
enterprise and its governance structure, where farmers are characterized by both their 
location and the quality of their product. Lastly, we empirically investigate the CEOs’ 
and the members’ evaluation of Coops.
An overall introduction to the thesis, including the background, research objectives, and 
the outline of the thesis, is presented in Chapter 1. The cooperative is characterized and 
Coops and IOFs are compared. The transaction relationship distinguishes the Coop and 
the IOF. A cooperative has disadvantages and advantages compared to an IOF. 
Disadvantages of a Coop are the free rider problem, the horizon problem, the portfolio 
problem, the control problem, and the influence costs problem (Cook, 1995). 
Advantages of a Coop are the elimination of double marginalization, countervailing 
power, assurance of supply, stable payment, and social benefits. Lastly, the research 
topics and outline of the thesis are introduced.
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Chapter 2 investigates the relationship between communication, innovation, and 
(de)centralization in cooperatives. Two types of communication are distinguished: 
horizontal and vertical. Horizontal communication (HC) is communication between the 
members, while vertical communication (VC) is communication between the members 
and the CEO. HC and VC are associated with different types of innovation. HC is related 
to process innovation, while VC is related to product innovation. We characterize a 
decentralized cooperative by members taking their own decisions regarding VC and 
production. In a centralized cooperative these decisions are made by the CEO of the 
cooperative enterprise. HC decisions are made by members individually in both 
cooperatives. The decentralized cooperative tends to overproduce due to the negative 
production externalities and it generates insufficient VC due to the positive product 
quality externalities. An advantage of the decentralized cooperative is that the costs of 
VC are carried by the various members, as opposed to the centralized cooperative in 
which all VC costs are generated by the CEO. The findings show that the centralized 
cooperative dominates when both communication cost coefficients are small and large, 
while the decentralized cooperative dominates when both communication cost 
coefficients are in an intermediate range.  
In Chapter 3 a sorting model is developed to analyze how farmers choose the processor 
enterprises and their governance structures. Farmers make decisions based on their 
location and product quality characteristics, and majority voting determines which 
governance structure the enterprise adopts. A three-stage game is developed. In the first 
stage each farmer chooses an enterprise. In the second stage the governance structure is 
determined by majority voting of the members. In the last stage, the farmer decides to 
produce or not. When the IOF price is low, the Coop market is the equilibrium. When 
the IOF price is in a middle range, the mixed market is the equilibrium. When the IOF 
price is high, the IOF market is the equilibrium. Additionally, when the IOF adopts a 
profit maximizing price policy, the Coop market is always the equilibrium. 
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We provide evidence from China for understanding the different evaluations between 
CEOs and members in Chapter 4. The results of a survey regarding Chinese 
cooperatives show that although both CEOs and members are satisfied with their 
cooperatives’ performance, their evaluations differ significantly. Specifically, the CEOs’ 
evaluation is lower than the members’ evaluation regarding the overall performance and 
financial performance of their cooperatives. However, CEO’s evaluation is higher than 
the members’ evaluation regarding social performance. The analyses imply that CEOs 
focus more on the economic performance of the cooperative, while the members focus 
more on the social performance. A number of factors that are associated with the CEOs’ 
evaluations, the members’ evaluation, and the difference between them have been 
identified as well. Specifically, the number of general meetings and CEOs’ age decrease 
the difference of evaluations. Male CEOs are more likely to evaluate more positive than 
female CEOs. Moreover female CEOs and members tend to have more similar 
evaluations. 
This dissertation contributes to the literature and practice in several ways. In chapter 2, 
we associate HC and VC with process and product innovation and determine the 
efficient governance structures. In practice, this chapter provides advice for the choice 
of communication policy of supplier owned enterprises in different settings. HC (VC) 
is expected in a decentralized (centralized) cooperative. In chapter 3, we analyze both 
vertical and horizontal differentiation in a single model. This is novel in the literature. 
We also determine the circumstances when the Coop and IOF governance structures 
emerge. In practice, this chapter provides advice for the farmers for how to make 
decisions with considering both location (to the enterprise) and quality (of their 
products). When the market price is low, farmers choose the closest enterprise and a 
Coop governance structure is adopted. When the market price is high, besides that the 
farmers like to choose the closest enterprise, high (low) quality farmers vote for the IOF 
(Coop) governance. In chapter 4, the difference between the evaluations of the manager 
and the members is determined. This may be useful in formulating a cooperative’s 
strategy. For example, if the cooperative recognizes that the CEO puts more weight on 
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financial performance than social performance, then social performance of the 
cooperative may have to receive more weight in the CEO’s performance measure. 
Moreover, the associated factors add to the knowledge on how the cooperative can 
reduce the different perceptions between CEOs and members. For instance, more GA 
meetings can be organized to ensure that the members wishes are understood, and taken 
into account, by the CEOs. 
There are various possibilities for future research. In chapter 2, a distinction is made 
between HC and VC, and these two types of communication are associated with 
different types of innovation. However, actual organizations use a rich menu of 
communication devices to address various issues. For example, both HC and VC are 
related to foster involvement, commitment, and trust between the farmers and the 
cooperative enterprise. Moreover, VC occurs also when farmers communicate 
extensively with the CEO about the transactions between the farm and the cooperative 
enterprise, and the strategy of the cooperative. Moreover, the control problem and the 
influence costs problem also involve VC (Cook, 1995). This may require different 
modelling. For instance, if involvement, commitment, and trust are considered in the 
model, both HC and VC have to add value regarding these aspects. A higher level of VC 
may lead to higher trust between the member and the CEO, and higher commitment of 
the CEO. If the control problem and the influence costs problem are considered together 
in the model, then a high level of VC may contribute to reducing the control problem, 
but it may increase the influence costs problem. In chapter 3, our model considers an 
average price policy for a Coop. However, Coops may adopt a differentiated price policy 
to create fairness between the members and to reflect product quality. Furthermore, 
quality is exogenous in our model (Sutton, 1991). Lastly, future research has to show 
how robust the two governance structures are in the competition with other governance 
structures. In chapter 4, a future study may use a sample from the Western world in order 
to account for different cooperative structures. Second, a confirmatory factor analysis 
can be performed in a future study to secure validity and reliability of the measurements. 
Third, there are possibilities to test other variables. For example, social activities and 
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social services can be examined and added to the social performance of cooperatives, to 
develop the measure of cooperatives’ social performance. Lastly, a study of the 
associated factors regarding the evaluations of the cooperative, and the difference in 
CEOs’ and members’ evaluations, has to be designed and investigated in order to deepen 
the understanding of the associations. 
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Summary 
An agriculture cooperative is an enterprise collectively owned by an association of many 
independent upstream agricultural farmers. This dissertation addresses various aspects 
of these cooperatives. In chapter 1, cooperatives are introduced. In chapter 2, two types 
of innovation are associated with two types of communication. They are analyzed in 
different governance structures, and the efficient governance structures are determined. 
A member sorting model is developed in chapter 3 to investigate which processor 
enterprise farmers choose and how the governance structure is determined. In chapter 4, 
CEOs’ and the members’ evaluations are empirically investigated in Chinese Coops. 
Finally, chapter 5 provides a summary and conclusion of this dissertation. 
The major conclusions are as follows. Chapter 2 investigates the relationship between 
communication, innovation, and (de)centralization in cooperatives. Horizontal 
communication (HC) is associated with process innovation, while vertical 
communication (VC) is associated with product innovation. The CEO decides regarding 
the deliveries of the member and the level of vertical communication in the centralized 
cooperative, while these decisions are taken by the members in the decentralized 
cooperative. The findings show that a decentralized cooperative is efficient for an 
intermediate level of the VC cost coefficient and when the HC cost coefficient is above 
a certain level, while a centralized cooperative is efficient in the other cases. This is due 
to the centralized cooperative internalizing the negative production externalities and a 
higher VC level. Chapter 3 investigates how members sort themselves across enterprises 
and which governance structures are adopted. The Coop pays a uniform price to all 
farmers to maximize members’ revenue and retains no profits, whereas investor-owned 
firm (IOF) differentiates payments based on quality. The market consists of 2 (1, 0) 
Coops and 0 (1, 2) IOFs when the payment for quality by the IOF is low (intermediate, 
high). In equilibrium a farmer tends to choose the enterprise most close to him/her, and 
a farmer with a high quality product tends to choose an IOF. In chapter 4, we provide 
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evidence from China for understanding the different evaluations between CEOs and 
members. The results of a survey show that both CEOs and members are satisfied with 
their cooperatives’ performance. However, members have higher scores than CEOs 
regarding member profitability and overall performance, while CEOs have a higher 
evaluation regarding social influence. The results also show that the number of general 
meetings and CEOs’ age decrease the difference in the evaluations. Male CEOs are more 
likely to evaluate more positive than female CEOs. Moreover female CEOs and 
members tend to have more similar evaluations. 
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Samenvatting  
Een landbouw coöperatieve is een onderneming in het bezit van een vereniging van 
onafhankelijke agrarische landbouwers. Dit proefschrift analyseert verscheidene 
aspecten van deze coöperatie. Hoofdstuk 1 introduceert coöperaties en de onderwerpen 
in het proefschrift. In hoofdstuk 2 worden twee soorten innovatie in verband gebracht 
met twee soorten communicatie. Ze worden geanalyseerd in verschillende coöperatieve 
bestuursstructuren en de efficiënte bestuursstructuur wordt bepaald. In hoofdstuk 3 
wordt een leden sortering model ontwikkeld om te onderzoeken welke onderneming 
boeren kiezen en hoe de bestuursstructuur wordt bepaald. In hoofdstuk 4 worden de 
evaluaties van de CEO's en de leden empirisch onderzocht in Chinese coöperaties. 
Hoofdstuk 5 vat de belangrijkste resultaten samen en formuleert conclusies. 
De belangrijkste conclusies zijn als volgt. Hoofdstuk 2 onderzoekt de relatie tussen 
communicatie, innovatie, en (de)centralisatie in coöperaties. Horizontale communicatie 
(HC) is gelieerd aan procesinnovatie en verticale communicatie (VC) aan 
productinnovatie. De CEO beslist ten aanzien van de leveringen van de leden en het 
niveau van de verticale communicatie in de gecentraliseerde coöperatie, terwijl deze 
beslissingen worden genomen door de leden in de gedecentraliseerde coöperatie. De 
bevindingen tonen aan dat een gedecentraliseerde coöperatie efficiënt is voor een 
gemiddeld niveau van de VC, en wanneer de HC kosten boven een bepaald niveau zijn. 
Een gecentraliseerde coöperatie is efficiënt in de overige scenarios. Dit komt doordat de 
centrale coöperatie de negatieve externaliteiten in productie kan internaliseren en een 
hoger niveau van VC heeft. Hoofdstuk 3 onderzoekt hoe leden ondernemingen kiezen 
en hoe de bestuursstructuur binnen een onderneming wordt gekozen. De coöperatie 
wordt verondersteld een uniforme prijs te betalen en keert alle opbrengsten uit aan de 
leden, terwijl de NV onderscheidt maakt in zijn betalingen op basis van kwaliteit en uit 
is op maximalisatie van de eigen winst. De markt bestaat uit 2 (1, 0) coöperaties en 0 (1, 
2) NVs wanneer de betaling voor kwaliteit door de NV laag (midden, hoog) is. In het 
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evenwicht kiest de boer de dichtstbijzijnde onderneming, en een boer met producten van 
hoge kwaliteit kiest de NV. In hoofdstuk 4 gebruiken we een enquête onder coöperaties 
in China om de verschillende evaluaties van de CEO en de leden te begrijpen. De 
resultaten tonen aan dat zowel CEO's en leden tevreden zijn over de prestaties van hun 
coöperaties. Echter, de leden hebben hogere scores dan CEO's met betrekking tot lid 
winstgevendheid en de algemene prestaties, terwijl de CEO's een hogere score hebben 
op het vlak van sociale invloed. De resultaten tonen ook aan dat meer algemene 
vergaderingen tot een verbetering van de evaluaties leidt, en dat meer algemene 
vergaderingen (mannelijke CEO's, oudere en meer ervaren leden) tot een daling (stijging, 
afname) van de evaluatieverschillen leiden.  
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Appendix 
Chapter 2 
Payoffs in Decentralized/Centralized Cooperative (given HC and VC) 
The mathematical steps to obtain the comparative statics in the centralized and 
centralized cooperatives given HC and VC are presented Table 1 below: 
Table 1: Payoffs calculation steps in decentralized and centralized cooperatives (given HC and VC) 
Decentralized cooperative Centralized cooperative 
𝜋1 = (𝑣 + 𝑑 − 𝑞1 − 𝑞2)𝑞1 − (𝐴 −
ℎ1)𝑞1 −
1
2
𝑟ℎ1
2 −
1
2
𝑘𝑣1
2  
𝜋2 = (𝑣 + 𝑑 − 𝑞1 − 𝑞2)𝑞2 − (𝐴 −
ℎ2)𝑞2 −
1
2
𝑟ℎ2
2 −
1
2
𝑘𝑣2
2  
𝜋 = 𝜋1 + 𝜋2 = (𝑣 + 𝑑 − 𝑄)𝑄 − 𝑐1𝑞1 −
𝑐2𝑞2 −
1
2
𝑟ℎ1
2 −
1
2
𝑘𝑣1
2 −
1
2
𝑟ℎ2
2 −
1
2
𝑘𝑣2
2
𝜋 = (𝑣 + 𝑑 − 𝑞1 − 𝑞2)(𝑞1 + 𝑞2) −
𝑐1𝑞1 − 𝑐2𝑞2 −
1
2
𝑟ℎ1
2 −
1
2
𝑟ℎ2
2 −
1
2
𝑘(𝑣1 +
𝑣2)
2  
𝜋1 = (𝑣 + 𝑑 − 𝑞1 − 𝑞2)𝑞1 − (𝐴 −
ℎ1)𝑞1 −
1
2
𝑟ℎ1
2 −
1
4
𝑘(𝑣1 + 𝑣2)
2  
𝜋2 = (𝑣 + 𝑑 − 𝑞1 − 𝑞2)𝑞2 − (𝐴 −
ℎ2)𝑞2 −
1
2
𝑟ℎ2
2 −
1
4
𝑘(𝑣1 + 𝑣2)
2  
First step: Maximize simultaneously𝜋1 
regarding  𝑞1  and 𝜋2  regarding 𝑞2 , and 
solve for 𝑞1 and 𝑞2 results in the reaction 
functions 
𝑞1
∗(𝑞2) =
1
2
(𝑑 − 𝐴 + 𝑣 + ℎ1) −
1
2
𝑞2,  
𝑞2
∗(𝑞1) =
1
2
(𝑑 − 𝐴 + 𝑣 + ℎ2) −
1
2
𝑞1. 
The intersections of the reaction 
functions result in the equilibrium 
First step: Maximize 𝜋 regarding 𝑞1  and 
𝑞2, and solve for 𝑞1 and 𝑞2 results in the 
reaction functions 
𝑞1
∗(𝑞2) =
1
2
(𝑑 − 𝐴 + 𝑣 + ℎ1) − 𝑞2,  
𝑞2
∗(𝑞1) =
1
2
(𝑑 − 𝐴 + 𝑣 + ℎ2) − 𝑞1.  
The symmetric solution to the interaction 
of the reaction functions results in the 
equilibrium 
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𝑞1
∗|𝐷 =
1
3
(𝑑 − 𝐴 + 𝑣 + 2ℎ1 − ℎ2)  
𝑞2
∗|𝐷 =
1
3
(𝑑 − 𝐴 + 𝑣 + 2ℎ2 − ℎ1).  
Therefore, 
𝑄∗|𝐷 =
2
3
(𝑑 − 𝐴 + 𝑣 + ℎ).  
 
𝑞1
∗|𝐶 = 𝑞2
∗|𝐶 =
1
4
(𝑑 − 𝐴 + 𝑣 + ℎ).  
Therefore, 
𝑄∗|𝐶 =
1
2
(𝑑 − 𝐴 + 𝑣 + ℎ)  
 
Second step: Plug 𝑞1
∗|𝐷, 𝑞2
∗|𝐷 back into 
𝜋. 
Due to symmetric computation, we take 
ℎ1 = ℎ2 = ℎ, 𝑣1 = 𝑣2 = 𝑣, 𝑞1 = 𝑞2 =
𝑄
2
=
1
3
(𝑑 − 𝐴 + 𝑣 + ℎ). 
 𝜋|𝐷 = (𝑣 + 𝑑 − 𝑄)𝑄 − (𝐴 − ℎ)𝑄 −
𝑟ℎ
2
− 𝑘𝑣
2
=
2
9
(𝑑 − 𝐴 + 𝑣 + ℎ)
2
−
𝑟ℎ
2
− 𝑘𝑣
2  
Second step: Plug 𝑞1
∗|𝐶, 𝑞2
∗|𝐶 back into 𝜋. 
Due to symmetric computation, we take 
ℎ1 = ℎ2 = ℎ, 𝑣1 = 𝑣2 = 𝑣, 𝑞1 = 𝑞2 =
𝑄
2
=
1
4
(𝑑 − 𝐴 + 𝑣 + ℎ) 
𝜋|𝐶 = (𝑣 + 𝑑 − 𝑄)𝑄 − (𝐴 − ℎ)𝑄 −
𝑟ℎ
2
− 2𝑘𝑣
2
=
1
4
(𝑑 − 𝐴 + 𝑣 + ℎ)
2
−
𝑟ℎ
2
− 2𝑘𝑣
2
.
Payoffs in Decentralized/Centralized Cooperative (given HC) 
Similarly, the mathematical steps to obtain the comparative statics in the centralized 
and centralized Cooperative without HC are presented in Table 2: 
Table 2: Payoffs calculation steps in decentralized and centralized cooperatives (given HC) 
Decentralized structure Centralized structure  
𝜋1 = (𝑣 + 𝑑 − 𝑞1 − 𝑞2)𝑞1 − 𝐴𝑞1 −
1
2
𝑘𝑣1
2  
𝜋2 = (𝑣 + 𝑑 − 𝑞1 − 𝑞2)𝑞2 − 𝐴𝑞2 −
1
2
𝑘𝑣2
2  
𝜋 = 𝜋1 + 𝜋2 = (𝑣 + 𝑑 − 𝑄)(𝑞1 +
𝑞2) − 𝐴𝑞1 − 𝐴𝑞2 −
1
2
𝑘𝑣1
2 −
1
2
𝑘𝑣2
2
𝜋 = (𝑣 + 𝑑 − 𝑞1 − 𝑞2)(𝑞1 + 𝑞2) −
𝐴𝑞1 − 𝐴𝑞2 −
1
2
𝑘(𝑣1 + 𝑣2)
2  
𝜋1 = (𝑣 + 𝑑 − 𝑞1 − 𝑞2)𝑞1 − 𝐴𝑞1 −
1
4
𝑘(𝑣1 + 𝑣2)
2  
𝜋2 = (𝑣 + 𝑑 − 𝑞1 − 𝑞2)𝑞2 − 𝐴𝑞2 −
1
4
𝑘(𝑣1 + 𝑣2)
2  
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First step: Maximize simultaneously𝜋1 
regarding  𝑞1  and 𝜋2  regarding 𝑞2 , and 
solve for 𝑞1 and 𝑞2 results in the reaction 
functions 
𝑞1
∗(𝑞2) =
1
2
(𝑑 − 𝐴 + 𝑣) −
1
2
𝑞2,  
𝑞2
∗(𝑞1) =
1
2
(𝑑 − 𝐴 + 𝑣) −
1
2
𝑞1. 
The intersections of the reaction 
functions result in the equilibrium 
𝑞1
∗(𝑣1, 𝑣2|𝐷) =
1
3
(𝑑 − 𝐴 + 𝑣)  
𝑞2
∗(𝑣1, 𝑣2|𝐷) =
1
3
(𝑑 − 𝐴 + 𝑣).  
Therefore, 𝑄(𝑣1, 𝑣2|𝐷) =
2
3
(𝑑 − 𝐴 +
𝑣𝐷).  
First step: Maximize 𝜋 regarding 𝑞1  and 
𝑞2, and solve for 𝑞1 and 𝑞2 results in the 
reaction functions 
𝑞1
∗(𝑞2) =
1
2
(𝑑 − 𝐴 + 𝑣) − 𝑞2,  
𝑞2
∗(𝑞1) =
1
2
(𝑑 − 𝐴 + 𝑣) − 𝑞1.  
The symmetric solution to the 
intersection of the reaction functions 
results in the equilibrium 
𝑞1
∗(𝑣1, 𝑣2|𝐶) = 𝑞2
∗(𝑣1, 𝑣2|𝐶) =
1
4
(𝑑 −
𝐴 + 𝑣).  
Therefore, 𝑄(𝑣1, 𝑣2|𝐶) =
1
2
(𝑑 − 𝐴 +
𝑣𝐶). 
 
Second step: Plug 𝑞1
∗(𝑣1, 𝑣2|𝐷), 
𝑞2
∗(, 𝑣1, 𝑣2|𝐷) back into 𝜋1 and 𝜋2. 
 𝜋1 = (
1
3
(𝑑 + 2𝐴) +
1
6
(𝑣1 +
𝑣2)) (
1
3
(𝑑 − 𝐴) +
1
6
(𝑣1 + 𝑣2)) −
𝐴(
1
3
(𝑑 − 𝐴) +
1
6
(𝑣1 + 𝑣2)) −
1
2
𝑘𝑣1
2 
𝜋2 = (
1
3
(𝑑 + 2𝐴) +
1
6
(𝑣1 +
𝑣2)) (
1
3
(𝑑 − 𝐴) +
1
6
(𝑣1 + 𝑣2)) −
𝐴(
1
3
(𝑑 − 𝐴) +
1
6
(𝑣1 + 𝑣2)) −
1
2
𝑘𝑣2
2. 
Maximizing 𝜋1 regarding 𝑣1; 
maximizing 𝜋2 regarding 𝑣2, results in 
the first order conditions, 
Second step: Plug 𝑞1
∗(𝑣1, 𝑣2|𝐶) , 
𝑞2
∗(𝑣1, 𝑣2|𝐶) back into 𝜋. 
𝜋 = (
1
2
(𝑑 + 𝐴) +
1
4
(𝑣1 + 𝑣2)) (
1
2
(𝑑 −
𝐴) +
1
4
(𝑣1 + 𝑣2)) − 𝐴(
1
2
(𝑑 − 𝐴) +
1
4
(𝑣1 + 𝑣2)) −
1
2
𝑘(𝑣1 + 𝑣2)
2.
 
Maximizing 𝜋  regarding 𝑣 (𝑣 = 𝑣1 +
𝑣2), results  
𝑣∗(𝑘|𝐶) =
2(𝑑−𝐴)
8𝑘−1
 .
  
Therefore, 
 𝑣1
∗(𝑘|𝐶) = 𝑣2
∗(𝑘|𝐶) =
(𝑑−𝐴)
8𝑘−1
 .
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𝑣1
∗(𝑣2|𝐷) =
2𝐴−2𝑑−𝑣2
1−18𝑘
  
𝑣2
∗(𝑣1|𝐷) =
2𝐴−2𝑑−𝑣1
1−18𝑘
. 
Solve the four reaction functions: 
𝑣1
∗(𝑘|𝐷) =  𝑣2
∗(𝑘|𝐷) =
(𝑑−𝐴)
9𝑘−1
.  
 
Final step: Substitute 𝑣1
∗(𝑘|𝐷) and 
 𝑣2
∗(𝑘|𝐷) into 𝑞1, 𝑞2,  
𝑄∗(𝑘|𝐷) = 𝑞1
∗(𝑘|𝐷) + 𝑞2
∗(𝑘|𝐷) =
6(𝑑−𝐴)𝑘
9𝑘−1
  
and 
𝜋∗(𝑘|𝐷) =
(𝑑−𝐴)2𝑘(18𝑘−1)
(9𝑘−1)2
. 
Final step: Substitute 𝑣1
∗(𝑘|𝐶) 
and 𝑣2
∗(𝑘|𝐶) into 𝑞1, 𝑞2,  
𝑄∗(𝑘|𝐶) = 𝑞1
∗(𝑘|𝐶) + 𝑞2
∗(𝑘|𝐶) =
4𝑘(𝑑−𝐴)
8𝑘−1
  
and 
𝜋∗(𝑘|𝐶) =
2(𝑑−𝐴)2𝑘
8𝑘−1
. 
Payoffs in Decentralized/Centralized Cooperative 
The mathematical steps to obtain the comparative statics in the centralized and 
centralized Cooperative, are presented in Table 3: 
Table 3: Payoffs calculation steps in decentralized and centralized cooperatives  
Decentralized structure Centralized structure  
𝜋1 = (𝑣 + 𝑑 − 𝑞1 − 𝑞2)𝑞1 − (𝐴 −
ℎ1)𝑞1 −
1
2
𝑟ℎ1
2 −
1
2
𝑘𝑣1
2  
𝜋2 = (𝑣 + 𝑑 − 𝑞1 − 𝑞2)𝑞2 − (𝐴 −
ℎ2)𝑞2 −
1
2
𝑟ℎ2
2 −
1
2
𝑘𝑣2
2  
𝜋 = 𝜋1 + 𝜋2 = (𝑣 + 𝑑 − 𝑄)(𝑞1 +
𝑞2) − 𝑐1𝑞1 − 𝑐2𝑞2 −
1
2
𝑟ℎ1
2 −
1
2
𝑘𝑣1
2 −
1
2
𝑟ℎ2
2 −
1
2
𝑘𝑣2
2
𝜋 = (𝑣 + 𝑑 − 𝑞1 − 𝑞2)(𝑞1 + 𝑞2) −
𝑐1𝑞1 − 𝑐2𝑞2 −
1
2
𝑟ℎ1
2 −
1
2
𝑟ℎ2
2 −
1
2
𝑘(𝑣1 +
𝑣2)
2  
𝜋1 = (𝑣 + 𝑑 − 𝑞1 − 𝑞2)𝑞1 − (𝐴 −
ℎ1)𝑞1 −
1
2
𝑟ℎ1
2 −
1
4
𝑘(𝑣1 + 𝑣2)
2  
𝜋2 = (𝑣 + 𝑑 − 𝑞1 − 𝑞2)𝑞2 − (𝐴 −
ℎ2)𝑞2 −
1
2
𝑟ℎ2
2 −
1
4
𝑘(𝑣1 + 𝑣2)
2  
First step: Maximize simultaneously𝜋1 
regarding  𝑞1  and 𝜋2  regarding 𝑞2 , and 
First step: Maximize 𝜋 regarding 𝑞1  and 
𝑞2, and solve for 𝑞1 and 𝑞2 results in the 
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solve for 𝑞1 and 𝑞2 results in the reaction 
functions 
𝑞1
∗(𝑞2) =
1
2
(𝑑 − 𝐴 + 𝑣 + ℎ1) −
1
2
𝑞2,  
𝑞2
∗(𝑞1) =
1
2
(𝑑 − 𝐴 + 𝑣 + ℎ2) −
1
2
𝑞1. 
The intersections of the reaction 
functions result in the equilibrium 
𝑞1
∗(ℎ1, ℎ2, 𝑣1, 𝑣2|𝐷) =
1
3
(𝑑 − 𝐴 + 𝑣 +
2ℎ1 − ℎ2)  
𝑞2
∗(ℎ1, ℎ2, 𝑣1, 𝑣2|𝐷) =
1
3
(𝑑 − 𝐴 + 𝑣 +
2ℎ2 − ℎ1).  
Therefore, 𝑄(ℎ1, ℎ2, 𝑣1, 𝑣2|𝐷) =
2
3
(𝑑 −
𝐴 + 𝑣 + ℎ).  
 
reaction functions 
𝑞1
∗(𝑞2) =
1
2
(𝑑 − 𝐴 + 𝑣 + ℎ1) − 𝑞2,  
𝑞2
∗(𝑞1) =
1
2
(𝑑 − 𝐴 + 𝑣 + ℎ2) − 𝑞1.  
The symmetric solution to the interaction 
of the reaction functions results in the 
equilibrium 
𝑞1
∗(ℎ1, ℎ2, 𝑣1, 𝑣2|𝐶) =
𝑞2
∗(ℎ1, ℎ2, 𝑣1, 𝑣2|𝐶) =
1
4
(𝑑 − 𝐴 + 𝑣 +
ℎ).  
Therefore,  𝑄(ℎ1, ℎ2, 𝑣1, 𝑣2|𝐶) =
1
2
(𝑑 −
𝐴 + 𝑣 + ℎ). 
Second step: Plug 𝑞1
∗(ℎ1, ℎ2, 𝑣1, 𝑣2|𝐷), 
𝑞2
∗(ℎ1, ℎ2, 𝑣1, 𝑣2|𝐷) back into 𝜋1 and 𝜋2. 
 𝜋1 = (
1
3
(𝑑 + 2𝐴) +
1
6
(𝑣1 + 𝑣2 −
2ℎ1 − 2ℎ2)) (
1
3
(𝑑 − 𝐴) +
1
6
(4ℎ1 −
2ℎ2+𝑣1 + 𝑣2)) − (𝐴 − ℎ1)(
1
3
(𝑑 −
𝐴) +
1
6
(4ℎ1 − 2ℎ2+𝑣1 + 𝑣2)) −
1
2
(𝑟ℎ1
2 + 𝑘𝑣1
2) 
𝜋2 = (
1
3
(𝑑 + 2𝐴) +
1
6
(𝑣1 + 𝑣2 − 2ℎ1 −
2ℎ2)) (
1
3
(𝑑 − 𝐴) +
1
6
(4ℎ2 − 2ℎ1+𝑣1 +
𝑣2)) − (𝐴 − ℎ2)(
1
3
(𝑑 − 𝐴) +
1
6
(4ℎ2 −
Second step: Plug 𝑞1
∗(ℎ1, ℎ2, 𝑣1, 𝑣2|𝐶) , 
𝑞2
∗(ℎ1, ℎ2, 𝑣1, 𝑣2|𝐶) back into 𝜋. 
𝜋 = (
1
2
(𝑑 + 𝐴) +
1
4
(𝑣1 + 𝑣2 − ℎ1 −
ℎ2)) (
1
2
(𝑑 − 𝐴) +
1
4
(ℎ1 + ℎ2+𝑣1 +
𝑣2)) − (𝐴 −
1
2
(ℎ1 + ℎ2)) (
1
2
(𝑑 − 𝐴) +
1
4
(ℎ1 + ℎ2+𝑣1 + 𝑣2)) −
1
2
(𝑟ℎ1
2 + 𝑟ℎ2
2 +
𝑘(𝑣1 + 𝑣2)
2).
 
Maximizing 𝜋1  regarding ℎ1 , 
maximizing 𝜋2  regarding ℎ2 , 
maximizing 𝜋  regarding 𝑣 (𝑣 = 𝑣1 +
𝑣2), results in the first order conditions, 
ℎ1
∗(ℎ2, 𝑣|𝐶) =
4𝐴−4𝑑−ℎ2−2𝑣1−2𝑣2
3−16𝑟
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2ℎ1+𝑣1 + 𝑣2)) −
1
2
(𝑟ℎ2
2 + 𝑘𝑣2
2). 
Maximizing 𝜋1 regarding ℎ1, 𝑣1; 
maximizing 𝜋2 regarding ℎ2, 𝑣2, results 
in the first order conditions, 
ℎ1
∗(ℎ2, 𝑣1, 𝑣2|𝐷) =
2(2𝐴−2𝑑+2ℎ2−𝑣1−𝑣2)
8−9𝑟
  
𝑣1
∗(𝑣2, ℎ1, ℎ2|𝐷) =
2𝐴−2𝑑−𝑣2−4ℎ1+2ℎ2
1−18𝑘
  
ℎ2
∗(ℎ1, 𝑣1, 𝑣2|𝐷) =
2(2𝐴−2𝑑+2ℎ1−𝑣1−𝑣2)
8−9𝑟
  
𝑣2
∗(𝑣1, ℎ1, ℎ2|𝐷) =
2𝐴−2𝑑−𝑣1−4ℎ2+2ℎ1
1−18𝑘
. 
Solve the four reaction functions: 
ℎ1
∗(𝑘, 𝑟|𝐷) = ℎ2
∗(𝑘, 𝑟|𝐷) =
4(𝑑−𝐴)𝑘
9𝑘𝑟−4𝑘−𝑟
  
 𝑣1
∗(𝑘, 𝑟|𝐷) =  𝑣2
∗(𝑘, 𝑟|𝐷) =
(𝑑−𝐴)𝑟
9𝑘𝑟−4𝑘−𝑟
.  
ℎ2
∗(ℎ1, 𝑣|𝐶) =
2𝐴−2𝑑−ℎ1−𝑣1−𝑣2
1−8𝑟
  
𝑣∗(ℎ1, ℎ2|𝐶) =
2𝐴−2𝑑−ℎ1−ℎ2
1−8𝑟
 .
 
 
Solve the three reaction functions: 
ℎ1
∗(𝑘, 𝑟|𝐶) = ℎ2
∗(𝑘, 𝑟|𝐶) =
2(𝑑−𝐴)𝑘
8𝑘𝑟−2𝑘−𝑟
  
 𝑣∗(𝑘, 𝑟|𝐶) =
2(𝑑−𝐴)𝑟
8𝑘𝑟−2𝑘−𝑟
. 
Therefore, 
𝑣1
∗(𝑘, 𝑟|𝐶) = 𝑣2
∗(𝑘, 𝑟|𝐶) =
(𝑑−𝐴)𝑟
8𝑘𝑟−2𝑘−𝑟
.  
 
 
Final step: Substitute 
ℎ1
∗(𝑘, 𝑟|𝐷),  ℎ2
∗(𝑘, 𝑟|𝐷), 𝑣1
∗(𝑘, 𝑟|𝐷) and 
 𝑣2
∗(𝑘, 𝑟|𝐷) into 𝑞1, 𝑞2,  
𝑞1
∗(𝑘, 𝑟|𝐷) = 𝑞2
∗(𝑘, 𝑟|𝐷) =
3(𝑑−𝐴)𝑘𝑟
9𝑘𝑟−4𝑘−𝑟
  
and 
𝜋∗(𝑘, 𝑟|𝐷) =
(𝑑−𝐴)2𝑘𝑟(18𝑘𝑟−16𝑘−𝑟)
(9𝑘𝑟−4𝑘−𝑟)2
. 
Final step: Substitute 
ℎ1
∗(𝑘, 𝑟|𝐶),  ℎ2
∗(𝑘, 𝑟|𝐶), 𝑣1
∗(𝑘, 𝑟|𝐶) 
and 𝑣2
∗(𝑘, 𝑟|𝐶) into 𝑞1, 𝑞2,  
𝑄∗(𝑘, 𝑟|𝐶) = 𝑞1
∗(𝑘, 𝑟|𝐶) +
𝑞2
∗(𝑘, 𝑟|𝐶) =
4(𝑑−𝐴)𝑘𝑟
8𝑘𝑟−2𝑘−𝑟
  
and 
𝜋∗(𝑘, 𝑟|𝐶) =
2(𝑑−𝐴)2𝑘𝑟
8𝑘𝑟−2𝑘−𝑟
. 
Proof Proposition 1: 
From Table 1 we obtain that given HC and VC,  𝑄𝐷 =
2
3
(𝑑 − 𝐴 + 𝑣 + ℎ)  and 𝑄𝐶 =
1
2
(𝑑 − 𝐴 + 𝑣 + ℎ). We can see that always 𝑄𝐷 > 𝑄𝐶. 
Proof Proposition 2: 
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From Table 1 we obtain that given HC and VC,
 
𝜋𝐷 =
2
9
(𝑑 − 𝐴 + 𝑣 + ℎ)
2
− 𝑟ℎ
2
−
𝑘𝑣
2
 
 
 and 𝜋𝐶 =
1
4
(𝑑 − 𝐴 + 𝑣 + ℎ)
2
− 𝑟ℎ
2
− 2𝑘𝑣
2
. The difference between the joint 
profit of the centralized cooperative and the decentralized cooperative is 
1
36
(d − A + 𝑣 + ℎ)
2
− 𝑘𝑣
2
> 0 when VC is 0. 
Proof Proposition 3:  
From Table 2 we obtain that without HC, 𝑉𝐷 =
2(𝑑−𝐴)
9−1 𝑘⁄
 and  𝑉𝐶 =
2(𝑑−𝐴)
8−1/𝑘
. Therefore the 
VC level is always higher in the centralized cooperative for all possible values of k. 
Proof Proposition 4:  
From Table 2 we obtain that without HC, 𝑄𝐷 =
6(𝑑−𝐴)
9−1 𝑘⁄
 and 𝑄𝐶 =
4(𝑑−𝐴)
8−1/𝑘
. The production 
level is higher in the decentralized cooperative than the centralized cooperative when 
6(𝑑−𝐴)
9−1 𝑘⁄
>
4(𝑑−𝐴)
8−1/𝑘
⟺3(8 −
1
𝑘
) > 2 (9 −
1
𝑘
) ⟺ 21 −
3
𝑘
> 18 −
2
𝑘
⟺ 6 >
1
𝑘
⟺ 𝑘 >
1
6
 . 
Therefore the production level is higher in the decentralized cooperative than in the 
centralized cooperative when k>1/6. 
Proof Proposition 5:  
From Table 2 we obtain that without HC, 𝜋𝐷 =
(𝑑−𝐴)2(18−1/𝑘)
(9−1 𝑘⁄ )2
 and 𝜋𝐶 =
2(𝑑−𝐴)2
8−1/𝑘
. The 
profit level is higher in the decentralized cooperative than in the centralized cooperative 
when  
(𝑑−𝐴)2(18−1/𝑘)
(9−1 𝑘⁄ )2
>
2(𝑑−𝐴)2
8−1/𝑘
⟺ (18 −
1
𝑘
) (8 −
1
𝑘
) > 2 (9 −
1
𝑘
)
2
⟺ 144𝑘2 − 26𝑘 + 1 >
162𝑘2 − 36𝑘 + 2 ⟺ 18𝑘2 − 10𝑘 + 1 < 0. The roots of the equation 18𝑘2 − 10𝑘 +
1 = 0 are 𝑘 =
5±√7
18
. Therefore 𝜋𝐷 > 𝜋𝐶 holds when 𝑘 ∈ (
5−√7
18
,
5+√7
18
). To conclude, the 
profit level is higher (lower) in the decentralized cooperative than in the centralized 
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cooperative when k ∈ (
5−√7
18
,
5+√7
18
) (otherwise). 
Proof regarding the equilibrium communication levels (Figure 4):  
From Table 2.2 in chapter 2, we obtain that with both HC and VC, 𝐻𝐶𝐷 =
8(𝑑−𝐴)
𝑟(9−1/𝑘)−4
 
and 𝐻𝐶𝐶 =
4(𝑑−𝐴)
𝑟(8−1/𝑘)−2
. The HC level in the decentralized cooperative is higher than in 
the centralized cooperative when 
8(𝑑−𝐴)
𝑟(9−1/𝑘)−4
>
4(𝑑−𝐴)
𝑟(8−1/𝑘)−2
⟺ 2𝑟 (8 −
1
𝑘
) − 4 > 𝑟 (9 −
1
𝑘
) − 4 ⟺ 16−
2
𝑘
> 9 −
1
𝑘
⟺ 𝑘 >
1
7
 . Therefore when  𝑘 > (<)
1
7
 , the HC level is 
higher (lower) in the decentralized cooperative than in the centralized cooperative. 
From Table 2.2 in chapter 2, we obtain that with both HC and VC, 𝑉𝐶𝐷 =
2(𝑑−𝐴)
𝑘(9−4/𝑟)−1
 
and 𝑉𝐶𝐶 =
2(𝑑−𝐴)
𝑘(8−2/𝑟)−1
. The VC level is higher in the decentralized cooperative than in 
the centralized cooperative when 
2(𝑑−𝐴)
𝑘(9−4 𝑟⁄ )−1
<
2(𝑑−𝐴)
𝑘(8−2/𝑟)−1
⟺ 𝑘(8 −
2
𝑟
) − 1 < 𝑘 (9 −
4
𝑟
) − 1 ⟺ 8−
2
𝑟
< 9−
4
𝑟
⟺ 𝑟 > 2. Therefore, when 𝑟 > (<)2, the VC level is higher 
(lower) in the centralized structure than in the decentralized structure.
  Proof Proposition 6: 
From Table 2.2 in chapter 2, we obtain that with both HC and VC, 𝑄𝐷 =
6(𝑑−𝐴)
9−4 𝑟⁄ −1/𝑘
 and 
𝑄𝐶 =
4(𝑑−𝐴)
8−2 𝑟⁄ −1/𝑘
. The production level is higher in the decentralized cooperative than in 
the centralized cooperative when 
6(𝑑−𝐴)
9−4/𝑟−1/𝑘
>
4(𝑑−𝐴)
8−2/𝑟−1/𝑘
⟺
3
9−4 𝑟⁄ −1/𝑘
>
2
8−2 𝑟⁄ −1/𝑘
⟺
𝑘 >
2𝑟
15𝑟−2
.  
Proof Proposition 7:  
From Table 2.2 in chapter 2, we obtain that with both the equilibrium HC and VC, 𝜋𝐷 =
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(d−A)2(18−16/r−1/k)
(9−4 r⁄ −1 k⁄ )2
 and 𝜋𝐶 =
2(d−A)2
(8−2 r⁄ −1/k)
. The profit level is higher in the decentralized 
cooperative than in the centralized cooperative when 
(d−A)2(18−16/r−1/k)
(9−4 r⁄ −1 k⁄ )2
>
2(d−A)2
(8−2 r⁄ −1/k)
⟺ (18𝑘𝑟 − 16𝑘𝑟)(8𝑘𝑟 − 2𝑘 − 𝑟) > 2(9𝑘𝑟 − 4𝑘 − 𝑟)2 ⟺ (−
20
𝑟
−
18)𝑘2 + (10 +
2
𝑟
) 𝑘 − 1 > 0 ⟺ (
20
𝑟
+ 18)𝑘2 − (10 +
2
𝑟
) 𝑘 + 1 < 0 . The roots of 
the equation (
20
𝑟
+ 18)𝑘2 − (10 +
2
𝑟
) 𝑘 + 1 = 0 are 𝑘 =
5𝑟+1±√7𝑟2−10𝑟+1)
20+18𝑟
 when 𝑟 ∈
(0,
1
7
(5 − 3√2))𝑜𝑟 𝑟 ∈ [
1
7
(5 + 3√2),∞). Due to the conditions of k and r, see footnote 
3, r is larger than 
1
7
(5 − 3√2) , hence 𝑟 ∈ (0,
1
7
(5 − 3√2)) is eliminated. Therefore 
when 
5𝑟+1−√7𝑟2−10𝑟+1)
20+18𝑟
  < k < 
5𝑟+1+√7𝑟2−10𝑟+1)
20+18𝑟
  and 𝑟 ∈ [
1
7
(5 + 3√2),∞),  the profit 
level is higher in the decentralized cooperative than in the centralized cooperative. 
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Chapter 3
Numerical examples illustrating Figure 3.9
When  𝛽 = 1.5 and 𝛿 = 2, 
𝑝0𝐶
∗ =
∫ ∫ 𝛿𝑣 𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑣
𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑝0𝐶,𝑑𝑀
∗ ,1)
0
min (1,
𝑝0𝐶+1
𝛽1
)
0
∫ ∫  𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑣
𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑝0𝐶,𝑑𝑀,
∗ 1)
0
min (1,
𝑝0𝐶+1
𝛽1
)
0
=
∫ ∫ 2𝑣 𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑣
𝑝0𝐶
0
,
1−𝑝0𝐶
1.5
0
+∫ ∫ 2𝑣 𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑣
𝑝0𝐶−1.5𝑣+1
2
0
1  
1−𝑝0𝐶
1.5
∫ ∫  𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑣
𝑝0𝐶
0
,
1−𝑝0𝐶
1.5
0
+∫ ∫  𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑣
𝑝0𝐶−1.5𝑣+1
2
0
1  
1−𝑝0𝐶
1.5
, it 
results in 𝑝0𝐶
∗ = 0.766. The three market structures are presented in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: The three market structures when 𝛽 = 1.5 and 𝛿 = 2
We first compare the IOF market with the mixed market. The enterprise 1 is the IOF 
governance structure for both markets, while the enterprise 0 is either an IOF or a Coop. 
The payoff of the farmer of enterprise 0 in the IOF market structure is 𝜋𝑓0𝐼 = 1.5𝑣 − 𝑑, 
while the payoff of the farmer of enterprise 0 in the mixed market structure is 𝜋𝑓0𝐶 =
0.766 − 𝑑. Therefore the indifferent farmer regarding the payoff is 𝑣∗ = 0.51, i.e. when 
𝜋𝑓0𝐼 = 𝜋𝑓0𝐶.
Farmers in 𝑣 < 𝑣∗ , 𝑑 < 𝑝0𝐶
∗  , 𝑑 < 𝑑𝑀
∗   (i.e. area A in Figure 1) prefer the Coop 
governance structure. The area is 0.5 × 0.51 + 0.5 × (0.51 + 0.153) × 0.268 =
0.344. Farmers in 𝑣 > 𝑣∗, 𝑣 > 𝑣0𝐼
∗  (i.e. area B in Figure 1) prefer the IOF governance 
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structure. The area is 0.5 × (1 − 0.51) = 0.245 . A > B, therefore the mixed market 
dominates the IOF market. 
Next compare the mixed market with the Coop market. The enterprise 0 is the Coop 
governance structure for both markets, while the enterprise 1 is either an IOF or a Coop. 
The payoff of the farmer in enterprise 1 in the mixed market structure is 𝜋𝑓1𝐼 = 1.5𝑣 −
(1 − 𝑑), while the payoff of the farmer of enterprise 1 in the Coop market structure is 
𝜋𝑓1𝐶 = 1 − (1 − 𝑑) . Therefore the indifferent farmer regarding the payoff is 𝑣
∗ =
0.667 when 𝜋𝑓1𝐼 = 𝜋𝑓1𝐶. 
Farmers in 𝑣 < 𝑣∗ , 𝑑 < 0.5  (i.e. area C in Figure 1) prefer the Coop governance 
structure. The area is 0.5 × 0.667 = 0.333. Farmers in 𝑣 > 𝑣∗, 𝑑 > 𝑑𝑀
∗  (i.e. area D in 
Figure 1) prefer the IOF governance structure. The area is (1 − 0.667) × (1 −
0.383) + 0.5 × (1 − 0.667) × (0.383 − 0.133) = 0.247 . The Coop market 
dominates the mixed market because C > D.  
Finally the Coop market is the equilibrium market when 𝛿 = 2, 𝛽 = 1.5. Similarly, the 
Coop market is the equilibrium when 𝛽 < 1.5. 
When 𝛽 = 1.6 and 𝛿 = 2 ,  
𝑝0𝐶
∗ =
∫ ∫ 𝛿𝑣 𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑣
𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑝0𝐶,𝑑𝑀
∗ ,1)
0
min (1,
𝑝0𝐶+1
𝛽1
)
0
∫ ∫  𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑣
𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑝0𝐶,𝑑𝑀,
∗ 1)
0
min (1,
𝑝0𝐶+1
𝛽1
)
0
=
∫ ∫ 2𝑣 𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑣
𝑝0𝐶
0
,
1−𝑝0𝐶
1.6
0
+∫ ∫ 2𝑣 𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑣
𝑝0𝐶−1.6𝑣+1
2
0
1  
1−𝑝0𝐶
1.6
∫ ∫  𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑣
𝑝0𝐶
0
,
1−𝑝0𝐶
1.6
0
+∫ ∫  𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑣
𝑝0𝐶−1.6𝑣+1
2
0
1  
1−𝑝0𝐶
1.6
. It 
results in 𝑝0𝐶
∗ = 0.728. The three market structures are presented in Figure 2.  
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Figure 2: The three market structures when 𝛽 = 1.6 and 𝛿 = 2 
We first compare the IOF market with the mixed market. Enterprise 1 is the IOF 
governance structure for both markets, while enterprise 0 is either an IOF or a Coop.
The payoff of the farmer of enterprise 0 in the IOF market structure is 𝜋𝑓0𝐼 = 1.6𝑣 − 𝑑, 
while the payoff of the farmer of enterprise 0 in the mixed market structure is 𝜋𝑓0𝐶 =
0.728 − 𝑑. Therefore the indifferent farmer is characterized by 𝑣∗ = 0.455, i.e. when 
𝜋𝑓0𝐼 = 𝜋𝑓0𝐶.
Farmers in 𝑣 < 𝑣∗ , 𝑑 < 𝑝0𝐶
∗  , 𝑑 < 𝑑𝑀
∗   (i.e. area A in Figure 2) prefer the Coop 
governance structure. The area is 0.5 × 0.455 + 0.5 × (0.17 + 0.455) × (0.728 −
0.5) = 0.299.  While farmers in 𝑣 > 𝑣∗, 𝑣 > 𝑣0𝐼
∗  (i.e. area B in Figure 2) prefer the IOF 
governance structure. The area is 0.5 × (1 − 0.455) = 0.273 . A > B, therefore the 
mixed market dominates the IOF market.
We then compare the mixed market with the Coop market. Enterprise 0 is the Coop 
governance structure for both markets, while enterprise 1 is either an IOF or a Coop. 
The payoff of the farmer of enterprise 1 in the mixed market structure is 𝜋𝑓1𝐼 = 1.6𝑣 −
(1 − 𝑑), while the payoff of the farmer of enterprise 1 in the Coop market structure is 
𝜋𝑓1𝐶 = 1 − (1 − 𝑑) . Therefore the indifferent farmer regarding is characterized by 
𝑣∗ = 0.625 when 𝜋𝑓1𝐼 = 𝜋𝑓1𝐶.
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Farmers in 𝑣 < 𝑣∗ , 𝑑 < 0.5  (i.e. area C in Figure 2) prefer the Coop governance 
structure. The area is 0.5 × 0.625 = 0.313, while farmers in 𝑣 > 𝑣∗, 𝑑 > 𝑑𝑀
∗  (i.e. area 
D in Figure 2) prefer the IOF governance structure. The area is (1 − 0.625) ×
(1 − 0.299) + 0.5 × (1 − 0.625) × (0.299 − 0.064) = 0.318 . D > C, therefore the 
mixed market dominates the Coop market. The conclusion is therefore that the mixed 
market is the equilibrium market when 𝛽 = 1.6 and 𝛿 = 2.
When 𝛽 = 1.7 and 𝛿 = 2,
𝑝0𝐶
∗ =
∫ ∫ 𝛿𝑣 𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑣
𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑝0𝐶,𝑑𝑀
∗ ,1)
0
min (1,
𝑝0𝐶+1
𝛽1
)
0
∫ ∫  𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑣
𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑝0𝐶,𝑑𝑀,
∗ 1)
0
min (1,
𝑝0𝐶+1
𝛽1
)
0
=
∫ ∫ 2𝑣 𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑣
𝑝0𝐶
0
,
1−𝑝0𝐶
1.7
0
+∫ ∫ 2𝑣 𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑣
𝑝0𝐶−1.7𝑣+1
2
0
1+𝑝0𝐶
1.7  
1−𝑝0𝐶
1.7
∫ ∫  𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑣
𝑝0𝐶
0
,
1−𝑝0𝐶
1.7
0 +∫ ∫  𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑣
𝑝0𝐶−1.7𝑣+1
2
0
1+𝑝0𝐶
1.7  
1−𝑝0𝐶
1.7
 . 
It results in 𝑝0𝐶
∗ = 0.679. Figure 3 presents the three market structures. 
Figure 3: The three market structures when 𝛽 = 1.7 and 𝛿 = 2 
We first compare the IOF market with the mixed market. Enterprise 1 is the IOF 
governance structure for both markets, while enterprise 0 is either an IOF or a Coop.
The payoff of the farmer in enterprise 0 in the IOF market structure is 𝜋𝑓0𝐼 = 1.7𝑣 − 𝑑, 
while the payoff of the farmer of enterprise 0 in the mixed market structure is 𝜋𝑓0𝐶 =
0.679 − 𝑑. Therefore the indifferent farmer is characterized by 𝑣∗ = 0.399.
 
 
122 
 
Farmers in 𝑣 < 𝑣∗ , 𝑑 < 𝑝0𝐶
∗  , 𝑑 < 𝑑𝑀
∗   (i.e. area A in Figure 3) prefer the Coop 
governance structure. The area is 0.5 × 0.399 + 0.5 × (0.189 + 0.399) × (0.179) =
0.252.  The farmers in 𝑣 > 𝑣∗ , 𝑣 > 𝑣0𝐼
∗   (i.e. area B in Figure 3)) prefer the IOF 
governance structure. The area is 0.5 × (1 − 0.399) = 0.3. B > A, therefore the IOF 
market dominates the mixed market. 
Compare next the mixed market with the Coop market. Enterprise 0 is the Coop 
governance structure for both markets, while enterprise 1 is either an IOF or a Coop. 
The payoff of the farmer of enterprise 1 in the mixed market structure is 𝜋𝑓1𝐼 = 1.7𝑣 −
(1 − 𝑑), while the payoff of the farmer of enterprise 1 in the Coop market structure is 
𝜋𝑓1𝐶 = 1 − (1 − 𝑑). Therefore the indifferent farmer is characterized by 𝑣
∗ = 0.588.  
Farmers in 𝑣 < 𝑣∗ , 𝑑 < 0.5  (i.e. area C in Figure 3) prefer the Coop governance 
structure. The area is 0.5 × 0.588 = 0.294. While farmers in 𝑣 > 𝑣∗, 𝑑 > 𝑑𝑀
∗  (i.e. area 
D in Figure 3) prefer the IOF governance structure. The area is (1 − 0.588) ×
(1 − 0.339) + 0.5 × (1 − 0.588) × (0.339) + 𝜀 = 0.342 + ε . D > C, therefore the 
mixed market dominates the Coop market. The conclusion is therefore that the IOF 
market is the equilibrium market when 𝛿 = 2, 𝛽 = 1.7. Similarly, the IOF market is the 
equilibrium when 𝛽 > 1.7. 
To summarize, when 𝛿 = 2, the Coop market is the equilibrium when 0 < 𝛽 ≤ 1.6, the 
mixed market is the equilibrium when 𝛽 is around 1.6, the IOF market is the equilibrium 
when 1.7 ≤ 𝛽 < 2.  
Next we investigate the equilibrium market structure when 𝛿 < 1. Take 𝛽 = 0.17 and 
𝛿 = 0.2 . It follows immediately that 𝑝0𝐶
∗ =
1
2
𝛿 = 0.1 . Figure 8 presents the three 
market structures.  
123
Figure 4: The three market structures when 𝛽 = 0.17 and 𝛿 = 0.2
We first compare the IOF market with the mixed market. The payoff of the farmer in 
enterprise 0 in the IOF market structure is 𝜋𝑓0𝐼 = 0.17𝑣 − 𝑑, while the payoff of the 
farmer in enterprise 0 in the mixed market structure is 𝜋𝑓0𝐶 = 0.1 − 𝑑. Therefore the 
indifferent farmer is characterized by 𝑣∗ = 0.588.
Farmers in 𝑣 < 𝑣∗ , 𝑑 < 𝑝0𝐶
∗  , 𝑑 < 𝑑𝑀
∗   (i.e. area A in Figure 4) prefer the Coop 
governance structure. The area is 0.588 × 0.1 = 0.0588, while farmers in 𝑣 > 𝑣∗, 𝑣 >
𝑣0𝐼
∗  (i.e. area B in Figure 4) prefer the IOF governance structure. The area is (0.1 +
0.17) × (1 − 0.588) × 0.5 = 0.0556. A > B, therefore the mixed market dominates the 
IOF market.
Similarly, C > D, therefore the Coop market dominates the mixed market. The 
conclusion is therefore that the Coop market is the equilibrium market when 𝛿 = 0.2, 
𝛽 = 0.17. 
Consider next the case 𝛽 = 0.19 and 𝛿 = 0.2. It follows immediately that 𝑝0𝐶
∗ =
1
2
𝛿 =
0.1. Figure 5 presents the three market structures. 
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Figure 5: The three market structures when 𝛽 = 0.19 and 𝛿 = 0.2
We first compare the IOF market with the mixed market. The payoff of the farmer in 
enterprise 0 in the IOF market structure is 𝜋𝑓0𝐼 = 0.19𝑣 − 𝑑, while the payoff of the 
farmer in enterprise 0 in the mixed market structure is 𝜋𝑓0𝐶 = 0.1 − 𝑑. Therefore the 
indifferent farmer is characterized by 𝑣∗ = 0.5263.
Farmers in 𝑣 < 𝑣∗ , 𝑑 < 𝑝0𝐶
∗  , 𝑑 < 𝑑𝑀
∗   (i.e. area A in Figure 5) prefer the Coop 
governance structure. The area is 0.5263 × 0.1 = 0.05263, while farmers in 𝑣 > 𝑣∗, 
𝑣 > 𝑣0𝐼
∗  (i.e. area B in Figure 5) prefer the IOF governance structure. The area is (0.1 +
0.19) × (1 − 0.5263) × 0.5 = 0.0687. B > A, therefore the IOF market dominates the 
mixed market.
Similarly, D > C, therefore the mixed market dominates the Coop market. The 
conclusion is therefore that the IOF market is the equilibrium market when 𝛽 = 0.19 
and 𝛿 = 0.2. 
Notice that when 𝛿 = 0.2, there is no interaction/competition between the IOF and the 
Coop, the mixed market never emerges. Similarly for all 𝛿 < 1, the mixed market never 
emerges.
Consider next the case when 𝛿  is very large. Take  𝛽 = 7  and 𝛿 = 10 . It can be 
determined that 𝑝0𝐶
∗ = 0.41667. Figure 6 presents the three market structures. 
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Figure 6: The three market structures when 𝛽 = 7 and 𝛿 = 10
We first compare the IOF market with the mixed market. The payoff of the farmer in 
enterprise 0 in the IOF market structure is 𝜋𝑓0𝐼 = 7𝑣 − 𝑑, while the payoff of the farmer 
in enterprise 0 in the mixed market structure is 𝜋𝑓0𝐶 = 0.41667 − 𝑑 . Therefore the 
indifferent farmer is characterized by 𝑣∗ = 0.059.
Farmers in 𝑣 < 𝑣∗ , 𝑑 < 𝑝0𝐶
∗  , 𝑑 < 𝑑𝑀
∗  (i.e. area A in Figure 6) preferring the Coop 
governance structure are obviously less than farmers in 𝑣 > 𝑣∗, 𝑣 > 𝑣0𝐼
∗  (i.e. area B in 
Figure 6) preferring the IOF governance structure. Therefore the IOF market dominates 
the mixed market. 
We then compare the mixed market with the Coop market. The payoff of the farmer in 
enterprise 1 in the mixed market structure is 𝜋𝑓1𝐼 = 7𝑣 − (1 − 𝑑), while the payoff of 
the farmer in enterprise 1 in the Coop market structure is 𝜋𝑓1𝐶 = 5 − (1 − 𝑑). Therefore 
the indifferent farmer is characterized by 𝑣∗ = 0.714.
Farmers in 𝑣 < 𝑣∗ , 𝑑 > 0.5  (i.e. area C in Figure 6) prefer the Coop governance 
structure. The area is 0.714 × 0.5 = 0.357. Farmers in 𝑣 > 𝑣∗, 𝑑 > 0.5 (i.e. area D in 
Figure 6) prefer the IOF governance structure. The area is (1 − 0.714) = 0.286. C > D, 
i.e. more farmers close to enterprise 1 vote for a Coop governance structure. Therefore 
the Coop market dominates the mixed market.
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Lastly we compare the IOF market with the Coop market. The payoff of the farmer in 
enterprise 1 in the IOF market structure is 𝜋𝑓1𝐼 = 7𝑣 − (1 − 𝑑), while the payoff of the 
farmer of enterprise 1 in the Coop market structure is 𝜋𝑓1𝐶 = 5 − (1 − 𝑑). Therefore 
the indifferent farmer is characterized by 𝑣∗ = 0.714.
Farmers in 𝑣 < 𝑣∗ , 𝑑 > 0.5  (i.e. area C in Figure 6) prefer the Coop governance 
structure. The area is 0.714 × 0.5. Farmers in 𝑣 > 𝑣∗, 𝑑 > 0.5 (i.e. area E in Figure 6) 
prefer the IOF governance structure. The area is (1 − 0.714) × 0.5. C > E, i.e. more 
farmers close to enterprise 1 vote for a Coop governance structure. Similarly, the farmers 
close to enterprise 0 vote for a Coop governance structure as well. Therefore the Coop 
market dominates the IOF market. 
The conclusion is therefore that the Coop market is the equilibrium market when  𝛽 =
7 and 𝛿 = 10. Similarly, the Coop market is the equilibrium when  𝛽 < 7 and 𝛿 = 10.
If 𝛽 = 8 and 𝛿 = 10, then 𝑝0𝐶
∗ = 0.3846. Figure 7 presents the three market structures. 
Figure 7: The three market structures when 𝛽 = 8 and 𝛿 = 10
We first compare the IOF market with the mixed market. The payoff of the farmer in 
enterprise 0 in the IOF market structure is 𝜋𝑓0𝐼 = 8𝑣 − 𝑑, while the payoff of the farmer 
in enterprise 0 in the mixed market structure is 𝜋𝑓0𝐶 = 0.3846 − 𝑑 . Therefore the 
indifferent farmer is characterized by 𝑣∗ = 0.048.
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Farmers in 𝑣 < 𝑣∗ , 𝑑 < 𝑝0𝐶
∗  , 𝑑 < 𝑑𝑀
∗  (i.e. area A in Figure 7) preferring the Coop 
governance structure are obviously less than the farmers in 𝑣 > 𝑣∗, 𝑣 > 𝑣0𝐼
∗  (i.e. area B 
in Figure 7) preferring the IOF governance structure. Therefore the IOF market 
dominates the mixed market. 
We then compare the mixed market with the Coop market. The payoff of the farmer in 
enterprise 1 in the mixed market structure is 𝜋𝑓1𝐼 = 8𝑣 − (1 − 𝑑), while the payoff of 
the farmer in enterprise 1 in the Coop market structure is 𝜋𝑓1𝐶 = 5 − (1 − 𝑑). Therefore 
the indifferent farmer is characterized by 𝑣∗ = 0.625. 
Farmers in 𝑣 < 𝑣∗ , 𝑑 > 0.5  (i.e. area C in Figure 7) prefer the Coop governance 
structure. The area is 0.625 × 0.5 = 0.312. Farmers in 𝑣 > 𝑣∗, 𝑑 > 0.5 (i.e. area D in 
Figure 7) prefer the IOF governance structure. The area is (1 − 0.625) = 0.375. D > C, 
therefore the mixed market dominates the Coop market. The conclusion is therefore that 
the IOF market is the equilibrium market when  𝛽 = 8 and 𝛿 = 10. Similarly, the IOF 
market is the equilibrium when  𝛽 > 8 and 𝛿 = 10 . Notice that when 𝛿 = 10 , the 
mixed market does not emerge. 
Proof Proposition 5: 
In an IOF market, the payoff of IOF 0 is 
𝜋0𝐼 = ∫ ∫ (𝑌(𝑣) − 𝑝0𝐼(𝑣)
min(𝛽0𝑣,
(𝛽0−𝛽1)𝑣+1
2
)
0
)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑣
1
0
  
= ∫ ∫ (𝛿 − 𝛽0
𝛽0𝑣
0
)𝑣𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑣 +
1
𝛽0+𝛽1
0
∫ ∫ (𝛿 − 𝛽0
(𝛽0−𝛽1)𝑣+1
2
0
)𝑣𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑣
1
1
𝛽0+𝛽1
  
=
(𝛿−𝛽0)(2𝛽0
3+2𝛽0
2𝛽1+3𝛽0
2+6𝛽0𝛽1−2𝛽0𝛽1
2−2𝛽1
3+3𝛽1
2−1)
12(𝛽0+𝛽1)2
.  
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We first take 𝛿 = 1 for computational convenience. The reaction function 𝛽0∗ of IOF 0 
is determined by the first order condition 𝑑𝜋0𝐼
𝑑𝛽0
= 0. The first order condition entails that 
the payoff maximizing price parameter 𝛽0∗  is determined by the implicit function 
𝑓(𝛽0
∗, 𝛽1) = 0, where  
𝑓(𝛽0
∗, 𝛽1) ≡
−4𝛽0
∗4−𝛽0
∗3(10𝛽1+1)−3𝛽0
∗2𝛽1(2𝛽1+1)+𝛽0
∗(2𝛽1
3−3𝛽1
2−1)+2𝛽1
4−𝛽1
3+𝛽1+2
12(𝛽0
∗+𝛽1)3
. 
Similarly, the payoff of IOF 1 is 
𝜋1𝐼 = ∫ ∫ (𝑌(𝑣) − 𝑝1𝐼(𝑣)
1
max(1−𝛽1𝑣,
(𝛽0−𝛽1)𝑣+1
2
)
)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑣
1
0
  
= ∫ ∫ (𝛿 − 𝛽1
1
1−𝛽1𝑣
)𝑣𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑣 +
1
𝛽0+𝛽1
0
∫ ∫ (𝛿 − 𝛽1
1
(𝛽0−𝛽1)𝑣+1
2
)𝑣𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑣.
1
1
𝛽0+𝛽1
  
Take 𝛿 = 1. The reaction function 𝛽1∗ of IOF 1 is determined the first order condition 
𝑑𝜋1𝐼
𝑑𝛽1
= 0. The first order condition entails that the payoff maximizing price parameter 
𝛽1
∗ is determined by the implicit function 𝑔(𝛽0, 𝛽1∗) = 0, where  
𝑔(𝛽0, 𝛽1
∗) ≡
−4𝛽1
∗4−𝛽1
∗3(10𝛽0+1)−3𝛽1
∗2𝛽0(2𝛽0+1)+𝛽1
∗(2𝛽0
3−3𝛽0
2−1)+2𝛽0
4−𝛽0
3+𝛽0+2
12(𝛽0+𝛽1
∗)3
. 
The Nash equilibrium in terms of the price parameters is determined by the intersection 
of the reaction functions 𝛽0∗ and 𝛽1∗. Notice that one of the solutions is 𝛽0∗ = 𝛽1∗ =
1
2
. 
We obtain the slope of the reaction function IOF 0 by taking the total derivative of 
𝑓(𝛽0
∗, 𝛽1) = 0 . The total derivative is 
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝛽0
∗ 𝑑𝛽0
∗ +
𝜕𝑓
𝜕𝛽1
𝑑𝛽1 = 0.  It results in 
𝑑𝛽0
∗
𝑑𝛽1
=
𝛽0
4+4𝛽0
3𝛽1+6𝛽0
2𝛽1
2+2𝛽0+4𝛽0𝛽1
3−3−𝛽1+𝛽1
4
2𝛽1
4+8𝛽0𝛽1
3+12𝛽0
2𝛽1
2+8𝛽0
3𝛽1+2𝛽1+3−𝛽0+2𝛽0
4 . 
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Substituting 𝛽0∗ = 𝛽1∗ =
1
2
 results in 𝑑𝛽0
∗
𝑑𝛽1
= −
3
11
< 0. Therefore the reaction function 𝛽0∗ 
has a negative slope at (1
2
, 1
2
). Symmetrically, the reaction function of IOF 1 has also a 
negative slope at (1
2
, 1
2
).  
A strategic substitute is a choice variable having a negatively sloping reaction function 
(Hendrikse, 2003, p314). This completes the proof of Proposition 5. 
Numerical examples illustrating Proposition 6 
We obtain from the proof of Proposition 5 that the two IOFs pay the same 𝛽0∗ = 𝛽1∗ =
1
2
 
when 𝛿 = 1.  The following shows the computational details of 𝛽0∗ and 𝛽1∗ for different 
values of 𝛿. 
When 𝛿 =
1
2
, the payoff of IOF 0 is 
𝜋0𝐼 = ∫ ∫ (𝑌(𝑣) − 𝑝0𝐼(𝑣)
min(𝛽0𝑣,
(𝛽0−𝛽1)𝑣+1
2
)
0
)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑣
1
0
  
= ∫ ∫ (
1
2
− 𝛽0
𝛽0𝑣
0
)𝑣𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑣 +
1
𝛽0+𝛽1
0
∫ ∫ (
1
2
− 𝛽0
(𝛽0−𝛽1)𝑣+1
2
0
)𝑣𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑣
1
1
𝛽0+𝛽1
  
=
(1−2𝛽0)(2𝛽0
3+2𝛽0
2𝛽1+3𝛽0
2+6𝛽0𝛽1−2𝛽0𝛽1
2−2𝛽1
3+3𝛽1
2−1)
24(𝛽0+𝛽1)2
.  
Maximizing the payoff of IOF 0 regarding the payment parameter 𝛽1 results in the first 
order condition: 
𝑑𝜋0𝐼
𝑑𝛽0
=
−4𝛽0
4−2𝛽0
3(5𝛽1+1)−6𝛽0
2𝛽1(𝛽1+1)+𝛽0(2𝛽1
3−6𝛽1
2−1)+2𝛽1
4−2𝛽1
3+𝛽1+1
12(𝛽0+𝛽1)3
= 0.  
Similarly, the payoff of IOF 1 is 
𝜋1𝐼 = ∫ ∫ (𝑌(𝑣) − 𝑝1𝐼(𝑣)
1
max(1−𝛽1𝑣,
(𝛽0−𝛽1)𝑣+1
2
)
)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑣
1
0
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=
(−1+2𝛽1)(2𝛽0
3+2𝛽0
2𝛽1−3𝛽0
2−6𝛽0𝛽1−2𝛽0𝛽1
2−2𝛽1
3−3𝛽1
2+1)
24(𝛽0+𝛽1)2
.  
Maximizing the payoff of IOF 1 regarding the payment parameter 𝛽1 results in the first 
order condition: 
𝑑𝜋1𝐼
𝑑𝛽1
=
2𝛽0
4+2𝛽0
3(𝛽1−1)−6𝛽0
2𝛽1(𝛽1+1)−𝛽0(10𝛽1
3+6𝛽1
2−1)−4𝛽1
4−2𝛽1
3−𝛽1+1
12(𝛽0+𝛽1)3
= 0.  
Solving the reaction functions results in 𝛽0∗ = 𝛽1∗ ≈ 0.36. 
When 𝛿 = 2, the payoff of IOF 0 is 
𝜋0𝐼 =
(2−𝛽0)(2𝛽0
3+2𝛽0
2𝛽1+3𝛽0
2+6𝛽0𝛽1−2𝛽0𝛽1
2−2𝛽1
3+3𝛽1
2−1)
12(𝛽0+𝛽1)2
.  
Maximizing the payoff of IOF 0 regarding the payment parameter 𝛽1 results in the first 
order condition: 
𝑑𝜋0𝐼
𝑑𝛽0
=
−4𝛽0
4−𝛽0
3(10𝛽1−1)−3𝛽0
2𝛽1(2𝛽1−1)+𝛽0(2𝛽1
3−3𝛽1
2−1)+2𝛽1
4+𝛽1
3+𝛽1+4
12(𝛽0+𝛽1)3
= 0.  
Similarly, the payoff of IOF 1 is 
𝜋1𝐼 = 
(−2+𝛽1)(2𝛽0
3+2𝛽0
2𝛽1−3𝛽0
2−6𝛽0𝛽1−2𝛽0𝛽1
2−2𝛽1
3−3𝛽1
2+1)
12(𝛽0+𝛽1)2
.  
Maximizing the payoff of IOF 1 regarding the payment parameter 𝛽1 results in the first 
order condition: 
𝑑𝜋1𝐼
𝑑𝛽1
=
2𝛽0
4+𝛽0
3(2𝛽1+1)−3𝛽0
2𝛽1(2𝛽1−1)−𝛽0(10𝛽1
3−3𝛽1
2−1)−4𝛽1
4+𝛽1
3−𝛽1+4
12(𝛽0+𝛽1)3
= 0.  
Solving the reaction functions results in 𝛽0∗ = 𝛽1∗ ≈ 0.87. 
Using the same method, we compute that 𝛽0(1) ≈ 1.59 when 𝛿 = 3, and 𝛽0(1) ≈ 2.53 
when 𝛿 = 4. 
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Therefore, we conclude that 𝛽0(1) increases when 𝛿 increases. 
Numerical examples illustrating Proposition 7-9 
Consider a mixed market with 𝛿 = 1.5. Coop 0 has an average price 
𝑝0𝐶 =
∫ ∫ 𝛿𝑣 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑣
𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑝0𝐶,𝑑𝑀
∗ )
0
1
0
∫ ∫  𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑣
𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑝0𝐶,𝑑𝑀
∗ )
0
1
0
=
∫ ∫ 𝛿𝑣 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑣
𝑝0𝐶
0
1−𝑝0𝐶
𝛽1
0
+∫ ∫ 𝛿𝑣 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑣
𝑝0𝐶−𝛽1𝑣+1
2
0
1
1−𝑝0𝐶
𝛽1
∫ ∫  𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑣
𝑝0𝐶
0
1−𝑝0𝐶
𝛽1
0
+∫ ∫ 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑣
𝑝0𝐶−𝛽1𝑣+1
2
0
1
1−𝑝0𝐶
𝛽1
=
−
0.5(3𝑝0𝐶−3𝑝0𝐶
2 +𝑝0𝐶
3 −2𝛽1
3−1+3𝑝0𝐶𝛽1
2+3𝛽1
2)
𝛽1(−2𝑝0𝐶+𝑝0𝐶
2 −2𝑝0𝐶𝛽1+𝛽1
2+1−2𝛽1)
.  
The payoff of IOF 1 is  
 𝜋1𝐼 = ∫ ∫ (𝛿 − 𝛽1)𝑣 𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑣
1
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑑𝑀
∗ ,𝑑1𝐼
∗ )
1
0
  
= ∫ ∫ (𝛿 − 𝛽1)𝑣 𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑣 +
1
1−𝛽1𝑣
1−𝑝0𝐶
𝛽1
0
∫ ∫ (𝛿 − 𝛽1)𝑣 𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑣
1
𝑝0𝐶−𝛽1𝑣+1
2
1
1−𝑝0𝐶
𝛽1
=
(1.5−𝛽1)
𝛽1
2 (0.33(1 − 𝑝0𝐶)
3 + 0.167(𝛽1
3 − (1 − 𝑝0𝐶)
3) + 0.25(1 − 𝑝0𝐶)(𝛽1
2 −
(1 − 𝑝0𝐶)
2)).  
IOF 1 maximizes its payoff by choosing 𝛽1such that it satisfies 
𝑑 𝜋1𝐼
𝑑𝛽1
= 0. 
Subsitution of 𝑝0𝐶 in this first order condition results in 𝑝𝑜𝐶
∗ ≈ 0.71 and 𝛽1
∗ ≈ 0.6. 
Similarly, we compute the equilibrium prices in the mixed duopoly when 𝛿 = 3 and 
𝛿 = 15.  
When 𝛿 = 3, 
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𝑝0𝐶 =
∫ ∫ 𝛿𝑣 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑣
𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑝0𝐶,𝑑𝑀
∗ )
0
1+𝑝0𝐶
𝛽1
0
∫ ∫  𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑣
𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑝0𝐶,𝑑𝑀
∗ )
0
1
1+𝑝0𝐶
𝛽1
0
=
∫ ∫ 𝛿𝑣 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑣
𝑝0𝐶
0
1−𝑝0𝐶
𝛽1
0
+∫ ∫ 𝛿𝑣 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑣
𝑝0𝐶−𝛽1𝑣+1
2
0
1+𝑝0𝐶
𝛽1
1−𝑝0𝐶
𝛽1
∫ ∫  𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑣
𝑝0𝐶
0
1−𝑝0𝐶
𝛽1
0
+∫ ∫ 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑣
𝑝0𝐶−𝛽1𝑣+1
2
0
1+𝑝0𝐶
𝛽1
1
1−𝑝0𝐶
𝛽1
=
3+𝑝0𝐶
2
2𝛽1
, i.e. 𝑝0𝐶 = √
3
2𝛽1−1
. 
 𝜋1𝐼 = ∫ ∫ (𝛿 − 𝛽1)𝑣 𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑣
1
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑑1𝐼
∗ ,𝑑𝑀
∗ ,1)
1
0
= ∫ ∫ (𝛿 − 𝛽1)𝑣 𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑣
1
1−𝛽1𝑣
1−𝑝0𝐶
𝛽1
0
+
∫ ∫ (𝛿 − 𝛽1)𝑣 𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑣
1
𝑝0𝐶−𝛽1𝑣+1
2
1+𝑝0𝐶
𝛽1
1−𝑝0𝐶
𝛽1
+ ∫ ∫ (𝛿 − 𝛽1)𝑣 𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑣
1
0
1
1+𝑝0𝐶
𝛽1
=
(3−𝛽1)(3𝛽1
2−3𝑝0𝐶
2 −1)
6𝛽1
2 .  
Substituting  𝑝0𝐶 in the first order condition 
𝑑 𝜋1𝐼
𝑑𝛽1
=
6+18𝑝0𝐶
2 −𝛽1−3𝑝0𝐶
2 𝛽1−3𝛽1
3
6𝛽1
3 = 0, results 
in 𝑝𝑜𝐶∗ ≈ 0.55 and 𝛽1∗ ≈ 1.88. 
When 𝛿 = 15,  
𝑝0𝐶 =
∫ ∫ 𝛿𝑣 𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑣
𝑚𝑖𝑛(1,𝑑𝑀
∗ )
0
1+𝑝0𝐶
𝛽1
0
∫ ∫  𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑣
𝑚𝑖𝑛(1,𝑑𝑀
∗ )
0
1+𝑝0𝐶
𝛽1
0
=
∫ ∫ 𝛿𝑣 𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑣
1
0
1−𝑝0𝐶
𝛽1
0
+∫ ∫ 𝛿𝑣 𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑣
𝑝0𝐶−𝛽1𝑣+1
2
0
1+𝑝0𝐶
𝛽1
1−𝑝0𝐶
𝛽1
∫ ∫  𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑣
1
0
1−𝑝0𝐶
𝛽1
0
+∫ ∫ 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑣
𝑝0𝐶−𝛽1𝑣+1
2
0
1+𝑝0𝐶
𝛽1
1−𝑝0𝐶
𝛽1
=
5(1+3𝑝0𝐶
2 )
2𝛽1𝑝0𝐶
 , i.e. 𝑝0𝐶 = √
5
2𝛽1−15
. 
 𝜋1𝐼 = ∫ ∫ (𝛿 − 𝛽1)𝑣 𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑣
1
𝑚𝑎𝑥(𝑑𝑀
∗ ,1)
1
1−𝑝0𝐶
𝛽1
= ∫ ∫ (𝛿 − 𝛽1)𝑣 𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑣
1
𝑝0𝐶−𝛽1𝑣+1
2
1+𝑝0𝐶
𝛽1
1−𝑝0𝐶
𝛽1
+
∫ ∫ (𝛿 − 𝛽1)𝑣 𝑑𝑑 𝑑𝑣
1
0
1
1+𝑝0𝐶
𝛽1
.  
IOF 1 maximizes its payoff by choosing 𝛽1 such that it satisfies 
𝑑 𝜋1𝐼
𝑑𝛽1
= 0. This results 
in − 1
6
𝛽1+3𝛽1𝑝0𝐶
2 −30−90𝑝0𝐶
2 +3𝛽1
3
𝛽1
3 = 0. 
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Substituting 𝑝0𝐶 in −
1
6
𝛽1+3𝛽1𝑝0𝐶
2 −30−90𝑝0𝐶
2 +3𝛽1
3
𝛽1
3 = 0 results in the price policies 𝑝𝑜𝐶∗ =
4.42 and 𝛽1∗ = 7.63. Notice that 𝑝𝑜𝐶∗ = 4.42 > 1, and the slope of 𝑣∗ =
1−𝑝0𝐶
𝛽1
is lower 
than the slope of 𝑑𝑀∗ . This implies that all farmers earn a positive payoff, and therefore
produce and deliver (Proposition 9).
Substitute back the values of 𝑝𝑜𝐶∗ and 𝛽1∗ into the separating line 𝑑𝑀∗ =
𝑝0𝐶−𝛽1𝑣+1
2
. We
find that the when 𝛿 increases, the line is flatter. It implies that when 𝛿 increases IOF 1
(Coop 0) attracts more high (low) value farmers (Proposition 7, Proposition 8).
Numerical examples illustrating Proposition 10
Compare the four cases for mixed market and Coop market (𝛿 is small, intermediate, 
large, very large).
Case 1: 0 < 𝛿 ≤ 1. Figure 8 presents the mixed market and the Coop market. 
Figure 8: Mixed market and Coop market (0 < 𝛿 ≤ 1)
The majority of the farmers located at the right side of 𝑑= ½ votes for Coop. 
First, the farmers located below the line 𝑣 =
1−𝑑
𝛽1
∗  (i.e. =
2(1−𝑑)
𝛿
 , see area a in Figure 9) 
vote Coop for enterprise 1, because they would gain nothing if it is an IOF. Second, the 
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farmers located above the line 𝑣 =
1−𝑑
𝛽1
∗  (see area b in Figure 9) also vote Coop for 
enterprise 1, because the payment for lower value farmers from a Coop (𝑝𝐶 =
𝛿
2
 ) is 
higher than from an IOF (𝑝𝐼 =
𝛿
2
𝑣). To conclude, the mixed market dominates the Coop 
market when 𝛿 ≤ 1.
Figure 9: Farmers choices (0 < 𝛿 ≤ 1)
Case 2: 𝛿 is intermediate, e.g. 𝛿 = 1.5. Figure 10 presents the mixed market and the 
Coop market. 
Figure 10: Mixed market and Coop market (𝛿 = 1.5)
The majority of the farmers located at the right side of 𝑑 =1/2 votes Coop.
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When 𝛿 = 1.5,  𝜋𝑓|𝐶𝐼 = {
0.71 − 𝑑, 0 ≤ 𝑑 ≤
1.71−0.6𝑣 
2
          
0.6𝑣 − 1 + 𝑑,
1.71−0.6𝑣 
2
< 𝑑 ≤ 1
,
𝜋𝑓|𝐶𝐶 = {
3
4
− 𝑑, 0 ≤ 𝑑 ≤
1
2
𝑑 −
1
4
,
1
2
< 𝑑 ≤ 1
.  
First, the farmers located at the right side of 𝑑𝑀
∗  (see area b in Figure 11) earn either 
0.6𝑣 − 1 + 𝑑  in an IOF or 𝑑 −
1
4
  in an Coop.  0.6𝑣 − 1 + 𝑑 − (𝑑 −
1
4
) = 0.6𝑣 −
0.75 < 0. Therefore all the farmers located at the right side of 𝑑𝑀
∗  vote Coop. Second, 
the farmers located at 
1
2
< 𝑑 < 𝑑𝑀
∗  (see area a in Figure 11) earn 0.71 − 𝑑 in the mixed 
market, or 𝑑 −
1
4
 in the Coop market. 0.71 − 𝑑 − (𝑑 −
1
4
) = 0.96 − 2𝑑 < 0. Therefore, 
the farmers located at the left side of 𝑑𝑀
∗  prefer the Coop market. To conclude, the Coop 
market dominates the mixed market when 𝛿 = 1.5.
 
Figure 11: Farmers choices (𝛿 = 1.5)
Case 3: 𝛿 is high, e.g. 𝛿 = 3. Figure 12 presents the mixed market and the Coop 
market. 
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Figure 12: Mixed market and Coop market (𝛿 = 3)
When 𝛿 = 3,  𝜋𝑓|𝐶𝐼 = {
0.55 − 𝑑, 0 ≤ 𝑑 ≤
1.55−1.88𝑣 
2
          
1.88𝑣 − 1 + 𝑑,
1.55−1.88𝑣 
2
< 𝑑 ≤ 1
, 
𝜋𝑓|𝐶𝐶 = {
3
2
− 𝑑, 0 ≤ 𝑑 ≤
1
2
𝑑 +
1
2
,
1
2
< 𝑑 ≤ 1
. 
First, the farmers located at the right side of 𝑑 = 
1
2
 (see area a in Figure 13) earn either 
1.88𝑣 − 1 + 𝑑  in an IOF or 𝑑 +
1
2
  in a Coop.  1.88𝑣 − 1 + 𝑑 − (𝑑 +
1
2
) = 1.88𝑣 −
1.5 > 0 when 𝑣 > 0.8. Otherwise the payoff in a Coop is higher. Therefore most of the 
farmers located at the right side of 
1
2
 vote Coop. Second, the farmers located at the right 
side of 𝑑𝑀
∗  and the left side of 
1
2
 (see area b in Figure 13) earn either 1.88𝑣 − 1 + 𝑑 in a 
mixed market, or 
3
2
− 𝑑  in the Coop market.  1.88𝑣 − 1 + 𝑑 − (
3
2
− 𝑑) = 1.88𝑣 +
2𝑑 − 2.5 > 0 when 𝑣 > 0.8. Therefore the farmers located at area b prefer the Coop 
market. To conclude, the majority vote determines that the Coop market dominates the 
mixed market when 𝛿 = 3.
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Figure 13: Farmers choices (𝛿 = 3)
Case 4: 𝛿 is very high, e.g. 𝛿 = 15. Figure 14 presents the mixed market and the Coop 
market. 
Figure 14: Mixed market and Coop market (𝛿 = 15)
When 𝛿 = 15,  𝜋𝑓|𝐶𝐼 = {
4.42 − 𝑑, 0 ≤ 𝑑 ≤
5.42−7.63𝑣 
2
          
7.63𝑣 − 1 + 𝑑,
5.42−7.63𝑣 
2
< 𝑑 ≤ 1
, 
𝜋𝑓|𝐶𝐶 = {
15
2
− 𝑑, 0 ≤ 𝑑 ≤
1
2
𝑑 +
13
2
,
1
2
< 𝑑 ≤ 1
. 
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First, the farmers located at the upper side of 𝑑𝑀
∗  and left side of 
1
2
 (see area a in Figure 
15) earn either 7.63𝑣 − 1 + 𝑑 in a mixed market or 
15
2
− 𝑑 in a Coop market. 7.63𝑣 −
1 + 𝑑 − (
15
2
− 𝑑) = 7.63𝑣 + 2𝑑 − 8.5 > 0  when 𝑣 >
8.5−2𝑑
7.63
  (i.e. when 𝑣 >
𝑝0𝐶
∗ −2𝑑
𝛽1
∗  ), 
the farmers choose IOF. Otherwise the payoff in a Coop is higher and the farmers choose 
Coop. Therefore most of the farmers located at the left side of 𝑑 =
1
2
 vote Coop. Second, 
the farmers located at the right side of 𝑑𝑀
∗  and the right side of 𝑑 =
1
2
 (see area b in 
Figure 15) earn either 7.63𝑣 − 1 + 𝑑  in the mixed market, or 𝑑 +
13
2
  in the Coop 
market.  7.63𝑣 − 1 + 𝑑 − (𝑑 +
13
2
) = 7.63𝑣 − 7.5 > 0  when 𝑣 > 0.98 . Therefore 
most of the farmers located at area b prefer the Coop market. To conclude, the majority 
vote determines that the Coop market dominates the mixed market when 𝛿 = 15.
Figure 15: Farmers choices (𝛿 = 15)
Moreover, we determined that the line 𝑣 =
𝑝0𝐶
∗ −2𝑑
𝛽1
∗  is always higher than 𝑑𝑀
∗  for other 
large values of 𝛿 . This implies that there are not enough farmers voting for an IOF 
governance structure in enterprise 1 no matter how high the market price is. This 
completes the proof that the Coop market dominates the mixed market.
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Chapter 4 
Table 4-9 in this appendix show the relationships between the associated factors and the 
evaluations of the cooperative.  
Table 4 shows the regression result of the associated factors regarding the evaluation of 
social influence by the CEOs. Table 5 introduces the robustness check. Comparing these 
two tables, the coefficients of each variable are the same, and the errors differ slightly. 
Therefore, this regression model is robust. 
Table 4: The associated factors regarding the evaluation of social influence by the CEOs 
The evaluation of social influence by the CEOs  Coefficients (standard errors) 
The number of general meetings -0.1 (0.08) 
Profit distribution 0.13 (0.07) 
Gender of CEOs -1.39* (0.58) 
Age of CEOs 0 (0.01) 
Education of CEOs 0.15 (0.13) 
Working Experience of CEOs 0.09 (0.17) 
Product type 0.1 (0.07) 
Economic status -0.22 (0.13) 
Membership size 0 (0) 
Constant 6.69*** (1.21) 
Note: N=91; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; coefficients are reported; standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
Table 5: The associated factors regarding the evaluation of social influence by the CEOs (with 
robustness check) 
The evaluation of social influence by the CEOs  Coefficients (robust errors) 
The number of general meetings -0.1 (0.09) 
Profit distribution 0.13 (0.07) 
Gender of CEOs -1.39* (0.42) 
Age of CEOs 0 (0.02) 
Education of CEOs 0.15 (0.13) 
Working Experience of CEOs 0.09 (0.08) 
Product type 0.1 (0.08) 
Economic status -0.22 (0.12) 
Membership size 0 (0) 
Constant 6.69*** (1.38) 
Note: N=91; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; coefficients are reported; robust errors are in 
parentheses. 
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Table 6 shows the regression result of the associated factors regarding the difference 
evaluation of social influence. Table 7 introduces the robustness check. Comparing these 
two tables, the coefficients of each variable are the same, and the errors differ slightly. 
Therefore, this regression model is robust. 
Table 6: The associated factors regarding the difference evaluation of social influence 
Difference evaluation social influence  Coefficients (standard errors) 
The number of general meetings -0.17* (0.08) 
Profit distribution 0.09 (0.07) 
Difference in gender -0.94* (0.39) 
Difference in age -0.03* (0.01) 
Difference in education 0.16 (0.12) 
Difference in experience -0.12 (0.16) 
Product type 0.16* (0.07) 
Economic status -0.18 (0.13) 
Membership size 0 (0) 
Constant -0.02 (0.49) 
Note: N=91; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; coefficients are reported; standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
Table 7: The associated factors regarding the difference evaluation of social influence (with 
robustness check) 
Difference evaluation social influence  Coefficients (robust errors) 
The number of general meetings -0.17* (0.1) 
Profit distribution 0.09 (0.07) 
Difference in gender -0.94* (0.44) 
Difference in age -0.03* (0.01) 
Difference in education 0.16 (0.13) 
Difference in experience -0.12 (0.10) 
Product type 0.16* (0.08) 
Economic status -0.18 (0.14) 
Membership size 0 (0) 
Constant -0.02 (0.52) 
Note: N=91; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; coefficients are reported; robust errors are in 
parentheses. 
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Table 8 shows the regression result of the associated factors regarding the difference 
evaluation of overall performance. Table 9 introduces the robustness check. Comparing 
these two tables, the coefficients of each variable are the same, and the errors differ 
slightly. Therefore, this regression model is robust. 
Table 8: The associated factors regarding the difference evaluation of overall performance 
Difference evaluation overall performance  Coefficients (standard errors) 
The number of general meetings -0.03 (0.07) 
Profit distribution 0 (0.06) 
Difference in gender -0.93** (0.35) 
Difference in age -0 (0.01) 
Difference in education 0.16 (0.11) 
Difference in experience -0.15 (0.15) 
Product type -0.12 (0.07) 
Economic status -0.1 (0.12) 
Membership size 0 (0) 
Constant -0.02 (0.44) 
Note: N=91; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; coefficients are reported; standard errors are in 
parentheses. 
Table 9: The associated factors regarding the difference evaluation of overall performance (with 
robustness check) 
Difference evaluation overall performance  Coefficients (robust errors) 
The number of general meetings -0.03 (0.09) 
Profit distribution 0 (0.06) 
Difference in gender -0.93** (0.36) 
Difference in age -0 (0.01) 
Difference in education 0.16 (0.11) 
Difference in experience -0.15 (0.09) 
Product type -0.12 (0.06) 
Economic status -0.1 (0.11) 
Membership size 0 (0) 
Constant -0.02 (0.46) 
Note: N=91; * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; coefficients are reported; robust errors are in 
parentheses. 
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Multicollinearity diagnostics are performed by the variance inflation factor test. The results 
are presented in Table 10-12. VIF scores for all regression models are smaller than 5, it 
entails that there is no multicollinearity.  
Table 10: VIF test with the evaluation of the social influence by the CEOs as the dependent variable 
Variable  VIF 
The number of general meetings 1.22 
Profit distribution 1.17 
Gender of CEOs 1.15 
Age of CEOs 1.18 
Education of CEOs 1.2 
Working Experience of CEOs 1.13 
Product type 1.17 
Economic status 1.12 
Membership size 1.15 
Mean VIF 1.17 
 
Table 11: VIF test with the difference of social influence evaluation as the dependent variable 
Variable  VIF 
The number of general meetings 1.22 
Profit distribution 1.2 
Difference in gender 1.12 
Difference in age 1.28 
Difference in education 1.33 
Difference in experience 1.18 
Product type 1.17 
Economic status 1.16 
Membership size 1.14 
Mean VIF 1.2 
 
Table 12: VIF test with the difference of overall evaluation as the dependent variable 
Variable  VIF 
The number of general meetings 1.22 
Profit distribution 1.2 
Difference in gender 1.12 
Difference in age 1.28 
Difference in education 1.33 
Difference in experience 1.18 
Product type 1.17 
Economic status 1.16 
Membership size 1.14 
Mean VIF 1.2 
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Moreover, Breusch Pagan test is performed for heteroscedasticity. The test of Breusch Pagan 
with dependent variable evaluation social influence of CEOs results in p=0.52. There is no 
evidence to reject null hypothesis which is homoscedasticity. Similarly, with dependent 
variable difference evaluation social influence (overall performance), the test result is 
p=0.56 (0.48). There is no evidence to reject null hypothesis. Therefore, there is no 
heteroscedasticity problem in the regression models.  
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1. A centralized cooperative internalizes the negative production externalities, and generates a 
higher vertical communication level than a decentralized cooperative.  
(this thesis) 
2. Horizontal and vertical communication levels are determined by the nature of the product, 
the innovation strategies, and the governance structure.  
(this thesis) 
3. Each farmer chooses an enterprise and its governance structure based on two dimensions: 
distance and quality. The farmers tend to choose the enterprise most close to them, and the 
high value farmers tend to choose an IOF.  
(this thesis) 
 
4. The emergence of a Coop (mixed, IOF) duopoly market structure depends on the IOF’s price 
policy. Coop (mixed, IOF) market is the equilibrium market structure when the payment for 
quality by the IOF is low (intermediate, high). Additionally, when the IOF adopts a profit 
maximizing price policy, the Coop market is always the equilibrium.  
(this thesis)  
 
5. The management and the society of members in cooperatives have different evaluations of 
their cooperatives. Members have higher scores than CEOs regarding member profitability 
and overall performance, while CEOs have a higher evaluation regarding social influence.  
(this thesis) 
6. Cooperation of individuals makes a bigger team, but not always a better team. 
 
7. Progress is made by trial and failure; the failures are generally a hundred times more 
numerous than the successes; yet they are usually left unchronicled.  
(William Ramsay) 
8. Stubbornness creates great discovery as well as blindness of advices.  
 
9. PhD: “Piled higher and deeper”.  
(PhD comics) 
10. Being able to use multi-perspective, multi-culture, multi-language skills provide ample 
opportunities for academic research. 
 
11. It isn’t what you have, or who you are, or where you are, or what you are doing that makes 
you happy or unhappy. It is what you think about.  
(Dale Carnegie) 
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Innovation, Member Sorting, and Evaluation of Agricultural Cooperatives 
This dissertation aims to extend the current understanding of the agricultural cooperatives, and it is done 
by executing three studies regarding various aspects of the cooperatives. First study investigates the 
relationship between communication, innovation, and (de)centralization in cooperatives. This study claims 
that the communication between members is related to process innovation, while the communication 
between mangers and members is related to product innovation. The adopted (de)centralization depends 
on the two types of communication costs. Second, a sorting model is developed to examine how 
members sort themselves across enterprises and which governance structures are adopted.  
A cooperative pays a uniform price to all farmers to maximize members’ revenue and retains no profits, 
whereas investor-owned firm differentiates payments based on quality. The model shows that the farmers 
tend to choose the neighboring enterprise, and the farmers with high quality products tend to choose an 
investor-owned firm. Besides, higher the quality payment, more farmers are attracted by the investor-
owned firm, and it has an impact on the market structure. Last, this dissertation provides evidence from 
China for a better understanding of the different evaluations between CEOs and members, therefore helps 
CEOs to best serve the membership of the cooperatives. The survey shows that members have higher 
scores than CEOs regarding member profitability and overall performance, while CEOs have a higher 
evaluation regarding social influence. Moreover, the associated factors that may influence the evaluations 
are explored. 
The Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM) is the Research School (Onderzoekschool) in  
the field of management of the Erasmus University Rotterdam. The founding participants of ERIM are the 
Rotterdam School of Management (RSM), and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE). ERIM was founded 
in 1999 and is officially accredited by the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (KNAW). The 
research undertaken by ERIM is focused on the management of the firm in its environment, its intra- and 
interfirm relations, and its business processes in their interdependent connections.
The objective of ERIM is to carry out first rate research in management, and to offer an advanced doctoral 
programme in Research in Management. Within ERIM, over three hundred senior researchers and PhD 
candidates are active in the different research programmes. From a variety of academic backgrounds and 
expertises, the ERIM community is united in striving for excellence and working at the forefront of creating 
new business knowledge.
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